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Matching Spatially Diversified Suppliers
with Random Demands
Zhe Liu
A fundamental challenge in operations management is to dynamically match spatially
diversified supply sources with random demand units. This dissertation tackles this chal-
lenge in two major areas: in supply chain management, a company procures from multiple,
geographically differentiated suppliers to service stochastic demands based on dynamically
evolving inventory conditions; in revenue management of ride-hailing systems, a platform
uses operational and pricing levers to match strategic drivers with random, location and
time-varying ride requests over geographically dispersed networks.
The first part of this dissertation is devoted to finding the optimal procurement and in-
ventory management strategies for a company facing two potential suppliers differentiated
by their lead times, costs and capacities. We synthesize and generalize the existing liter-
ature by addressing a general model with the simultaneous presence of (a) orders subject
to capacity limits, (b) fixed costs associated with inventory adjustments, and (c) possible
salvage opportunities that enable bilateral adjustments of the inventory, both for finite and
infinite horizon periodic review models. By identifying a novel, generalized convexity prop-
erty, termed (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity, we are able to characterize the optimal single-source
procurement strategy under the simultaneous treatment of all three complications above,
which has remained an open challenge in stochastic inventory theory literature. To our
knowledge, we recover almost all existing structural results as special cases of a unified
analysis. We then generalize our results to dual-source settings and derive optimal policies
under specific lead time restrictions. Based on these exact optimality results, we develop
various heuristics and bounds to address settings with fully general lead times.
The second part of this dissertation focuses on a ride-hailing platform’s optimal control
facing two major challenges: (a) significant demand imbalances across the network, and (b)
stochastic demand shocks at hotspot locations. Towards the first major challenge, which is
evidenced by our analysis of New York City taxi trip data, the dissertation shows how the
platform’s operational controls—including demand-side admission control and supply-side
empty car repositioning—can improve system performance significantly. Counterintuitively,
it is shown that the platform can improve the overall value through strategic rejection of
demand in locations with ample supply capacity (driver queue).
Responding to the second challenge, a demand shock of uncertain duration, we show how
the platform can resort to surge pricing and dynamic spatial matching jointly, to enhance
profits in an incentive compatible way for the drivers. Our results provide distinctive
insights on the interplay among the relevant timescales of different phenomena, including
rider patience, demand shock duration and drivers’ traffic delay to the hotspot, and their
impact on optimal platform operations.
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One of the fundamental challenges in supply chain and revenue management is the dynamic
matching of geographically dispersed supply sources and demand units.
In supply chains, production facilities or distribution centers function as the supply
sources, servicing a specific network of inventory points over time. Within the broad field
of revenue management, consider the area of ride-hailing networks, such as those run by
Uber, Lyft and Didi, with a combined revenue of $49.6 billion in the US and $53.5 billion in
China alone in 20191, here, the challenge is to match a pool of drivers, acting as suppliers
of ride capacity, with riders located at the nodes of a given geographically dispersed traffic
network.
While the above two planning areas are quite distinct, they share several key features.
First, the demand process at the demand points is stochastic. Second, the geographic
distance and associated travel time between supply and demand points is a key factor in
determining matching strategies, to be traded off with several other factors.
In the supply chain area, these travel times translate into lead times for orders placed
by the demand point(s); these lead times, in turn are a key determinant in establishing
safety stocks as proper hedges against the uncertainties, embedded in the demand process,
in particular when a high level of service is to be provided to service sensitive buyers at the
demand points.
Similarly, in ride-hailing systems, the customers (potential riders) are very delay sen-
sitive, as are the suppliers (drivers) for whom pickup times translate into lost earning
opportunities. And in both arenas, customers become ever more sensitive to time delays as
a key measure of service.
1Statista.com: https://www.statista.com/outlook/368/ride-hailing. Accessed on July 22, 2019.
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The first part of this dissertation (Chapters 1 and 2) address these problems in a context
where a company has access to multiple, geographically dispersed suppliers to procure a
single item, the demand for which is stochastic and, possibly, time-dependent. We focus
on systems with two potential suppliers (dual sourcing). Typically, one supplier charges a
lower purchase price but has a relatively large lead time, while the second supplier has a
shorter lead time but is more expensive. Besides for their lead time and price, the suppliers
may be differentiated by their capacity levels.
Some companies elect a single supplier based on aggregate cost and service consider-
ations; however, significant benefits can, often, be obtained when using the two suppliers
in parallel. This then raises the challenge of designing procurement strategies which select
when and how much to order from each as a function of the dynamically evolving inventory
information.
Chapter 2 develops a tractable planning model for this class of problems, incorporating
various practical complications and opportunities. More specifically, we study a finite hori-
zon, single product, periodic review inventory system with two supply sources and salvage
options. A challenging trade-off exists between the two sources because the expedited sup-
plier has a shorter lead time but charges a higher per-unit price, while the regular supplier
has a longer lead time but lower ordering costs. A further complication is the salvage option
that allows for bilateral inventory adjustments. All inventory adjustments involve a fixed
cost component in addition to variable costs or revenues and may be subject to capacity
limits.
In each period, we show that an optimal policy first determines the size of an order with
the expedited supplier, if any, or the size of any salvage quantity, based, exclusively, on the
regular full inventory position. Thereafter, the inventory position is adjusted upward (by the
expedited supplier order) or downward (by the salvage quantity); any order with the regular
supplier is then determined as a function of the adjusted inventory position. Moreover,
the dependence of the optimal order sizes and/or salvage quantity, on the period’s starting
inventory position follows a relatively simple structure. In the most general case, the optimal
policy is characterized by four critical threshold levels of the inventory position. As far as
the second stage ordering decision with the regular supplier is concerned, the optimal policy
2
is characterized by two threshold parameters partitioning the adjusted inventory position
line in up to three regions.
The simultaneous treatment of capacitated inventory adjustments, bilateral inventory
adjustments and fixed costs incurred for any such adjustment, is a major challenge even
within traditional single sourcing problems. Indeed, since the initiation of stochastic inven-
tory theory by Arrow et al. (1951), various structural results have been identified for various
single item models. For example, base stock policies are optimal in the base model, where
order costs are linear in the order sizes, no capacity limits prevail and inventory levels can
only be adjusted upward via procurement orders. Double threshold, so-called (s, S) policies
were shown to be optimal in broad generality when there are additional fixed order costs.
However, the simultaneous treatment of all of the above complications has remained an
open challenge.
Chapter 1 synthesizes and generalizes the existing literature by addressing a general
model with the simultaneous presence of (a) orders subject to capacity limits, (b) fixed cost
component in addition to variable costs, and (c) possible bilateral adjustment of inventories,
both for finite and infinite horizon periodic review models. We provide a full characteri-
zation of the optimal procurement strategy by showing that in each period the inventory
position line is to be partitioned into (maximally) five regions: in the most far left (right)
region, it is optimal to place an order (initiate a salvage sale) of a specific easily calculable
magnitude. In the middle region, it is optimal to avoid any inventory adjustment. Finally,
in the second region from the left (right), the policy alternates between intervals where
one stays put and those where an order is to be placed (a salvage sale is to be initiated).
We provide a broad sufficient condition under which the second region from the left (right)
vanishes. So that, in particular, the optimal policy is characterized by three regions only.
Our results are obtained by identifying a novel generalized convexity property for the
value functions, which we refer to as (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity. To our knowledge, we recover
all existing structural results as special cases of a unified analysis.
In Chapter 3, we shift our attention to ride-hailing platforms such as Uber, Lyft and
Didi that match demand (riders) with service capacity (drivers) over a geographically dis-
persed network. This matching problem is complicated by two challenges. (i) There are
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significant demand imbalances in the network. (ii) Drivers are self-interested and behave
strategically in deciding whether to join, and if so, how to reposition (route) themselves
when not transporting riders. To address these challenges, we study the value of two oper-
ational controlsdemand-side admission control and supply-side repositioning controlon the
performance of a revenue-maximizing ride-hailing platform.
Considering a fluid model of a two-location network in a game-theoretic framework,
we characterize the system equilibrium under three control regimes, ranging from minimal
control to centralized admission and repositioning control. The results contribute novel
insights on the interplay between the platform’s admission control and the drivers’ strategic
routing decisions. We also quantify the impact of control capabilities on platform revenue,
participating capacity and per-driver profits. We find that the value of control is largest at
moderate utilization and increases with demand imbalances.
Chapter 4, the last chapter of the dissertation, studies an online platform that operates
a ride-hailing network with price and delay sensitive riders and strategic drivers that supply
processing capacity. Our model jointly considers surge pricing (rider price and driver wage)
and dynamic spatial matching in the platform’s profit maximization problem, responding
to a demand shock at a hotspot with uncertain magnitude and/or duration. Surge pricing
is meant to a) moderate demand and b) incentivize supply to proactively reposition toward
the hotspot. Dynamic matching trades off non-hotspot local matches for more lucrative
hotspot matches, within service level constraints. Importantly, a surge in driver wages acts
after a delay that depends on the distance drivers need to cover until they can get matched
at the hotspot, and this heterogeneous repositioning delay may render the drivers’ future
expected benefit from the current wage surge uncertain, which affects their decisions to
react.
We obtain optimal pricing and matching policies under fixed and random shock du-
ration. Our results show the interplay between important timescales, e.g., rider patience,
demand shock duration, and drivers’ travel delay to the hotspot, and their impact on sys-
tem performance. The distinctive features of this work lie on the focus of system transient
under non-stationary demand, the network setting, and drivers’ strategic response to surge
signals given delayed incentives.
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Chapter 1
Synthesis and Generalization of Structural Results in Inventory
Management: A Generalized Convexity Property
1.1 Introduction.
The seminal papers by Arrow et al. (1951) and Dvoretzky et al. (1953) initiated the field of
stochastic inventory theory, more than 65 years ago. These authors proposed a single-item
base model with a finite planning horizon in which an order can be placed at the beginning
of each period to increase the inventory level. The base model assumes that orders of an
arbitrary, unlimited size may be placed and that the associated order costs are proportional
to the order sizes. Demands are random but independent across time. Additional costs
consist of inventory carrying and stockout or backlogging costs, assumed to be proportional
with the end-of-the-period inventory levels and backlogging sizes, respectively. In the base
model, it was shown that a so-called base-stock policy is optimal, in each period. Under
such a policy, the inventory level is increased to a “base-stock” level, whenever it is found
to be below that level; otherwise, it is optimal not to place any order. Scarf (1960) showed
that, under backlogging of stockouts, a base-stock policy continues to be optimal in the
presence of an order lead-time, except that the policy acts on a different inventory measure,
the so-called inventory position = inventory level plus all outstanding orders.
It was quickly understood that the base model needed to be generalized to address
various complications that arise in practice, for example fixed order costs or capacity limits
for individual order sizes. When fixed order costs are included to the base model, Scarf
(1960) and Iglehart (1963) showed that, under broad general conditions, an (s, S)-policy
is optimal, for finite and infinite horizon models, respectively. Under an (s, S)-policy, it is
optimal to elevate the inventory position to an order-up-to level, S, but only if the period’s
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starting inventory position is at or below a second threshold s < S (as opposed to S itself
in the absence of fixed order costs). Federgruen and Zipkin (1986a,b) showed that order
capacity limits result in the optimality of a so-called modified base-stock policy: at the
beginning of each period, an order is placed to bring the inventory position as close to the
base-stock level as is feasible.
But, what if both complications (fixed order costs and capacity limits for individual
orders) prevail simultaneously? As Federgruen and Zipkin (1986b) wrote:
“If the production costs have a fixed (as well as a variable) component, it might
be reasonable to expect that the modified (s, S) policy would be optimal: when
the inventory level falls below a critical number s, produce enough to bring total
stock up to S, or as close as possible, given the production capacity; otherwise
do not produce.”
However, Wijngaard (1972) and later on Shaoxiang and Lambrecht (1996) and Shaox-
iang (2004) identified counterexamples, both in finite and infinite horizon models. Indeed,
a more complex structure emerges.
Similarly, some authors, starting with Whisler (1967) and Constantinides and Richard
(1978), have considered settings where inventories may be adjusted downwards (as well as
upwards) via sales in secondary channels (jobbers, discounters, outlet stores, etc) or returns
to the supplier. Several authors have addressed inventory models with bilateral inventory
adjustment options, i.e., procurement orders along with salvage sales and/or returns to the
suppliers, for example Dai and Yao (2013) and Feinberg and Lewis (2005, 2007), see also
the references therein. However, to our knowledge, no one has considered settings where
the size of the inventory adjustments is subject to capacity limits, for example.
This chapter synthesizes and generalizes the existing literature with exogenously speci-
fied demands by addressing a general model with the simultaneous presence of the above-
mentioned complications, specifically,
(a) bilateral inventory adjustment options, via procurement orders and salvage sales or
returns to the supplier;
(b) fixed costs associated with procurement orders and downward inventory adjustments
(via salvage sales or returns);
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(c) capacity limits associated with upward or downward inventory adjustments.
We provide a full characterization of the optimal inventory adjustment strategy, both
for finite and infinite horizon periodic review models, by showing that in each period the
inventory position line is to be partitioned into (maximally) five regions: in the most far
left (right) region, it is optimal to place an order (initiate a salvage sale) of a specific easily
calculable magnitude. In the middle region, it is optimal to avoid any inventory adjustment.
Finally, in the second region from the left (right), the policy alternates between intervals
where one stays put and those where an order is to be placed (a salvage sale is to be
initiated) of a size specified by a given function.
Our results are obtained by identifying a novel generalized convexity property for the
value functions, which we refer to as strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity. To our knowledge,
we recover most existing structural results for models with exogenous demands as special
cases of a unified analysis. (To our knowledge, the exceptions are uncapacitated models
with non-linear order costs, of a type, different from the fixed-plus-linear structure.)
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 1.2 we review the
related literature. Section 1.3 introduces our general model and the associated notation.
Section 1.4 derives the structure of an optimal policy in a single period model. Section 1.5
covers a general finite horizon model; this Section also recovers existing structures in the
literature as special cases of our general results. Section 1.6 shows how our structural results
extend to stationary infinite horizon models, either under the discounted total cost or the
long-run average cost criterion. Section 1.8 ends the chapter with some concluding remarks.
1.2 (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity: A generalized convexity
property and review of existing literature.
The structural results obtained in this chapter are based on our identifying a new generalized
concept of convexity.
Definition 1.1 ((C1K1, C2K2)-convexity). Given constants C1 > 0,K1 ≥ 0 and C2 >
0,K2 ≥ 0, a real-valued continuous function f is called strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex if
7
for any x ≥ y, a ∈ [0, C1] and b ∈ (0, C2],
f(x+ a) +K1 ≥ f(x) + a
b
(
f(y)− f(y − b)−K2
)
. (1.1)
Denote SCC1K1,C2K2 as the set of all strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex functions. When (1.1)
is required only for x = y, we refer to the property as weak (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity.




Figure 1.1: Geometric illustration of strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex functions
Figure 1.1 provides an intuitive way of understanding the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity
property. For any two points y ≤ x, select any point x + a with a ∈ (0, C1] and any point
y − b with b ∈ (0, C2]. Raise the function value at point x+ a by K1 and draw a ray from
(x, f(x)) to (x+a, f(x+a)+K1). Similarly raise the function value at point y−b by K2 and
draw a ray from (y− b, f(y− b)+K2) to (y, f(y)). Then f is strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex
if the slope of the former ray is bigger than or equal to the slope of the latter ray.
The (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity property generalizes many convexity properties, developed
since Scarf (1960) identified K-convexity as the key structural property to establish opti-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It appears that the basic convexity property goes back to Archimedes, in his treatise “On
the sphere and cylinder” in the third century B.C.E., see also Heath (1912) and Dwilewicz
(2009). It arises as a special case of (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity with C1 = C2 = ∞ and
K1 = K2 = 0. It is, of course, well known that for basic convexity, the weak and strong
versions are equivalent: If the inequality in Table 1.1 holds for all x = y—which defines
“weak convexity”—it holds for all x ≥ y, as well. In other words, weak convexity implies
strong convexity, and vice versa.
K-convexity corresponds with the special case where C1 = C2 = ∞ and K1 ≥ 0,K2 =
0. The term was coined by Scarf (1960) to address models with fixed order costs, but
no capacity limits or salvage opportunities. Scarf (1960) used the property to show that
an (s, S)-policy is optimal under convex holding and backlogging costs. Veinott (1966)
subsequently showed this optimality result for holding and backlogging cost functions that
are quasi-convex only, but (nearly) increasing over time. See also the recent tutorial by
Feinberg (2016). Gallego and Sethi (2005) extended the K-convexity property to functions
that are defined on a general Euclidean space Rn, to address multi-product systems with
fixed order costs.
Gallego and Scheller-Wolf (2000) addressed models with fixed order costs and capacity
limits for individual orders (but no salvage opportunities). These authors introduced the
CK-convexity property, again a special case of our general structure where C2 = ∞ and
K2 = 0. Gallego and Scheller-Wolf (2000) also pioneered the above distinction between
“weak” and “strong” convexity properties.
Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004a,b) addressed a periodic review combined inventory control
and pricing model in which each period’s demand distribution may be controlled by selecting
a unit retail price from a closed price interval. The remaining assumptions are identical
to those in the Scarf model, i.e., the base inventory model with fixed order costs. Chen
and Simchi-Levi (2004a) covers the finite horizon case, while Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004b)
address the long-run average and discounted profit criterion; the models are confined to
the case where the order lead time is zero. The authors consider affine price-dependent
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demand functions, specified as:
Dn(p) = αndn(p) + βn, n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (1.2)
where dn(p) is a deterministic demand function and {αn} and {βn} are sequences of in-
dependent random variables whose distributions are independent of the chosen retail price
pn. In the finite horizon model of Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004a), the authors show that the
value functions continue to be K-convex but only in the special case of an additive demand
model, i.e., when αn = 1 for all n. This implies that an (s, S) policy continues to be optimal
in that case. However, K-convexity fails to apply in the general affine demand model (1.2).
Indeed, no (s, S) policy is necessarily optimal, contrary to a conjecture by Thomas (1974).
For the more general model, the authors identify the sym-K-convexity property and
show that the value functions satisfy this generalized K-convexity property, see Table 1.1.
On that basis, they showed that, in each period n, there are two threshold levels sn < Sn
such that no order is placed when the beginning inventory level is above Sn and the inventory
level is increased to Sn when it is found to be below sn. However, when the beginning
inventory level is between the two thresholds, it is optimal to either refrain from ordering
or to elevate the inventory level to Sn. In Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004b), the author showed
that in infinite horizon settings, with stationary parameters and distributions, an (s, S)-
policy is optimal in the general affine model (1.2), following a different approach, aligned
with that of Zheng (1991).
Returning to inventory models with exogenously specified demand variables, Chen and
Simchi-Levi (2009) addressed a model with bilateral inventory adjustments and fixed costs
for each adjustment (but no capacity limits). Their analysis is based on a further gen-
eralization of K-convexity, introduced by Ye and Duenyas (2007) which the authors refer
to as (K1,K2)-convexity. To avoid confusion, we label the property as “YD-(K1,K2)-
convexity” with YD the initials of the authors. In the special case where K1 = K2 = K,
YD-(K1,K2)-convexity reduces to sym-K-convexity. The authors show that all value func-
tions are YD-(K1,K2)-convex under minor restrictions for the time-dependence of the fixed
adjustment costs K1 and K2. Chen and Simchi-Levi (2009) follow Neave (1970) who had
addressed the same model but failed to provide a complete analysis for the case where the
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two fixed costs K1 and K2 differ from each other. Similarly, Feinberg and Lewis (2007)
employed the Y D − (K1,K2)-convexity property to analyze the infinite horizon version of
the stochastic cash balance problem.
Ye and Duenyas (2007) had introduced their YD-(K1,K2)-convexity property to ana-
lyze a capacity adjustment model, with similar results to those in Chen and Simchi-Levi
(2009). Semple (2007) introduced the “weak (K1,K2)-convexity” property as a further gen-
eralization of YD-(K1,K2)-convexity. The author showed, again under the same parameter
restrictions as in Ye and Duenyas (2007), that all value functions are weakly (K1,K2)-
convex if the terminal value function has this property; moreover, all structural results
obtained in Ye and Duenyas (2007) can be obtained under this more general convexity
property. Clearly, weak (K1,K2)-convexity is a special case of our “strong (C1K1, C2K2)-
convexity” property under the special parameter choices C1 = C2 =∞ and weakening the
definitional inequality (1.1) to hold only for y = x. Unbeknownst to Semple, Gallego and
O¨zer (2001) had, six years earlier, introduced the same “weak (K1,K2)-convexity”, under
the name C(a, b)-convexity. The authors used this property to establish optimality of a
state-dependent (s, S) policy in an inventory model with advanced demand information.
Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2012) introduced a new convexity property that includes the
strong CK-convexity property of Gallego and Scheller-Wolf (2000), Shaoxiang and Lam-
brecht (1996) and Shaoxiang (2004), and the sym-K convexity property of Chen and Simchi-
Levi (2004a) as special cases. The authors replace on the right side of inequality (1.1), the
fixed cost K, by a general function σ(K, a):
f(x+ a) + σ(K, a) ≥ f(x) + a
b
(f(y)− f(y − b) for any y ≤ x, a ∈ [0, C], b > 0.
The authors employ this property, which they refer to as σ(K, z)-convexity, to characterize
the structure of an optimal policy, when there are two possible fixed order costs, K1 < K2 ≤
2K1, with the lower fixed cost K1 applicable iff the order size is below a given threshold.
(The model is uncapacitated and inventory adjustments are in the upward direction only.)
Lu and Song (2014), subsequently, identified another variant of σ(K, z)-convexity for a
model with a convex piecewise-linear order cost function and a fixed cost. These authors
refer to their structure as strong (K, c, q)-convexity. K-approximate convexity, introduced
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in Lu et al. (2016, 2018) is a related approach, in approximate rather than exact dynamic
programming. The fundamental idea is to approximate the exact one-period cost structure
and the cost-to-go functions, respectively, with a convex function such that the maximal
approximation error is at most K, and derive bounds for the distance between the exact
and approximate value functions. See Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2012) and Lu and Song
(2014) for a review of other models with a non-linear order cost function, different from the
standard fixed-plus-linear structure.
Chapter 2 employs the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity properly to characterize the
structure of the optimal inventory adjustment strategy in a dual sourcing setting with
salvage opportunities, fixed inventory adjustment costs and capacity limits for orders and
salvage batches.
Proposition 1.1 summarizes the above relationships among the various convexity prop-
erties.
Proposition 1.1. (a) convexity ⇒ K-convexity ⇒ sym-K-convexity
⇒ YD-(K1,K2)-convexity⇒ weak (K1,K2)-convexity⇒ strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity
(b) convexity ⇒ strong K-convexity ⇒ strong CK-convexity
⇒ strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity
Lemma 1.1 establishes various preservation properties for strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex
functions.
Lemma 1.1 (Properties of SCC1K1,C2K2).
(i) If f(x) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2, then f(−x) ∈ SCC2K2,C1K1.




(iii) If f(x) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 and g(x) ∈ SCC1K′1,C2K′2, then for any α, β ≥ 0, αf(x) +
βg(x) ∈ SCC1(αK1+βK′1),C2(αK2+βK′2). As a special case, when g(x) is convex, hence
g(x) ∈ SCC10,C20, αf(x) + βg(x) ∈ SCC1(αK1),C2(αK2) for any β ≥ 0.
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(iv) If f(x) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2, then f(x−a) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 for any real number a. Moreover,
for any random variable Y with E|f(x− Y )| <∞, Ef(x− Y ) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2.
Proof. Parts (i) and (ii) are immediate.
(iii) Let h(x) = αf(x) + βg(x), for any x ≥ y, a ∈ [0, C1], b ∈ (0, C2] we have
∆ = αK1 + βK
′




h(y)− h(y − b)− αK2 − βK ′2
)
= αK1 + βK
′








K1 + f(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(








g(y)− g(y − b)−K ′2
)]
≥ 0
(iv) Using (iii) this is immediate.
1.3 Model.
We consider a single-item periodic review model with a single supplier. Extensions with
multiple suppliers are addressed in Chapter 2. At the beginning of each period, an order
may be placed with the supplier, possibly subject to a time-dependent capacity limit. In
each period, there may also be a (limited) salvage option to reduce inventory by sales to a
secondary channel (discounters, jobbers, outlet stores, etc.) or returns to the supplier. The
lead time is L periods, both for ordering and for salvaging, when available as an option. The
cost associated with any given order has a fixed and variable component; similarly, a fixed
cost is incurred when a salvage sale is initiated, along with revenues that are proportional
with the size of the salvage batch. All stockouts are backlogged. In addition to the ordering
and salvaging costs and revenues, there are standard holding and backlogging costs, assumed
to be proportional or convexly increasing with the end-of-the-period inventory levels and
backlog sizes.
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We consider a planning horizon of N ≤ ∞ periods and our objective is to minimize
the total expected discounted costs over the full planning horizon. We index the periods
backward from 1 to N . (Section 1.6 covers the long-run average cost criterion)
The sequence of events in period n is as follows: at the beginning of the period, any order
placed [salvage batch initiated] in period n + L is added to [removed from] the inventory.
Based on the inventory position (= inventory on hand – backlogs + all outstanding orders),
the firm then decides on a new order size, or a salvage quantity to be initiated, if it wants
to reduce the inventory position. Stochastic demand is then realized and satisfied with
on-hand inventory. At the end of the period, any leftover inventory is carried forward to
the next period, while any unsatisfied demand is fully backlogged.
We show below that the single inventory position measure suffices to make optimal
decisions; moreover, it is never optimal to simultaneously place an order and initiate a
salvage batch.
We now state the notation employed in our model:
Kn, Cn = fixed cost and capacity limit for an order placed in period n,
Kvn, C
v
n = fixed cost and capacity limit for any salvage quantity initiated in period n,
L = order lead time,
cn = unit price charged by the supplier in period n,
cvn = unit revenue received when salvaging inventory in period n,
α = discount factor, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The sequence of demands {Dn} represents independent random variables with general
distributions. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1.1. cn ≥ cvn, n = N, . . . , 1.
This ranking is satisfied in all practical settings and precludes it ever being optimal to
place an order and initiate a salvage batch in the same period. (Assume, to the contrary,
that in some period n, it is optimal to place an order of size qn, along with the initiation of
a salvage batch of size q¯n. Under Assumption 1.1, money is saved by reducing the order to
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(qn − q¯n) and canceling the salvage batch, if qn ≥ q¯n; alternatively, if q¯n > qn, money may
be saved by reducing the salvage batch to (q¯n − qn) and canceling the order.)
Settings without actual salvage opportunities may be represented as having such op-
portunities, however, with cvn = −M , where M denotes a sufficiently large constant. This
representation allows for a unified treatment of models with and without salvage opportu-
nities.
For n = N, . . . , 1, let
xn = the inventory position at the beginning of period n, before any inventory adjustement;
yn = the inventory position at the beginning of period n, after any inventory adjustmenet.
Inventory and backlogging related costs are assumed to depend on the end-of-period
inventory levels only, it is well known since Scarf (1960) that under full backlogging, an
equivalent representation of the controllable parts of the total expected discounted cost
over the planning horizon is obtained by charging to period n+L, the expected value of the
actual costs incurred at the end of period n. This follows from the sample path relationship
between yn, the inventory position at the beginning of period n, and the inventory level
In−L at the end of period n− L:
In−L = yn −D(L)n ,
where D
(L)
n = Dn +Dn−1 + · · ·+Dn−L is the aggregate demand in time interval [n, n−L].
For all n = N, . . . , 1, let
Ln(xn + qn) = the expected value of all inventory and backlogging related costs
at the end of period n− L discounted back to period n
and impose a standard assumption regarding these functions, satisfied for most common
cost structures.
Assumption 1.2. (i) The function Ln(·) is convex and Ln(y) = O(|y|p) for some p ≥ 1,
n = N, . . . , 1. Also, E(Dpn) <∞ for n = N, . . . , 1.
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(ii) cvn ≤ −∂
−Ln(x)
∂x for n = N, . . . , 1, where
∂−Ln(x)
∂x denotes the left derivative of the
function Ln(·).1
Assumption 1.2 (ii) ensures that, in every period n, the marginal backlogging cost is in
excess of the unit salvage value.
Beyond Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2, we need a few additional parameter restrictions.
Assumption 1.3. For n = N, . . . , 1,
Kn ≥ αKn−1, Kvn ≥ αKvn−1, (1.3)
Cn ≤ Cn−1, Cvn ≤ Cvn−1. (1.4)
The inequalities (1.3) were already recognized as essential in the base model with fixed
order costs, see Scarf (1960) and Zipkin (2000). The inequalities (1.4) indicate that capacity
limits for order and salvage quantities may not decline over time; this is typically the case
in practical applications.
To introduce the dynamic programming formulation, define the following value func-
tions:
fn(x) = the optimal expected discounted total costs in the last n periods, assuming period
n is started with an inventory position of x units;
f1n(x) = the optimal expected discounted total costs in the last n periods, assuming period
n is started with an inventory position of x units and no salvage batch is initiated;
f2n(x) = the optimal expected discounted total costs in the last n periods, assuming period
n is started with an inventory position of x units and a salvage batch is initiated.
Clearly, since, as shown, it is never optimal to place an order and to initiate a salvage
1A convex function has left and right derivatives everywhere.
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sale in the same period, we have for n = N, . . . , 1:
fn(x) = min{f1n(x), f2n(x)}, (1.5)
f1n(x) = min
xn≤yn≤xn+Cn
{Knδ(yn − xn) + cn(yn − xn) + Ln(yn) + αEfn−1(yn −Dn)}, (1.6)
f2n(x) = min
min{[xn−Cvn]+,xn}≤yn≤xn
{Kvnδ(xn − yn) + cvn(yn − xn) + Ln(yn) + αEfn−1(yn −Dn)},
(1.7)
for a given terminal value function f0(·) satisfying:
Assumption 1.4. The terminal value function f0(·) ∈ SCC0K0,Cv0Kv0 and is non-increasing
on the negative half-line.
The dynamic programming formulation exploits the fact that it is never optimal to
simultaneously place a procurement order and to initiate a salvage sale. It also utilizes
the simple state dynamics xn−1 = yn − Dn. The lower bound for yn in (1.7), i.e., yn ≥
min{[xn − Cvn]+, xn}, reflects the fact that, at least in physical inventory models, there
are no salvage opportunities when xn ≤ 0, while salvage opportunities are bounded by
min{xn, Cvn} when xn > 0. Instead of analyzing the DP (1.5)–(1.7) directly, we relax the
feasible action set in (1.7) to xn − Cvn ≤ yn ≤ xn, giving rise to the relaxed DP:
f˜n(x) = min{f˜1n(x), f˜2n(x)}, (1.8)
f˜1n(x) = min
xn≤yn≤xn+Cn
{Knδ(yn − xn) + cn(yn − xn) + Ln(yn) + αEf˜n−1(yn −Dn)}, (1.9)
f˜2n(x) = min
xn−Cvn≤yn≤xn
{Kvnδ(xn − yn) + cvn(yn − xn) + Ln(yn) + αEf˜n−1(yn −Dn)}. (1.10)
We first show that this relaxation can be adopted without affecting the optimal policies.
Theorem 1.1. For i = N, . . . , 1, let y∗i (xi) denote the optimal inventory policy in the
relaxed dynamic program (1.8)–(1.10) when the inventory position at the beginning of period
i is xi, then
(a) If xi ≤ 0, then y∗i (xi) ≥ xi, i.e., it is optimal not to salvage;
(b) If xi > 0, then y
∗
i (xi) ≥ 0, i.e., it is optimal to maintain a non-negative inventory
position.
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Proof. (a) Suppose, to the contrary, that 0 < a = xi−y∗i (xi). We show that a cost improve-
ment can be achieved on any sample path ω, by perturbing the time series {y∗i (xi), y¯j =
y∗j (xj), j = i − 1, . . . , 1} to {y¯i = xi, y¯j = y∗j (xj), j = i − 1, . . . , 1}. In other words, the
perturbation involves the cancellation of the salvage batch in period i, and reducing the
inventory adjustment in period i− 1 by a units. Note that after the inventory adjustment
in period i − 1, the remaining sample path until the end of the planning horizon, remains
unaltered. Let ∆ denote the incremental costs incurred due to the perturbation,
∆ ≤
[




+ α[Kvi−1 + amax{−ci−1,−cvi−1}]






− amax{ci−1, cvi−1} < 0 (1.11)
To justify the first inequality, note that the first term to its right denotes the cost savings
in the first period due to the cancellation of the salvage batch in period i. This cancellation
results in a saving of Kvi , the fixed cost of this batch and a reduction of the backlog size at
the end of period i, by a units, at a per-unit saving of at least ∂
−Li(0)
∂x ; on the other hand,
a loss of revenues, hence an increase in costs of acvi emerges from the canceled salvage
transaction.
The second term to the right of the first inequality in (1.11) is an upper bound for the
additional costs incurred in period i − 1; here, the decrease in the inventory adjustment
may save the fixed cost Ki−1, in case this decrease cancels an order or, at worst, it may
initiate a salvage batch in period i − 1, thus adding αKvi−1 to the total cost. In addition,
the modified inventory adjustment results in either a reduction of the variable cost ci−1 or
an additional revenue cvi−1 per unit. The total additional variable cost in period i − 1 are
therefore bounded from above by −amax{ci−1, cvi−1}.
The second inequality in (1.11) follows from Assumptions 1.2 and 1.3.




Dk(ω) ≤ 0, j = i, i− 1, . . . , 1.
Consider the following modification to the optimal policy δ∗: in period i reduce the size of
the salvage batch by b units; thereafter, stay put until the first period in which y∗j ≥ zj , if
any. Let l = max{j ≤ i − 1 : y∗j (xj) ≥ zj}, where l = 0 when this index set is empty. If
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l ≥ 1, place an order in period l for y∗j − zj units. We distinguish between two cases: (b1)
l ≥ 1 and (b2) l = 0.
Proof for case (b1): after period l, the modified policy implements the same actions as
the original policy δ∗. Let ∆ denote the incremental cost due to the policy perturbation.
By part (a) and the definition of the time period l, we have for all j = i− 1, . . . , l + 1 that
xj ≤ y∗j < zj . (1.12)
Note that the sample paths of the modified and the original policies coincide from period
l on. Thus, the cost differential ∆ arises due to cost differences in the interval [i, l] only.
Thus, let ∆ = ∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3, where
∆1 = difference in procurement and salvage costs in periods i− 1, . . . , l;
∆2 = lost revenues in period i due to the reduction of the salvage batch in that period
by b units;
∆3 = difference in backlogging and holding costs in the entire interval [i, l].
Note that, by the definition of the period index l:
ql = y
∗
l − xl = y∗l − (y∗l+1 −Dl+1) > y∗l − zl+1 +Dl+1 = y∗l − zl > 0.
Thus, the original as well as the modified policy initiate a salvage batch in period i and
place an order in period l, and the salvage batch and order size under the modified policy
are smaller than their counterparts under the original policy δ∗. Since the modified policy
avoids inventory adjustments in the intermediate periods in (i, l), it follows that ∆1 ≤ 0.
Also ∆2 = bc
v
i , while ∆3 ≤ b∂
−Li(0)
∂x , since the backlog size at end of period i is b units
smaller under the modified policy and at the end of all remaining periods j = i−1, . . . , l+1,







< 0 by Assumption 1.2.
Proof for case (b2): In this case, the modified policy reduces the salvage batch in period
i by b units and stays put for the remainder of the planning horizon, ending the planning
horizon with an inventory level z1 −D1, as opposed to an ending inventory level y∗1 −D1
under the original policy. The proof for case (b1) shows that the modified policy incurs a
lower total of procurement, salvage, holding and backlogging costs. However, in this case,
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∆ contains the additional differential f0(z1 − D1) − f0(y∗1 − D1) ≤ 0, by Assumption 1.4
and y∗1 < z1.
In view of Theorem 1.1, we proceed without loss of optimality, with the relaxed dynamic
program (1.8)–(1.10), omitting the ∼ sign on top of the value functions f˜(·), f˜1(·), f˜2(·).
1.4 The single period problem.
It follows from the dynamic programming recursions (1.8)–(1.10) that, in each period n, we
face an optimization problem of the following structure
g1(x) = min
y∈[x,x+C1]
{K1δ(y − x) + β1(y − x) + g(y)}, (1.13)
g2(x) = min
y∈[x−C2,x]
{K2δ(x− y) + β2(y − x) + g(y)}, (1.14)
g0(x) = min{g1(x), g2(x)} (1.15)
with g1(·) = f1n(·), g2(·) = f2n(·), g0(·) = fn(·), β1 = cn, β2 = cvn,K1 = Kn,K2 = Kvn, C1 =
Cn, C2 = C
v
n and g(y) = Ln(y) + αEfn−1(y −Dn).
We now analyze this single stage optimization problem (1.13)–(1.15), under the assump-
tion that the terminal cost formulation g(·) has the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity property
for specific parameter values C1,K1, C2,K2.
Define auxiliary functions
g˜1(x) = K1 + min
y∈[x,x+C1]
{β1(y − x) + g(y)}, (1.16)
g˜2(x) = K2 + min
y∈[x−C2,x]
{β2(y − x) + g(y)}, (1.17)
as counterparts of g1(x) and g2(x), under definitive inventory adjustment, i.e., definitively
incurring fixed costs for ordering or salvaging, respectively, and let Ai(x) = g˜i(x)− g(x) be
the increase in minimal cost if forced to order (for i = 1) or salvage (for i = 2).
To characterize the structure of an optimal policy, we need to define some critical points,
with the convention that the infimum (supremum) of an empty set equals +∞ (−∞).
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, s = sup{x : A2(x) ≥ 0}, s = inf{x : A2(x) < 0}.
(1.19)
These critical points play important roles in the structure of the optimal strategy. By
its definition, B is the (smallest) global minimizer of g˜1(x) if C1 = ∞, i.e., the smallest
order-up-to level for sufficiently small x if ordering is better than staying put. Similarly,
S is the (largest) global minimizer of g˜2(x) if C2 = ∞, .i.e., the biggest salvage-down-to
level for sufficiently large x if salvaging is better than staying put; b is the smallest among
all inventory levels where ordering is not better than staying put; b¯ is the largest among
all inventory levels where ordering is better than staying put; s is the largest among all
inventory levels where salvaging is not better than staying put; s is the smallest among all
inventory levels where salvaging is better than staying put.
Note that b = b¯ [s = s] if the function A1(·) [A2(·)] has a single root. We have
observed this single root property to hold in all problem instances we have encountered, see
Section 2.6. It can, however, not be guaranteed, for general (C1K1, C2K2)-convex functions,
which may have many local optima, see Figure 1.1.
The Proposition below characterizes the ranking of the critical points, which is impor-
tant when developing the optimal policy structure.
Proposition 1.2 (Critical Points). Assume β1 ≥ β2 and g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2, then
(i) −∞ ≤ b ≤ b¯ ≤ s ≤ s ≤ ∞;
(ii) −∞ ≤ b ≤ B ≤ S ≤ s ≤ ∞;
(iii) If C2 =∞ and K1 ≥ K2, then b¯ ≤ B; if C1 =∞ and K1 ≤ K2, then S ≤ s;
(iv) If C1 = ∞ and K2 = 0, then b = b¯; if C2 = ∞ and K1 = 0, then s = s. If
C1 = C2 =∞ and K1 = K2 = 0, then b = b¯ = B,S = s = s.
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In this Proposition, (i) ranks four critical points. (ii) ranks and locates the global
minimizers B and S between b and s. (iii) and (iv) lead to simple policy structures, in
certain special cases, which will be discussed later.
To prove this Proposition, we first need some auxiliary lemmas. Note that by definition
we have
g1(x) = min{g(x), g˜1(x)}, A1(x) < 0 ∀x < b, A1(x) ≥ 0 ∀x > b¯, (1.20)
g2(x) = min{g(x), g˜2(x)}, A2(x) < 0 ∀x > s, A2(x) ≥ 0 ∀x < s. (1.21)
The following lemma shows that all regions where it is optimal to order (order regions)
are to the left of all regions where it is optimal to salvage inventory (salvage regions).
Lemma 1.2 (Separation of Order/Salvage Regions). Assume β1 ≥ β2 and
g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2, then
(i) if g˜2(y) < g(y) for some y, then g(x) ≤ g˜1(x) for any x ≥ y;
(ii) if g˜1(y) < g(y) for some y, then g(x) ≤ g˜2(x) for any x ≤ y.
Proof. (i) Given g˜2(y) < g(y), by the definition of g˜2(·) we have
g˜2(y) = K2 + β2(−b) + g(y − b) < g(y) for some b ∈ (0, C2],
where b cannot take the value of 0 because K2 ≥ 0. Equivalently,
g(y)− g(y − b)−K2 > −β2b.
Hence by strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of g(·), for any x ≥ y and a ∈ [0, C1] we have
K1 + g(x+ a)− g(x) ≥ a
b
(
g(y)− g(y − b)−K2
)
≥ −β2a ≥ −β1a,
where the last inequality follows from β1 ≥ β2. Equivalently,
K1 + β1a+ g(x+ a) ≥ g(x).
As this holds for any a ∈ [0, C1], we obtain g˜1(x) ≥ g(x). It can also be verified that if
K1 > 0, we have strict inequality as g˜1(x) > g(x). Case (ii) can be proved in a similar way
and the details are omitted here.
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Intuitively, (i) shows that if salvaging is better than staying put at a given level y, then
staying put is better than ordering at or above y. In other words, ordering is never optimal
above a “salvaging” point. Similarly, (ii) shows that if ordering is better than staying put
at a given level y, then staying put is better than salvaging at or below y, i.e., salvaging is
never optimal below an “ordering” point.
The following corollary shows that if at a given level y, salvaging is strictly preferred,
it is optimal not to order for any inventory level x > y. Similarly, if at a given level y,
ordering is strictly preferred, it is optimal not to salvage for any inventory level x < y.
Corollary 1.1. Assume β1 ≥ β2 and g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2, then
(i) if g2(y) < g1(y) for some y, then g2(x) ≤ g1(x) for any x ≥ y;
(ii) if g1(y) < g2(y) for some y, then g1(x) ≤ g2(x) for any x ≤ y.
Proof. To verify (i), notice that g2(y) < g1(y) implies g˜2(y) < g(y) since g1(y) ≤ g(y)
and g2(y) = min{g(y), g˜2(y)}. By Lemma 1.2 (i), g(x) ≤ g˜1(x), which implies g2(x) ≤
g1(x) since g2(x) ≤ g(x) and g1(x) = min{g(x), g˜1(x)}. Similarly, we can prove (ii):
g1(y) < g2(y) implies g˜1(y) < g(y) since g2(y) ≤ g(y) and g1(y) = min{g(y), g˜1(y)}. By
Lemma 1.2 (ii), g(x) ≤ g˜2(x), which implies g1(x) ≤ g2(x) since g1(x) ≤ g(x) and g2(x) =
min{g(x), g˜2(x)}.
Certain monotonicities of the functions concerned play an important role in formulating
optimal policy structure, as are shown in the lemma below.
Lemma 1.3 (Monotonicity). Assume g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 and finite |b¯|, |s|, 2 then
(i) if K2 = 0, β1x+ g(x) is strictly decreasing on (−∞, b¯);
(ii) if K1 = 0, β2x+ g(x) is strictly increasing on (s,∞).
Proof. Here we prove (i) as (ii) can be shown similarly, and we prove the general case where
K2 ≥ 0 noted by the footnote. Consider x1 < x2 < b¯ with x2 − x1 ≤ C2, then there exists
2Finite |b¯| and |s| can be implied by A1(x) < 0 for some x and A2(y) < 0 for some y, respectively.
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b0 ∈ (x2, b¯) such that A1(b0) < 0 by the definition of b¯ and the continuity of A1(·). Hence
we have
g(b0) > g˜1(b0) = K1 + β1(z − b0) + g(z),
for some z ∈ (b0, b0 + C1]. Note that z cannot take the value of b0 since otherwise K1 < 0.
Equivalently,
β1b0 + g(b0) > K1 + β1z + g(z).
Then by the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of β1x+ g(x) we have







β1x2 + g(x2) < β1x1 + g(x1) +K2,
i.e., β1x+ g(x) is strictly non-K2-increasing on (−∞, b¯). Specially, if K2 = 0, β1x+ g(x) is
strictly decreasing on (−∞, b¯).
We are now ready for the proof of Proposition 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. (i) First, we show b¯ ≤ s by contradiction. Suppose b¯ > s, then
by the definition of b¯ and s in (1.18) and (1.19), respectively, and the continuity of
A1(·) and A2(·), there exist x and y such that s < x < y < b¯ for which A2(x) < 0
and A1(y) < 0, or g˜2(x) < g(x) and g˜1(y) < g(y). This contradicts Lemma 1.2 and
hence b¯ ≤ s. Next, we show b ≤ b¯ also by contradiction. Assume b > b¯, then by the
definition of b in (1.18), A1(z) < 0 for any z ∈ (b¯, b), which contradicts the definition
of b¯. Hence we have b ≤ b¯. We can prove s ≤ s in a similar way.
(ii) First, we show B ≤ S. Let
h1(y) = β1y + g(y), h2(y) = β2y + g(y) = h1(y)− (β1 − β2)y,
which are both strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex according to Lemma 1.1.(iii). Then by
(1.18) and (1.19) we have
B = inf{arg min
y




which imply that h1(x) > h1(B) for all x < B. Then for any x < B, we have
h2(x) = h1(x)− (β1 − β2)x > h1(B)− (β1 − β2)x ≥ h1(B)− (β1 − β2)B = h2(B),
where the second inequality follows from β1 ≥ β2. This implies that B ≤ S by the
definition of S.
Next, we show b ≤ B and S ≤ s. For b ≤ B, suppose on the contrary b > B, then by
(1.20) we have A1(B) < 0, hence
g(B) > g˜1(B) = K1 + min
B≤y≤B+C1
{β1y + g(y)} − β1B = K1 + g(B),
where the last equality follows from the fact that B is a global minimizer of β1y+g(y).
This contradicts K1 ≥ 0 and hence it should be b ≤ B. In a similar way we can show
S ≤ s.
(iii) We prove the case where C2 =∞ and K1 ≥ K2 by contradiction; the other case where
C1 =∞ and K1 ≤ K2 can be proved in the same way. Assuming b¯ > B, there exists
x ∈ (B, b¯) such that A1(x) < 0 by the definition of b¯ in (1.18). Then
g(x) > g˜1(x) = K1 + g(z) + β1(z − x) (1.22)
for some z ∈ (x, x+ C1]. Notice that z cannot take value of x because that results in
K1 < 0. By the definition of B in (1.18) and z > x > B, we have
g(z) + β1z ≥ g(B) + β1B,
or equivalently,
g(B)− g(z) ≤ β1(z −B). (1.23)
By strong (C1K1,∞K2)-convexity of g(·) we have























g(B) +K2 −K1 − g(z)
)





≤ K1 + g(z) + β1(z − x),
where the second inequality follows from the assumption K1 ≥ K2 and the last in-
equality follows from (1.23). This contradicts (1.22), thus we have shown b¯ ≤ B.
(iv) We first prove by contradiction the case where K2 = 0; the other case where K1 = 0
can be shown in the same way. By part (i), it suffices to show that the assumption
b < b¯ results in a contradiction. By the definition of b and b¯ in (1.18) there exist x and
y such that b ≤ x < y < b¯ and A1(x) ≥ 0, A1(y) < 0. Since K2 = 0 and x < y < b¯,
Lemma 1.3 (i) implies
β1x+ g(x) > β1y + g(y). (1.24)
By (iii) of this Lemma, b¯ ≤ B, thus, since C1 =∞ and since B is a global minimizer
of the function β1y + g(y),
g˜1(x) = K1 + β1B + g(B)− β1x, (1.25)
g˜1(y) = K1 + β1B + g(B)− β1y. (1.26)
Noticing the definition of A1(·) in Definition 1.2, A1(x) ≥ 0 and A1(y) < 0 together
with (1.24)–(1.26) yield
K1 + β1B + g(B) ≥ β1x+ g(x) > β1y + g(y) > K1 + β1B + g(B),
a clear contradiction. Hence, b = b¯.
Next, we consider the case where K1 = K2 = 0. We prove b¯ = B; the equality
S = s can be shown in the same way. First notice that b¯ ≤ B by (iii) of this Lemma.
Suppose, to the contrary, b¯ < B, then by the definition of b¯ in (1.18) there exists
x ∈ (b¯, B) that A1(x) ≥ 0, or g˜1(x) ≥ g(x) by the definition of A1(·). With K1 = 0,
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this implies that
g˜1(x) = β1B + g(B)− β1x ≥ g(x),
which contradicts the definition of B, as x < B. Hence b¯ = B.
We now proceed to the optimal single-period policy structure, in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1.2 (Single Period Optimal Policy Structure). Assume β1 ≥ β2 and g(·) ∈
SCC1K1,C2K2, then g0(x) and the corresponding minimizer y
∗(x) are characterized by Ta-
ble 1.2 and Figure 1.2, in which g˜1(·) and g˜2(·) are defined by (1.16) and (1.17), respectively.
If y∗(x) is specified as a two-element set {·, ·}, either one of the two elements may apply.
Let
B(x) = inf B(x) where B(x) = arg min
x≤y≤x+C1
{β1y + g(y)}, (1.27)
S(x) = supS(x) where S(x) = arg min
x−C2≤y≤x
{β2y + g(y)} (1.28)
denote minimizers of g˜1(x) and g˜2(x), respectively. Let b(x) = B(x)−x and s(x) = x−S(x)
denote the corresponding order and salvage quantity.
Table 1.2: Single period optimal policy structure
x (−∞, b) [b, b¯) [b¯, s] (s, s] (s,∞)
g0(x) g˜1(x) min{g˜1(x), g(x)} g(x) min{g˜2(x), g(x)} g˜2(x)
y∗(x) B(x) {B(x), x} x {S(x), x} S(x)
Proof. • x ∈ (−∞, b). x < b implies that A1(x) < 0 by (1.20), so g˜1(x) < g(x) and by
Lemma 1.2 g(x) ≤ g˜2(x). It follows that g0(x) = g1(x) = g˜1(x) and y∗(x) = B(x),
the minimizer of g˜1(x).
• x ∈ [b, b¯). By the definition of b¯ in (1.18), there exists y ∈ (x, b¯) such that A1(y) < 0,
i.e., g˜1(y) < g(y). Then g(x) ≤ g˜2(x) by Lemma 1.2. It is therefore optimal to either
place an order or to keep the inventory position unaltered. The minimizer y∗(x)










Figure 1.2: Illustration of single period optimal policy structure
• x ∈ [b¯, s]. x ≥ b¯ implies that A1(x) ≥ 0 by (1.20), so g˜1(x) ≥ g(x). Similarly x ≤ s
implies that A2(x) ≥ 0 by (1.21), so g˜2(x) ≥ g(x). Therefore g0(x) = g1(x) = g2(x) =
g(x) and y∗(x) = x.
• x ∈ (s, s]. By the definition of s in (1.19), there exists y ∈ (s, x) such that A2(y) < 0,
i.e., g˜2(y) < g(y). Then g(x) ≤ g˜1(x) by Lemma 1.2. Therefore it is optimal to either
initiate a salvage batch or stay put, and the minimizer y∗(x) equals S(x) or x.
• x ∈ (s,∞). x > s implies that A2(x) < 0 by (1.21), so g˜2(x) < g(x) and by Lemma 1.2
g(x) ≤ g˜1(x). It hence follows that g0(x) = g2(x) = g˜2(x) and y∗(x) = S(x), the
minimizer of g˜2(x).
In other words, four critical points partition the inventory position line into five regions.
In the two extreme regions, (−∞, b) and (s,∞), a positive order or salvage transaction
needs to be initiated, respectively; in the middle region, [b¯, s], it is optimal to stay put; in
the second region, [b, b¯), it is optimal to either order or to stay put, and in the fourth region,
(s, s], it is optimal to either initiate a salvage transaction or to stay put. Within the latter
two regions, it is possible that the optimal policy alternates several times between ordering
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or salvaging versus staying put, a phenomenon already discovered in simpler models without
salvage opportunities, see e.g., Shaoxiang and Lambrecht (1996) and Shaoxiang (2004).
As mentioned, if the functions A1(·) and A2(·) have a single root, b = b¯ and s = s, so
that the second and fourth region vanish. In all of our numerical experience, this single
root property prevails. In this case, the five-region policy simplifies to a three-region policy,
and Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2 simplify to the following Table 1.3 and Figure 1.3. However,
Ye and Duenyas (2007), dealing with the special case of our model with unrestricted order
sizes, identified an instance where a five-region policy emerges because the functions A1(·)
and A2(·) have multiple roots.
Table 1.3: Simplified optimal policy structure
x (−∞, b) [b, s] (s,∞)
g0(x) g˜1(x) g(x) g˜2(x)
y∗(x) B(x) x S(x)






Figure 1.3: Illustration of single period optimal policy structure
The following monotonicity properties enable further simplification when computing an
optimal policy.
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Proposition 1.3 (Monotonicity). (a) The functions B(·) and S(·) are increasing for all
n = N, . . . , 1.
(b) The optimal order-up-to level y∗(x) is increasing in x, almost everywhere, for all n =
N, . . . , 1. Lack of full monotonicity may occur in terms of downward jumps and these
may arise at the, at most finitely many, breakpoint values where the optimal policy
switches between ordering and staying put, or between staying put and salvaging.
(c) If the function g(·) is convex, b(·) is decreasing and s(·) is increasing.
Proof. (a) We prove the monotonicity of the function B(·); the proof for the function S(·)
is analogous. It suffices to show that the family of sets {B(x) : −∞ < x <∞} is increasing
in the standard partial order ≥p for subsets of a lattice, see Vives (2001) (p 23): for a pair
of sets B1,B2, B1 ≥p B2 if for any b1 ∈ B1 and b2 ∈ B2, sup(b1, b2) ∈ B1 and inf(b1, b2) ∈ B2.
Note that the feasibility intervals [x, x + C], subsets of the real line R, are increasing in
x. Since the minimand in (1.27) is independent of x, hence has decreasing differences in
(x, y), the monotonicity of the sets {B(x) : −∞ < x < ∞} follows from Theorem 2.3 (b),
in combination with Remark 10, in Vives (2001).
(b) An immediate corollary of part (a) is that y∗(·) is increasing on any interval on which
the optimal policy prescribes “ordering” or any interval on which it prescribes “staying
put”. The remaining characterization of the function y∗(·) is immediate.
(c) We prove that b(x) is decreasing in x. The monotonicity proof for s(·) is analogous.
Similar to the proof of part (a), define
Ω(x) = arg min
0≤q≤C1
{β1(x+ q) + g(x+ q)} (1.29)
and note that b(x) = inf Ω(x). Since g(·) is convex, it has increasing differences in (x, q).
Applying Theorem 2.3 (b) in Vives (2001) to a minimization problem, we get that the sets
{Ω(x) : −∞ < x <∞} are decreasing in the partial order ≥p, defined in the proof of part
(a). In particular, b(·) is decreasing as well.
Downward jumps of the function y∗(·) in a few points, may indeed occur, as exhibited
by the common Example in Shaoxiang and Lambrecht (1996) and Shaoxiang (2004): the
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order-up-to level exhibits a downward jump at x = 6. Note that this example pertains
to an infinite horizon model with stationary inputs, and hence, a fortiori, in finite horizon
models with non-stationary inputs.
In spite of the fact that the order-up-to policy y∗(·) fails to be perfectly monotone, the
structure in Proposition 1.3 may be exploited to simplify the dynamic programming calcu-
lations, no less than in models where perfect monotonicity can be shown. Assuming y∗(·) is
calculated on a grid {x1, x2, . . .}, we may exploit the fact that y∗(xi) ∈ [y∗(xi−1),∞)∪{xi}.
The convexity assumption of the function g(·) is usually satisfied in a true single-period
setting, where g(y) = L(y). Unfortunately, it often fails in multi-period settings. The
monotonicity of the function g(·) implies that every interval on which it is optimal to
order may be partitioned into two (possibly empty) subintervals: in the first subinterval, it
is optimal to order up to capacity; in the second subinterval the order quantity decreases.
Similarly, any interval in which it is optimal to salvage, may be partitioned into two (possibly
empty) subintervals: in the first subinterval, the salvage quantity increases; if this quantity
reaches the capacity level, there is a second subinterval on which the salvage quantity equals
the capacity level.
Based on Theorem 1.2 and the previous lemmas, we have the following three corollaries
that capture special cases where the optimal policy takes on simpler or more specific forms.
First, as mentioned, a setting without a salvage option corresponds with the parameter
choices β2 = −M,K2 = 0, C2 = ∞. In this case, s = ∞, and the four-region structure in
Table 1.2 reduces to three regions only. Similar simplifications due to s = ∞ arise in the
special cases discussed below.
Corollary 1.2 (No-Salvage Models). When there is no salvage option and g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,∞0,
the structure of the optimal policy in the one-period problem is displayed by the first three
columns in Table 1.2, since s =∞.
Corollary 1.3 (Uncapacitated Models). When C1 = C2 = ∞, part of the optimal policy
structure in Theorem 1.2 takes on simpler forms summarized by Table 1.4.
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Table 1.4: Special optimal policy structures when C1 = C2 =∞
(a) When K1 ≥ K2 (If K2 = 0, b = b¯ and the shaded column disappears)
x (−∞, b) [b, b¯) [b¯, s] (s, s] (s,∞)
g0(x) g˜1(x) min{g˜1(x), g(x)} g(x) min{g˜2(x), g(x)} g˜2(x)
y∗(x) B {B, x} x {S(x), x} S
(b) When K1 ≤ K2 (If K1 = 0, s = s and the shaded column disappears)
x (−∞, b) [b, b¯) [b¯, s] (s, s] (s,∞)
g0(x) g˜1(x) min{g˜1(x), g(x)} g(x) min{g˜2(x), g(x)} g˜2(x)
y∗(x) B {B(x), x} x {S, x} S
(c) When K1 = K2 = 0
x (−∞, B) [B,S] (S,∞)
y∗(x) B x S
Proof. In this case we clearly have
B(x) = inf{arg min
y≥x
{β1y + g(y)}} = B, for x ≤ B;
S(x) = inf{arg min
y≤x
{β2y + g(y)}} = S, for x ≥ S.
By Proposition 1.2 (ii), for x < b ≤ B, y∗(x) = B; for x > s ≥ S, y∗(x) = S. This verifies
the structure in the two outer regions for both K1 ≥ K2 and K1 ≤ K2. For the shaded
regions in subtable (a) and (b):
• When K1 ≥ K2, , b¯ ≤ B by Proposition 1.2 (iii), hence for any x < b¯ ≤ B, g0(x) =
g˜1(x) and y
∗(x) = B. Specially, if K2 = 0, Proposition 1.2 (iv) indicates b = b¯, and
the shaded region in Table 1.4 (a) does not exist.
• When K1 ≤ K2, S ≤ s by Proposition 1.2 (iii), hence for any x > s ≥ S, g0(x) = g˜2(x)
and y∗(x) = S. Specially, if K1 = 0, Proposition 1.2 (iv) indicates s = s, and the
shaded region in Table 1.4 (b) does not exist.
For the special case where K1 = K2 = 0, as given by subtable (c) simply follows from
Proposition 1.2 (iv).
When there are no capacity limits but a fixed cost for ordering or salvaging does exist
(as in subtables (a) and (b)), the following simplifications arise: the two outer regions have
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simple constant order-up-to and salvage-down-to levels B and S, respectively. Depending
on the relative size of K1 and K2, the second or fourth region also has a specific target
adjustment level. Finally, when either K1 or K2 is zero, the second or fourth region does
not exist. This makes the corresponding ordering or salvaging decision a simple “(s, S)”–
type policy. Furthermore, when there are no fixed costs, subtable (c) displays a three-region
structure where both ordering and salvaging decisions become “base stock”–type policies.
The characterization in Table 1.4 is similar to that in Theorem 1 in Ye and Duenyas
(2007), with additional simplifications indicated when one or both of the fixed costs are
zero, see also Semple (2007). Dai and Yao (2013) consider a continuous review variant
of this model where the demand process is given by a Brownian motion; the authors also
confine themselves to stationary models under the long-run average cost criterion, further
assuming that L = 0. For this case, they establish optimality of the following 4 threshold
policy: there exist threshold d < D < U < u, such that inventory is increased (decreased)
to D (U) when it reaches the level d (u); no inventory adjustment is made as long as the
inventory level resides in (d, u).
Corollary 1.4 (No-Fixed Costs Models). When either K1 = 0 or K2 = 0, part of the
optimal structure can be characterized with more specificity, as is shown in Table 1.5, in
which
B¯(x) = inf{ arg min
b¯≤y≤x+C1
{β1y + g(y)}, for x ≥ b¯− C1;
S(x) = sup{ arg min
x−C2≤y≤s
{β2y + g(y)}, for x ≤ s+ C2;
1+b = 1(b > b¯− C1), 1−b = 1(b < b¯− C1);
1+s = 1(s > s+ C2), 1
−
s = 1(s < s+ C2).
Proof. We first consider the case where K2 = 0; the case where K1 = 0 is symmetric and
can be shown similarly. When K2 = 0, by Lemma 1.3 (i), β1x+ g(x) is strictly decreasing
on (−∞, b¯).
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Table 1.5: Special optimal policy structures (partly) when K1 = 0 or/and K2 = 0
(a) When K2 = 0. (Structure on [b¯,∞) same as in Table 1.2)
x (−∞,min{b¯− C1, b}) [min{b¯− C1, b},max{b¯− C1, b}) [max{b¯− C1, b}, b¯)
g0(x) g˜1(x) g˜1(x) min{g˜1(x), g(x)}
y∗(x) x+ C1 {x+ C1, x}1−b + B¯(x)1+b {B¯(x), x}
(b) When K1 = 0. (Structure on (−∞, s] same as in Table 1.2)
x (s,min{s+ C2, s}] (min{s+ C2, s},max{s+ C2, s}] (max{s+ C2, s},∞)
g0(x) min{g˜2(x), g(x)} g˜2(x) g˜2(x)
y∗(x) {S(x), x} {x− C2, x}1+s + S(x)1−s x− C2
(c) When K1 = K2 = 0 and C1 <∞, C2 =∞. (Structure on [b¯,∞) same as in Table 1.2)
x (−∞, b¯− C1) [b¯− C1, b¯)
g0(x) g˜1(x) g˜1(x)
y∗(x) x+ C1 b¯
• x < min{b¯−C1, b}. x < b implies that g0(x) = g˜1(x) by the general optimal policy in
Table 1.2. Since β1y + g(y) is strictly decreasing on (−∞, b¯) and x+ C1 < b¯, clearly
y∗(x) = x+ C1.
• min{b¯− C1, b} ≤ x < max{b¯− C1, b}. It is presumed that b¯− C1 6= b since otherwise
this interval is empty and there is nothing to show. Then there are two cases to
consider:
(a) b < b¯ − C1. The interval is b ≤ x < b¯ − C1. Clearly x ∈ [b, b¯) so g0(x) =
min{g˜1(x), g(x)} by the general optimal policy in Table 1.2. By the same argu-
ment as in the previous interval, if an order is placed, it is optimal to place a full
capacity order. Therefore y∗(x) ∈ {x+ C1, x}.
(b) b > b¯−C1. The interval is b¯−C1 ≤ x < b. Again x < b implies that g0(x) = g˜1(x)
by the general optimal policy in Table 1.2. Since b¯ ≤ x + C1 and β1y + g(y) is
strictly decreasing on (−∞, b¯), y∗(x) = B¯(x).
• max{b¯−C1, b} ≤ x < b¯. Clearly x ∈ [b, b¯) so g0(x) = min{g˜1(x), g(x)} by the general
optimal policy in Table 1.2. Since b¯ ≤ x + C1 and β1y + g(y) is strictly decreasing
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on (−∞, b¯), if it is optimal to place an order then y∗(x) = B¯(x) ∈ [b¯, x + C1]. Thus,
y∗(x) ∈ {B¯(x), x}.
Next we prove the optimal policy structure given by Table 1.5 (c) under K1 = K2 = 0
and C1 <∞, C2 =∞. Notice that this is a special case of subtable (a), where we also have
K1 = 0 and C2 =∞. We only need to show b = b¯ = B¯(x),∀x ∈ [b¯−C1, b¯] so that subtable
(a) becomes subtable (c). First we show β1x+ g(x) is increasing on (b¯,∞), which directly
implies B¯(x) = b¯,∀x ∈ [b¯− C1, b¯] by the definition of B¯. To see this, it follows from (1.20)
and K1 = 0 that for any x > b¯ and y ∈ [x, x+ C1],
A1(x) ≥ 0⇒ β1y + g(y)− β1x ≥ g(x)⇔ β1x+ g(x) ≤ β1y + g(y).
Then we show b = b¯. By Lemma 1.3 (i), β1x + g(x) is strictly decreasing on (−∞, b¯).
Therefore for any x ≤ b¯− C1,
β1x+ g(x) > β1y + g(y)⇒ β1y + g(y)− β1x < g(x), ∀y ∈ (x, x+ C1]
⇒ g˜1(x) < g(x)⇒ A1(x) < 0.
This implies b ≥ b¯− C1 noticing the definition of b in (1.18). Suppose b¯− C1 ≤ b < b¯. By
the definition of b and b¯ in (1.18) there exist x and y such that b¯−C1 ≤ b ≤ x < y < b¯ and
A1(x) ≥ 0, A1(y) < 0. It is shown above that B¯(s) = b¯,∀s ∈ [b¯− C1, b¯], hence
g˜1(x) = β1b¯+ g(b¯)− β1x, g˜1(y) = β1b¯+ g(b¯)− β1y.
Therefore
A1(x) ≥ 0⇒ g˜1(x) ≥ g(x)⇒ β1b¯+ g(b¯)− β1x ≥ g(x),
A1(y) < 0⇒ g˜1(y) < g(y)⇒ β1b¯+ g(b¯)− β1y < g(y),
which imply the following obvious contradiction:
β1b¯+ g(b¯) ≥ β1x+ g(x) > β1y + g(y) > β1b¯+ g(b¯),
where the middle inequality follows from Lemma 1.3 (i) as x < y < b¯. Hence, b = b¯.
Observe that B(x) [S(x)] denotes the optimal inventory position to order up to [salvage
down to] when the period is started with an inventory position of x units and assuming
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one is committed to initiate an order [a salvage batch]. B¯(x) [S(x)] restricts the choice for
the optimal order-up-to [salvage-down-to] levels to those above [below] b¯ [s]. Corollary 1.4
shows that, when K2 = 0, the (ordering) half line (−∞, b¯) may be partitioned into three
intervals, see Table 1.5 (a): in the left most interval, it is optimal to place a maximum
size order and in the right most interval, it is optimal to place an order or to stay put
(but salvaging is suboptimal). In the middle interval, it is optimal to place an order when
b > b¯− C1; when b ≤ b¯− C1, it is optimal to either place a maximum size order (C1) or to
stay put. A similar specification may be provided for the (salvage) half line (s,+∞) when
K1 = 0, see Table 1.5 (b). When K1 = K2 = 0 and C1 <∞, C2 =∞, Table 1.5 (c) shows
that the (ordering) half line (−∞, b¯) displays a modified base-stock policy for the ordering
decision.
1.5 The multi period problem.
The (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity is preserved under the minimization operations specified by
(1.13)–(1.15). This enables us to extend the structural results, above, to general multi-
period planning horizons.
Proposition 1.4 (Preservation of strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity). Assuming β1 ≥ β2, if
g(·) is strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex, then
g1(x) = min
y∈[x,x+C′1]
{K1δ(y − x) + β1(y − x) + g(y)},
g2(x) = min
y∈[x−C′2,x]
{K2δ(x− y) + β2(y − x) + g(y)},
g0(x) = min{g1(x), g2(x)}
are also strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex for any C
′
1 ≥ C1, C ′2 ≥ C2.
We are now ready for our main result.
Theorem 1.3 (Multi Period Optimal Policy Structure). (a) Assume f0(·) ∈ SCC0K0,Cv0Kv0
and f0(x) = O(|x|p) for some integer p ≥ 1. Then fn(x) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn and fn(x) =
O(|x|p) for n = N,N − 1, . . . , 1.
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(b) In each period n = N,N − 1, . . . , 1, the optimal policy structure is as defined in The-
orem 1.2 and Proposition 1.3 (a) and (b), with g1(·) = f1n(·), g2(·) = f2n(·), g0(·) =
fn(·), β1 = cn, β2 = cvn,K1 = Kn,K2 = Kvn, C1 = Cn, C2 = Cvn and g(y) = Ln(y) +
αEfn−1(y −Dn).
Proof. (a) We prove this theorem by induction. By our assumption, the theorem holds
for n = 0. Suppose the result holds for period n − 1, i.e., fn−1(·) ∈ SCCn−1Kn−1,Cvn−1Kvn−1
and fn−1(x) = O(|x|p). We first prove that fn(x) = O(|x|p). Since fn−1(x) = O(|x|p),
there exists a constant A > 0 such that |fn−1(x)| ≤ A|x|p; so that |Efn−1(y − Dn)| ≤







EDp−ln |y|l ≤ Bmax{|y|p, 1} for some constant
B > 0. Since Ln(y) = O(|y|p) by Assumption 1.2 (i), there exists a constant C > 0 such
that |Ln(y)| ≤ C|y|p. Let y∗(x) achieve the minimum in (1.9), then |f1n(x)| ≤ Kn+ cn|y∗|+
|Ln(y∗)|+αB|y∗|p ≤ Kn + cn(|x|+Cn) +C(|x|+Cn)p +αBmax{1, (|x|+Cn)p} = O(|x|p),
thus f1n(x) = O(|x|p). By similar argument, f2n(x) and hence fn(x) are also O(|x|p).
We then approve that fn(x) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn . Since fn−1(·) ∈ SCCn−1Kn−1,Cvn−1Kvn−1 , by
Lemma 1.1 (iii), (iv) and Assumption 1.3,
αEfn−1(y −Dn) ∈ SCCn−1(αKn−1),Cvn−1(αKvn−1) ⊂ SCCnKn,CvnKvn . (1.30)
Since Ln(·) is convex, by Lemma 1.1 (iii) we have
g(y) = Ln(y) + αEfn−1(y −Dn) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn . (1.31)
It then follows from Proposition 1.4 that f1n(·), f2n(·), fn(·) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn .
(b) Immediate from Theorem 1.2 and Proposition 1.3 (a) and (b).
Pursuant to Proposition 1.3 in Section 1.4, we discussed the implications of the every-
where monotonicity property of Proposition 1.3 (a), and the almost everywhere monotonic-
ity property of Corollary 1.3 (b). The same observations pertain to the general multi-period
setting. Proposition 1.3 (c) fails to apply to the general multi-period model, since the con-
vexity assumption, there, typically fails.
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1.6 The infinite horizon model: minimizing total expected
discounted costs as well as long-run average costs.
In this section, we prove that all of our structural results carry over to stationary infi-
nite horizon models, assuming either the present value of all costs and revenues is to be
minimized, or the long-run average cost value.
In extending our results from finite horizon to infinite horizon models, we follow the
approach in Huh et al. (2011), closely; we therefore adopt much of the notation there.
A deterministic Markov policy δ is a sequence of decision rules {δ1, δ2, . . . , } such that in
period t, δt prescribes a specific feasible action to any potential state of the system. Under
a given Markov policy δ and starting state s, let φ(St, At) denote the net costs charged
in period t when St is the state of the system, and At the action (order size, salvage
batch) chosen, then. Let Jα(δ, s) = Eδ[
∑∞
t=1 α
tφ(St, At)] denote the expected infinite-
horizon present value of costs under policy δ when starting in state s. A policy δα is called
discounted cost optimal under a given discount factor α, if, simultaneously, for every starting
state s ∈ S,
Jα(δ
α, s) = inf
δ
Jα(δ, s).
The long-run average cost under a Markov policy δ and starting state s ∈ S is defined as







A stationary policy δ∗ is long-run average cost optimal if, simultaneously for all s ∈ S





We show the existence of a stationary discounted cost optimal policy, for any discount
factor α < 1, as well as the existence of a stationary long-run average cost optimal policy
and the even stronger preservation property establishing a strong relationship between the
two optimality criteria. We show that our model has the preservation property in that there
exists a stationary policy δ∗ satisfying the following properties.
(i) δ∗ is “long-run average cost optimal” stationary in the sense that






for all s ∈ S, and
(ii) δ∗ is “limit discount optimal” in the following sense: for any starting state s and any




Theorem 1.4 (Infinite Horizon Optimality). (a) (Discounted Cost Optimality) For every
0 < α < 1, there exits a sequence of finite-horizon optimal policies {δα(·)} that con-
verges point-wise to a discounted cost optimal policy δα(·) as T approaches ∞. The
discounted optimal policy δα(·) has the structure described in Theorem 1.3.
(b) (Long-Run Average Cost Optimality) There exits a stationary long-run average cost
optimal policy δ∗. Moreover, the preservation property described in (1.32) and (1.33)
holds.
Theorem 1.4 corresponds with Theorem 3.1 in Huh et al. (2011) where it is shown to hold
for any inventory management Markov Decision Process (MDP) that satisfies Assumptions 1
and 2, as well as Condition (SC) there. The authors show that under these three conditions,
the MDP satisfies the conditions in Scha¨l (1993). The framework addressed in Huh et al.
(2011) is very broad and, in some ways, more general than the broad model addressed in this
chapter: it allows for demand distributions and capacity values that are Markov modulated,
i.e., determined by an underlying world state variable which evolves according to a given
Markov chain; it also allows for combined inventory control and pricing problems, where,
as discussed in Section 1.2, in each period a price level is chosen along with an inventory
adjustment and where the price level may impact the demand distribution. However, Huh
et al. (2011) did not allow for salvage opportunities, i.e., bilateral inventory adjustments.
To ensure that Assumption 1 in Huh et al. (2011) is satisfied, we merely require the
additional Assumption:
Assumption 1.5. In the stationary infinite-horizon model, per definition, the sequence
{Dn} is assumed to be i.i.d. as a random variable D, and Cn = C for all n. Moreover,
ED < C.
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The restriction ED < C is, of course, necessary to ensure that the inventory process can
be governed in a way that it remains stable and the long-run average costs remain finite.
See Federgruen and Zipkin (1986b) for a more detailed discussion in the special case where
no salvage opportunities exist and no fixed inventory adjustment costs are incurred.
Assumption 2 in Huh et al. (2011) requires us to limit the type of expected holding and
backlogging cost functions that may be used:
Assumption 1.6. L(y) = Eh((y − Dl+1)+) + Ep((Dl+1 − y)+), where h(·) and p(·) are




z′ − z′′ ≤ h¯, p ≤
p(z′)− p(z′′)
z′ − z′′ ≤ p¯
for any pair of distinct nonnegative numbers z′ and z′′.
The holding and backlogging cost structure in Assumption 1.6 is the commonly used
structure, both in the literature and in practice. However, some models allow for h(·) and
p(·) that grow superlinearly, but are bounded by a polynomial function of a higher degree,
as in Assumption 1.2. This generalization will be discussed in Section 1.8.
To prove Theorem 1.4, it therefore suffices to be shown that Condition (SC) in Huh
et al. (2011) is satisfied. We need some additional notation. Let
X0t = the inventory level at the beginnning of period t after any inventory adjustments
initiated L periods earlier
X lt = X
0
t + inventory adjustments to take effect within the next l periods, l = 1, . . . , L− 1,
XLt = yt = X
0
t + all inventory adjustments to take effect within the next L periods.
A function g : Rn → R is a symmetrically linearly bounded above (SLBA) function if
there exist positive scalers ζ and ρ such that g(x) ≤ ζ + ρ‖x‖ with ‖x‖ the 1-norm of x.
A function g : Rn → R is a symmetrically quadratically bounded above (SQBA) function if
there exist positive scalers ζ, ρ and ξ such that g(x) ≤ ζ + ρ‖x‖+ ξ(‖x‖)2.
Condition 1.1 (Condition (SC)). Let X = (X0, X1, . . . , XL−1) be an arbitrary vector of
inventory levels in any given period. There exist constants M¯ ≥ 0 and M ≤ 0 satisfying
the following.
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(a) Let X′ = (X ′0, X ′1, . . . , X ′L−1) denote an inventory vector identical to X except for one
component, say l ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}. There exists a a real-valued function ηl(X,X′) with
the following properties.
(i) For any Markov policy δ, there exists a Markov policy δ′ such that for all N ≥ 1:
JN (δ′,X′) ≤ JN (δ,X) + ηl(X,X′),
where JN (δ,X) [JN (δ′,X′)] denotes the expected total costs over a planning hori-
zon of N periods when starting with the inventory vector X [X] and following
policy δ [δ′].
(ii) If X l ≥ M¯ and X ′l = I l − 1, then ηl(X,X′) ≤ 0.
(iii) If X l < I ′l ≤M , then ηl(X,X′) ≤ 0.
(iv) If I l = 0, then ηl(X,X′) is a SQBA function of X′l.
(b) Let XL be such that y = XL > max{M¯,XL−1} and let δ be any Markov policy. Then,
there exists an action X ′L = y′ such that XL−1 ≤ X ′L ≤ max{M¯,XL−1} and a policy
δ′ such that for any N ≥ 1,
JN (X ′L, δ′,X) ≤ JN (XL, δ,X),
where JN (XL, δ,X) [JN (X ′L, δ′,X)] denotes the expected total costs over a planning
horizon of N periods when the initial inventory vector is X and the initial inventory
position is set to XL [X ′L].
The following Lemma shows that Condition (SC) is, indeed, satisfied. Together with
Assumption 1.6 this provides the proof for Theorem 1.4.
Lemma 1.4. Condition (SC) holds under Assumptions 1.1–1.6.
As pointed out in Huh et al. (2011), the preservation property establishes that, for any
discount factor 0 < α < 1, a discounted cost optimal stationary policy exists and that this
policy inherits the structural properties established in Theorem 1.3. As far as the long-
run average cost policy δ∗ is concerned, the preservation property “however, is, in itself,
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insufficient to show that δ∗ inherits the structural properties” in Theorem 1.3. However,
the proof of the long-run average cost policy δ∗ sharing these properties can be complicated,
with similar arguments as those employed in Section 5 of Huh et al. (2011) for the inventory
models addressed there.
1.7 Easily implementable heuristics: numerical examples
The structure of the optimal policy may be too complex for implementation, in several
managerial settings. This applies, in particular, to the most general model where there
may be intervals on which the order-up-to or salvage-down-to quantity is given by general
non-linear functions {Bn(·), Sn(·)}. One recommendation is to replace these functions by a
linear (or possibly piecewise linear) function, far more easily understood and accepted.
More specifically, it is easily verified that in any period n = N, . . . , 1, values Ln < Un
exist such that y∗n(xn) = Cn for all xn < Ln, and y∗n(xn) = x − Cvn for all x > Un.
Procurement models are typically solved on a rolling-horizon basis and only the policy rule
pertaining to the first period, period N , needs to be implemented. In case the functions
{BN (·)} and {SN (·)} have nonlinear components, replace, on [LN , UN ], y∗N (·) by y˜N (·)
as follows: on any interval [x, x¯] in which the optimal policy prescribes an order [salvage
quantity], throughout, replace the curve corresponding with {y∗N (·)} by the line connecting
(x, y∗N (x)) and (x¯, y
∗




As mentioned, the second and fourth interval in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2 vanish when
the functions A1(·) and A2(·) have at most one root. In all of our numerical experience,
this is always the case, reducing the policy structure to that in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.3.
Moreover, in all of our numerical experience dealing with unimodal demand distributions,
the complexity of a nonlinearB(·) or S(·) function never arises, so that the above suggestions
for a simplified policy structure never applied, because the structure of the exact optimal
policy {y∗n(·)} is already of the desired, simple (piecewise linear) form. The possibility of
nonlinear B(·) functions was exemplified by Gallego and Scheller-Wolf (2000) dealing with
the special case of our model, where salvaging is not an option. The authors identified
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one such instance by entertaining an artificial demand distribution with {1, 6, 7} as its
three-point support such that P[D = 1] = P[D = 7] = 0.15 and P[D = 6] = 0.7.
We illustrate our results with a set of 13 instances obtained by the systematic variation
of 7 key parameters in the model. All instances use stationary data and demand distri-
butions. All demand distributions are Normals truncated at zero. The 13 instances share
the parameters h = 1,ED = 5,Kv = 2, Cv = 10, cv = 1.3. The remaining parameters are
specified in Table 1.6.
Table 1.6: Parameter setting for numerical studies
Scenario K C c α l p σ
base case 2 10 3 1 2 5 2
high fixed ordering cost 10 10 3 1 2 5 2
low fixed ordering cost 0 10 3 1 2 5 2
large order capacity 2 20 3 1 2 5 2
small order capacity 2 2 3 1 2 5 2
high unit ordering cost 2 10 20 1 2 5 2
low unit ordering cost 2 10 1.5 1 2 5 2
small α 2 10 3 0.7 2 5 2
long lead time 2 10 3 1 5 5 2
zero lead time 2 10 3 1 0 5 2
high service level 2 10 3 1 2 49 2
volatile demand 2 10 3 1 2 5 5
stable demand 2 10 3 1 2 5 0.5
The base case example is illustrated by Figure 1.4, in which we display the function
y∗N (·) on the left panel and the value functions fN (·), f1N (·) and f2N (·) on the right panel.
For x < 9, it optimal to place a maximum size order; for 9 ≤ x < 16, it is optimal to order
up to the level 19. For 16 ≤ x ≤ 32 it is optimal to stay put, and for 32 < x < 38, it
is optimal to salvage down to the level 28. Finally for x ≥ 38 it is optimal to initiate a
maximum salvage quantity. Parallel figures for the remaining 12 instances are contained
in the online appendix. Note that y∗N (·) is piecewise linear in all instances so that the
suggested policy simplifications do not need to be undertaken.
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Figure 1.4: A numerical example of optimal policy and value functions
1.8 Concluding remarks.
This chapter analyzes a general periodic review inventory planning model that allows for
the simultaneous treatment of three prevalent complicating factors: (a) bilateral inventory
adjustments, (b) capacity limits for such adjustments, and (c) fixed costs for any such
adjustments. Prior literature has addressed only subsets of these complications. We char-
acterize the structure of an optimal policy, both for finite and infinite horizon models. We
also show that earlier structural results can be obtained as corollaries of our general theory.
The analyses are enabled by the identification of a new convexity property that generalizes
all existing ones, as in Table 1.1.
It is of interest to generalize our results further. Specific directions include combined
inventory control and pricing models, i.e., allowing the demand distribution to be endoge-
nously controlled, for example by the dynamic selection of a price level. This would gen-
eralize the work of Federgruen and Heching (1999) and Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004a,b)
which fail to allow for inventory reductions or capacity limits.
We are also confident that some of the technical restrictions can be relaxed, for ex-
ample Assumption 1.6. Assumption 1.2 ensures that the Ln(·) functions are polynomially
bounded. It should be possible to eliminate Assumption 1.6 by generalizing Condition (SC)
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Dual Sourcing under Capacity Limits, Fixed Costs and Salvage
Opportunities
2.1 Introduction and Summary
Manufacturing companies and retail chains often have access to two alternative supply
sources for component parts, product modules, finished goods or supply materials. One
source is typically low cost but has long lead times, whereas the other provides quicker
response but at a higher price. When designing its procurement process, the purchaser
may select one of the two sources as its exclusive supplier. Alternatively, it may opt for a
dual sourcing strategy which procures from both sources. In the latter case, the challenge
is to determine how and when each of the sources is to be used, as a function of the
dynamically evolving inventory information. We address this question within a general
model that incorporates economies of scale with respect to the order costs, capacity limits
for individual orders and opportunities to reduce inventory via salvage sales.
The above strategic dilemmas arise, first and foremost, when firms decide on offshoring
vs onshoring options. In the past few decades, there has been a consistent trend to offshore.
However, the trend has recently been reversed, as companies have come to realize that, along
with other sourcing considerations, price savings associated with offshore options need to
be traded off against increased inventory costs and stockout risks due to the larger lead
times involved. Longer lead times translate into a need for larger safety stocks, under a
given targeted service level, or inferior service levels under given inventory investments. In
contrast, onshore procurement from a local or nearby market is fast but typically incurs a
higher purchase price or manufacturing cost.
Moreover, many companies have come to realize that a hybrid approach employing two
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or more suppliers, simultaneously, is, frequently, considerably more effective than one which
relies on a single supplier, see e.g. Scheller-Wolf et al. (2007).
Within the operations management community, several authors have reported on spe-
cific company settings where dual sourcing is employed. These include Beyer and Ward
(2002) reporting on Hewlett-Packard’s strategy for manufacturing servers and Rao et al.
(2000) on Caterpillar’s for compact worktools sold in the North American market. Allon
and Van Mieghem (2010a) report on a $10 billion high-tech US manufacturer of wire-
less transmission components with two assembly plants, one in China and one in Mexico.
The authors identify a heuristic dual sourcing strategy, which, in their application, saves
up to 20% over the best single sourcing strategy. Based on this application, Allon and
Van Mieghem (2010b) developed a teaching game, see also Van Mieghem and Allon (2015).
The study of periodic review, dual sourcing inventory models starts with four papers
in the early sixties, assuming independent demands, full backlogging of stockouts, and two
suppliers with different lead times and different per-unit procurement prices. Other than
linear order costs, there are holding and backlogging costs assumed to be convex in the
end-of-the-period inventory and backlog levels, respectively.
Fukuda (1964) showed that a dual base stock policy, which acts on a single inventory
measure, is optimal in this model, as long as the lead time of the slower supplier is exactly
one period longer than that of the expedited supplier. (We refer to this as the consecutive
lead time case). Under this policy, one starts by determining the size of the order to
be placed with the expedited supplier, if any. This order is determined by a base-stock
(order-up-to) policy acting on the (full) inventory position = the inventory level plus all
outstanding orders. After the order with the expedited supplier is added to this inventory
position measure, a second base-stock policy is applied to determine the order size with the
slower supplier (if any).
Under arbitrary lead times, Whittemore and Saunders (1977) showed that no procure-
ment strategy, acting on a single or even two inventory measures (so-called indices) needs
to be optimal. As a consequence, many heuristic policies were proposed, mostly in the past
decade, to handle the general lead time case. See Sun and Van Mieghem (2017) for a recent
survey.
48
However, to our knowledge, little progress was made to include important generalizations
and complicating factors that arise in practice and have become part of standard single
sourcing inventory models, by themselves or in various combinations; in particular:
(a) fixed order costs and (b) capacity limits associated with the orders with the two sup-
pliers.
An additional generalization is
(c) the ability to decrease the inventory level by salvaging a given quantity through sales
in a secondary channel (jobbers, discounters, outlet stores, etc.).
In view of the Whittemore and Saunders (1977) result, we, initially, confine ourselves
to the consecutive lead time case. We must also assume that, when applicable, the lead
time for a salvage transaction equals the order lead time of one of the two suppliers. This
is a natural assumption when salvaging involves returning items to this supplier; in other
settings, however, the lead time assumptions may be restrictive. Section 2.5 therefore
discusses effective heuristics for general lead time combinations.
We show that a single index policy continues to be optimal for this very general model
that incorporates the three complications (a)–(c), simultaneously. (The remaining model
assumptions are standard and identical to those employed in the above-mentioned literature
on dual sourcing models.) In each period, one first determines the size of an order with
the expedited supplier, if any, or the size of any salvage quantity, based, exclusively, on the
regular full inventory position. Thereafter, the inventory position is adjusted upward (by
the expedited supplier order) or downward (by the salvage quantity); any order with the
regular supplier is then determined as a function of the adjusted inventory position.
Moreover, under some parameter restrictions, the dependence of the optimal order sizes
and/or salvage quantity on the period’s starting inventory position follows a relatively
simple structure. In the most general case, the optimal policy is characterized by four
critical threshold levels of the inventory position: be ≤ b¯e ≤ se ≤ se partitioning the
inventory position line into 5 consecutive regions. In the middle range [b¯e, se], it is optimal
to forgo both an order with the expedited supplier, as well as any salvage activity. In the
far-left (-right) region (−∞, be) [(se,∞)], it is optimal to place an order with the expedited
supplier [to initiate a salvage sale], the size of which varies as a non-linear function of the
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inventory position. This leaves us with the remaining pair of intervals [be, b¯e) and (se, se].
In the former, one alternates between sub-intervals with a positive order and those where
it is optimal to stay put; however, salvaging is not to be considered in this interval [be, b¯e).
Similarly, one alternates on (se, se] between sub-intervals where it is optimal to stay put
and those where it is optimal to initiate a salvage batch; however, ordering does not need
to be considered. We identify a simple condition under which the second and fourth regions
vanish, giving rise to an even simpler three-region policy.
As far as the second stage ordering decision with the regular supplier is concerned, the
optimal policy is characterized by two threshold parameters, br, b¯r partitioning the adjusted
inventory position line in up to three regions. The structure of the optimal strategy within























Note. The solid line is the 45° line through the origin, shifted by the capacities C and Cv to
obtain the dotted lines.
Figure 2.1: General optimal policy structure
Even simpler and more pronounced structures arise in various special cases; where only
a subset of the complications (a)–(c) prevails, or where some model parameters take on a
specific value, for example, when either orders or salvage sales can be initiated without a
fixed cost.
For general lead time combinations, we propose and evaluate effective heuristics; see
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Section 2.5. We also conduct various numerical studies to illustrate and evaluate these
heuristics, and to draw managerial insights.
Here are some of the key managerial insights: The benefits of dual sourcing may be in
excess of 10%, and even as large as 30%. They increase as the lead time, and hence the
relative value of the expedited supplier, increases. These savings are achieved even though
the expedited supplier is used infrequently and for a small part of the total purchase volume.
The benefits are larger in capacitated versus uncapacitated systems, and in systems in which
the fixed procurement costs are relatively low. These findings explain the current trend to
complement offshore production factories with onshore smaller “SpeedFactories”, see Boute
et al. (2019). Finally, the benefits of dual sourcing increase as a higher service level [demand
volatility] is targeted [experienced].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we give a review of
the literature on multi-sourcing procurement strategies. Section 2.3 shows, under the above
lead time restrictions, how the general dual sourcing problem can be reduced to a tractable
single sourcing problem. In Section 2.4, we derive under some parameter restrictions, the
structure of the optimal dual sourcing policy both in the most general and in various
special cases. Based on these structural results, we develop, in Section 2.5, our proposed
heuristics for general lead time combinations. Numerical studies in Section 2.6 review
various managerial insights. Section 2.7 contains concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature Review
In this section, we review the literature on dual sourcing stochastic inventory models. As
mentioned in the Introduction, the 60-year-old literature has mostly focused on a base
periodic review model with independent demands, full backlogging of stockouts, linear order,
holding and backlogging costs, and two potential uncapacitated suppliers, differentiated by
their per-unit procurement price and lead times. This workhorse model may be viewed as
the direct extension of the seminal single source model by Arrow et al. (1951).
Three papers in the early sixties, i.e., Barankin (1961), Daniel (1963) and Neuts (1964)
focused on the special case where the lead time of the expedited supplier is negligible (or
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zero), and that of the regular supplier exactly one period. Here, the optimal strategy
employs two base-stock levels: first, the period’s starting inventory level—including last
period’s regular order—is used by a simple base-stock policy to determine whether an order
is to be placed with the expedited supplier. Thereafter, a second base-stock policy is used
to determine the order with the regular supplier, if any, comparing the adjusted inventory
level (inventory level plus the new order with the expedited supplier) with a second base-
stock level. Fukuda (1964) extended this result to the case where the lead time of the
regular supplier is arbitrary and that of the expedited supplier one period shorter. The
same structural result continues to apply, except that the base-stock policies act on the
period’s starting inventory position, as opposed to the inventory level.
Whittemore and Saunders (1977) showed that no simple structure prevails for the gen-
eral case with non-consecutive lead times, i.e., lead times that differ by more than a single
period. In particular, the optimal policy needs to be based on more than one, or even any
constant number of inventory measures, or indices.
With this negative insight, the development of dual sourcing models was interrupted for
some 30 years. In the last decade, we have seen a plethora of papers suggesting and compar-
ing heuristic policies for the infinite horizon, stationary base model with general lead times.
This literature stream started with Veeraraghavan and Scheller-Wolf (2008) proposing the
use of dual index base-stock polices. Here, the first stage order to the expedited supplier
is determined by a base-stock policy acting on the so-called expedited inventory position,
consisting of the inventory level plus all outstanding orders to arrive within the expedited
supplier’s lead time from the current period. The second stage order with the regular sup-
plier is determined by a second base-stock policy acting on the full inventory position, the
current period’s order with the expedited supplier included. These authors compared the
cost performance of the best policy within their proposed class, with the overall optimal
policy. To this end, they conducted a numerical study assuming the demand distribution
has support on a few values only., so that the set of possible inventory levels can be limited
and the optimal policy can be found via dynamic programming, at least for small lead time
values. The authors report that their proposed dual index policy, in the majority of cases,
comes within 1% or 2% of optimality.
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The authors also consider capacity limits for the two suppliers. In this case, base stock
policies need to be replaced by “modified base-stock policies”, where an order is placed to
bring the relative inventory index as close as possible to the base-stock level. In the single
sourcing literature, such policies were shown to be optimal, see e.g. Federgruen and Zipkin
(1986a,b).
Scheller-Wolf et al. (2007) show that a single-index base-stock policy performs compara-
bly or even better than the dual index base-stock policy in Veeraraghavan and Scheller-Wolf
(2008). Under a single index base-stock policy, the order with the expedited supplier is de-
termined by a base-stock policy acting on the full inventory position, which includes all
outstanding orders, rather than the more limited “expedited” inventory position in Veer-
araghavan and Scheller-Wolf (2008). In Scheller-Wolf et al. (2007)’s numerical study, the
average difference between the cost values of the two heuristics is less than 0.5% and the
maximum difference no more than 3%. While the cost performance is almost identical be-
tween the two heuristics, the authors point at several major advantages of the single index
heuristic, including the fact that it is simpler and that the optimal base-stock levels can be
computed analytically, at “25–60 times faster” computational times.
Sheopuri et al. (2010) develop six alternative heuristic polices, some of considerably
more complex structure (for example, the vector-based base-stock policy and the “best
weighted” index policy). Their numerical study shows that each of the heuristics has an
average cost performance that comes within 1% of that of the dual index base-stock policy,
and hence of the single index base-stock policy, as well. These authors also show that the
single source lost-sales model can be viewed as a special case as the dual source model with
backlogging. Several of the structural properties identified by Zipkin (2008a) for the lost
sales model can therefore be generalized in the study of dual sourcing problems. In the
same spirit as Sheopuri et al. (2010), Hua et al. (2015) developed another class of heuristic
policies, again with comparable cost performance, in their numerical study.
Allon and Van Mieghem (2010a) proposed a Tailored Based-Surge (TBS) heuristic in
which a constant size order is placed with the regular supplier and a base-stock policy is
used for the expedited supplier. Janakiraman et al. (2015) analyzed this class of policies,
deriving optimality gap bounds when the demands consist of a regular base demand plus
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an infrequent surge demand. In a numerical study, similar to that in Veeraraghavan and
Scheller-Wolf (2008), they observed that the optimality gap of the best TBS policy varies
between 21% and 3.5%. Xin and Goldberg (2017) showed that a TBS policy is asymptot-
ically optimal when the lead time difference goes to infinity. Xin et al. (2017) extend the
results to a setting where the expedited supplier is unreliable, i.e., in any period the supplier
is with a given probability unable to fill any order. The authors evaluate the performance
of the TBS heuristic based on Walmart data. As mentioned in the Introduction, Allon and
Van Mieghem (2010b) developed the Mexico-China teaching game, based on the industrial
application which motivated their parallel paper. See also Chapter 7 in the prominent text-
book on Operations Strategy by Van Mieghem and Allon (2015) for a treatment of the dual
sourcing problem.
Sun and Van Mieghem (2017) developed a robust optimization approach for the base
dual sourcing problem. Under this approach, the problem can be formulated as a math-
ematical program, avoiding the curse of dimensionality associated with standard dynamic
programming formulations that aim at optimizing aggregate expected costs.
Very few papers address generalizations of the base model. A noted exception is Sethi
et al. (2003) who incorporates fixed order costs into the model with the one period lead time
difference. They show that, in each period, the order for the expedited supplier and that for
the regular supplier are to be determined sequentially, both on the basis of an (s, S)-policy
acting on the regular inventory position. We retrieve this result as one of the special cases
in our general model. Fox et al. (2006) also allow for fixed order costs but assume zero lead
time for the both suppliers. It is easily seen that this model reduces to a single sourcing
problem with a piecewise linear concave order cost. Boute and Van Mieghem (2015) add
capacity costs and order smoothing considerations into the base model.
A few papers have addressed dual sourcing problems in continuous review models. Moin-
zadeh and Schmidt (1991) and Song and Zipkin (2009) assumed demands are generated by
a Poisson process and a dual-index base-stock policy is applied. The former paper assumes
the lead times are deterministic while the latter allows for stochastic but exogenous lead
times. Moinzadeh and Schmidt (1991) characterize the steady-state inventory level distri-
bution and hence the long-run average cost for any (dual-index) base-stock policy. Song and
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Zipkin (2009) models the system as a queueing network with overflow by-passes and obtain
the steady-state distribution of the network in product form. Very recently, Zhou and Yang
(2016) extended their work by allowing for compound Poisson demands and fixed order
costs. These authors propose, as heuristic, a single index pair of (R,nQ)-policies. At each
demand epoch, one places an order with the expedited supplier iff the full inventory position
is below a reorder level Re; the order is sized as the smallest multiple of an order size Qe
which elevates the inventory position above Re. With this order added to the inventory
position, any order with the regular supplier is determined by a different (Rr, nQr)-policy.
All of the above continuous review papers make an upfront restriction to a specific
class of heuristic policies. However, the recent paper by Song et al. (2017), characterizes
the optimal policies in a setting with linear costs but endogenously determined stochastic
lead times, under a certain condition, and propose near-optimal heuristic policies when the
condition fails.
2.3 Dual Sourcing: Equivalency with a Single Sourcing
Model
We consider a single-item periodic review inventory system with two potential suppliers: a
regular and an expedited supplier. In each period, there may also be a salvage option to
reduce inventory, generating a given per-unit revenue or cost. The lead time for ordering
from the expedited supplier [regular supplier, salvaging] is le [lr, ls]. In the base model
we focus on the case where lr = le + 1 and ls = le.
1 (The condition ls = le applies
when both expedited orders and salvage transactions occur in negligible time, or when
salvaging involves returns to the supplier.) As explained in the Introduction, optimal order
and salvaging policies, that act on a single inventory measure each, can only be expected
under these lead time restrictions. Moreover, the structural results obtained for this special
case suggest effective heuristic adaptations under general lead time combinations. See
Section 2.5.
1The only other tractable case has ls = lr, using a similar analysis. Janakiraman and Seshadri (2017)
address this specific case, in a model without fixed cost or capacity limits and cvn = 0.
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We index the periods backward from 1 to N . The sequence of events in period n is
as follows: At the beginning of period n, an order may arrive from the expedited or the
regular supplier, or both. Such deliveries are added to the inventory level. The firm now
decides on new order sizes to be placed with each of the two suppliers as well as any salvage
quantity if it wants to reduce its inventory position. Stochastic demand is then realized and
satisfied with on-hand inventory. At the end of the period, any unsatisfied demand is fully
backlogged while leftover inventory is carried over to the next period. It is easily verified
that it is never optimal to simultaneously place an order with the expedited supplier and to
sell off a batch of inventory, since both inventory adjustments take effect in the very same
period.




n = fixed cost for any expeditied and regular order, respecitively.
Cen, C
r
n = capacity limit for any expeditied and regular order, respectively.
cen, c
r
n = unit price charged by the expedited and regular suppliers, respectively.







n = fixed cost, unit cost and capacity limit, respectively, when salvaging inventory.
Dn = stochastic demand.
α = discount factor, α ∈ [0, 1].
(Often, cvn < 0, reflecting salvage revenues.)
Assume {Dn, 1 ≤ n ≤ N} are independent random variables with general distributions.
Inventory and backlogging related costs will be introduced below. We impose the following
restrictions on the cost parameters. These restrictions are innocuous and merely preclude
arbitrage opportunities.
Assumption 2.1. For any period n, the unit order costs, the unit salvage revenue and
backlogging cost satisfy the restrictions: (i) cen ≥ cvn, and (ii) crn ≥ αcvn−1.
Assumption 2.1 (i) precludes the possibility of arbitrage opportunities where goods are
procured from the expedited supplier, to be sold at a premium via the salvage channel.
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Similarly, Assumption 2.1 (ii) precludes the possibility of buying units form the regular
supplier and initiating the sell-off of these units, at a profit, one period later.
The state and action variables, in period n, are given by:
xn = the inventory position at the beginning of period n
= the beginning inventory level, i.e., on-hand inventory minus backlogs, plus all
outstanding orders from both suppliers, exclusive of the current orders.
qen = the size of the expedited-channel inventory adjustment in period n.
qrn = the size of the order placed with the regular supplier in period n.
Note that qrn ≥ 0 while −∞ < qen <∞. qen ≥ 0 [qen < 0] represents the size of the expedited
order [salvage batch] initiated in period n.
Our ability to aggregate the order with the expedited supplier, with the amount to be
salvaged (a common lead time later), follows, by Assumption 2.1 (i), from the fact that
it is never optimal to initiate both a negative and a positive expedited-channel inventory
adjustment in the same period: if the net inventory position adjustment is positive [nega-
tive], one is better off reducing the expedited order [salvage batch] to the level of the net
inventory adjustment and canceling the salvage batch [expedited order].
The inventory position dynamics are given by
xn−1 = xn + qen + q
r
n −Dn.
Moreover, the inventory level In−le at the end of period n− le is given by
In−le = xn + q
e
n −Dn,n−le , (2.1)
where Dn,m = Dn + Dn−1 + · · · + Dm is the aggregate demand in the time interval [n,m]
with m ≤ n.
Assuming the inventory and backlogging related costs depend on the end-of-period in-
ventory level sizes only—as in virtually all single-sourcing inventory models, the (single
dimensional) inventory position xn is a sufficient description of the state of the system. In-
stead of charging the actual inventory costs that arise at the end of period m (m = 1, 2, . . .)
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to that period, one obtains an equivalent representation of the controllable part of the to-
tal expected discounted cost by charging its expected value to the start of period m + le,
employing the stochastic identity (2.1). Thus for all n = 1, 2, . . . , N , let
Ln(xn + q
e
n) = the expected value of all inventory and backlogging related costs
at the end of period n− le discounted back to period n.
We are now ready to formulate the dynamic programming recursions for our model. Let
fn(x) = the optimal discounted expected total costs in the last n periods of the planning
horizon, when period n is started with an inventory position x.
As mentioned, under Assumption 2.1, it is never optimal to place an order with the
expedited supplier along with the initiation of a salvage order. Therefore
fn(x) = min{f1n(x), f2n(x)}, (2.2)
where
f1n(x) = the minimum total expected cost in the last n periods, when starting with an
inventory position of x units, and assuming an expedited order is placed in period n,
f2n(x) = the minimum total expected cost in the last n periods, when starting with an
inventory position of x units, and assuming a salvage sale is initiated in period n.
These functions satisfy the recursions:
f1n(x) = min
qen∈[0,Cen],qrn∈[0,Crn]
{Kenδ(qen) + cenqen +Krnδ(qrn) + crnqrn + Ln(x+ qen)
+ αEfn−1(x+ qen + qrn −Dn)}, (2.3)
f2n(x) = min
qen∈[−Cvn,0],qrn∈[0,Crn]
{Kvnδ(−qen) + cvnqen +Krnδ(qrn) + crnqrn + Ln(x+ qen)
+ αEfn−1(x+ qen + qrn −Dn)}, (2.4)
where δ(u) = 1 if u > 0 and δ(u) = 0 otherwise.
In settings without salvage opportunities, fn(x) = f
1
n(x). However, to allow for a unified
treatment, we model the “no-salvage” case as one in which cvn = −M , a large negative
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number such that salvaging is completely unattractive. Without loss of generality, we set
Kvn = 0 and C
v
n =∞ in this case.
Since (2.3) and (2.4) share the last three terms, and substituting
yn = x+ q
e
n = the beginning inventory position of period n, after inclusion of any
expedited supplier order or salvage sale quantity,
zn = yn + q
r




n = the beginning inventory position of period n, after inclusion
of all inventory adjustments of period n,
we can rewrite (2.3) and (2.4) as
f1n(x) = min
y∈[x,x+Cen]
{Kenδ(y − x) + cen(y − x) + gn(y)}, (2.5)
f2n(x) = min
y∈[x−Cvn,x]
{Kvnδ(x− y) + cvn(y − x) + gn(y)}, (2.6)
where
gn(y) = Ln(y) + f
r
n(y), (2.7)
f rn(y) = min
z∈[y,y+Crn]
{Krnδ(z − y) + crn(z − y) + αEfn−1(z −Dn)}. (2.8)
In other words, the order and salvage decisions in any given period may be thought of as
occurring in two stages: first a new order with the expedited supplier/salvage quantity is
determined based on xn—the inventory position, followed by the choice of a supplementary
order with the regular supplier based on the augmented inventory position yn. Our second
conclusion is that the general dual source inventory planning problem is equivalent to a
single source model with an “adjusted” future cost function gn(·). In particular, the optimal
combined ordering and salvage policy can be obtained by computing a series of nested one-
dimensional value functions, and this under general parameters and demand distributions.
In particular, one starts with the evaluation of the function gn(·), followed by that of f1n(·)
and f2n(·). The ultimate value function fn(·) is obtained as the pointwise minimum of the
functions f1n(·) and f2n(·).
In the next section, we show that under a few parameter restrictions, a specific structure
for the optimal policy can be established.
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2.4 A Combined Procurement Strategy of Special Structure
Chapter 1 introduces the key convexity concept, (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity, in 1.1, and
shows that (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity generalizes almost all familiar convexity structures.
See Proposition 1.1 and Table 1.1. We show that, under a few restrictions, an optimal pol-
icy is of relatively simple structure, exhibited in Theorem 2.2, below. First, in terms of the
expected holding and backlogging cost functions Ln(·), we introduce a standard assumption:
Assumption 2.2. The function Ln(·) is convex and Ln(y) = O(|y|p) for some p ≥ 1,
n = 1, 2, . . . , N . Also, E(Dpn) <∞ for n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
In addition, we need
Assumption 2.3. For n = N, . . . , 1:
(i) Krn = K
e





(ii) Kn ≥ αKn−1, Kvn ≥ αKvn−1;
(iii) Cn ≤ Cn−1, Cvn ≤ Cvn−1.
In other words, capacity limits are assumed to weakly increase over time, an assumption
satisfied in most practical applications. (Most frequently, capacities are constant over the
course of the inventory planning horizon.) The inequalities Kn ≥ αKn−1 and Kvn ≥ αKvn−1
echo those in the basic single source inventory problem with fixed order costs, see Scarf
(1960) or Zipkin (2000). Assumption 2.3 (i) is more restrictive, in particular the assumption
that both suppliers have the same capacities.
We first show that all value functions {fn(·)}, n = N,N − 1, . . . , 1 satisfy the strong
(C1K1, C2K2)-convexity property, assuming the terminal value function f0(·) does.
Theorem 2.1. Assume f0(x) ∈ SCC0K0,Cv0Kv0 and f0(x) = O(|x|p) for some integer p ≥ 1.
Then fn(x) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn and fn(x) = O(|x|p) for n = N,N − 1, . . . , 0.
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Now, define auxiliary functions
g˜1n(x) = Kn + min
y∈[x,x+Cn]





{cvn(y − x) + gn(y)}, A2n(x) = g˜2n(x)− gn(x),







{crn(z − y) + αEfn−1(z −Dn)}, − αEfn−1(y −Dn).
Here, g˜1n(x) represents the optimal expected cost from period n on assuming one is com-
mitted to place an order with the expedited supplier in this period (possibly combined with
an order with the regular supplier). A1n(x) = g˜
1
n(x) − gn(x) denotes the cost differential
with the optimal expected cost from period n on, assuming one is committed to forgo any
order with the expedited supplier or a salvage batch in this period. Similarly, g˜2n(x) repre-
sents the optimal expected cost from period n on assuming one is committed to initiate a
salvage batch in this period (possibly combined with an order with the regular supplier).
A2n(x) = g˜
2
n(x)− gn(x) denotes the cost differential with the same benchmark gn(·) used in
the definition of A1n(·). Finally, g˜rn(y) denotes the expected optimal cost until the end of
the planning horizon, assuming one is committed to place an order with the regular sup-
plier, while foregoing an order with the expedited supplier or a salvage batch, and Arn(y)
denotes the cost differential vis-a`-vis the optimal expected cost when forgoing any inventory
adjustments in period n.
Define the following critical points for period n:
Ben = inf{arg min
y
{ceny + gn(y)}}, ben = inf{x : A1n(x) ≥ 0}, b¯en = sup{x : A1n(x) < 0},
(2.9)
Sn = sup{arg min
y
{cvny + gn(y)}}, sn = sup{x : A2n(x) ≥ 0}, sn = inf{x : A2n(x) < 0},
(2.10)
Brn = inf{arg min
z




Ben(x) = inf{ arg min
x≤y≤x+Cn
{ceny + gn(y)}}, Sn(x) = sup{ arg min
x−Cvn≤y≤x
{cvny + gn(y)}},
Brn(y) = inf{ arg min
y≤z≤y+Cn
{crnz + αEfn−1(z −Dn)}}





The following theorem can be proven based on the proof of Theorem 1.2 in Chapter 1.
Theorem 2.2. (a) The critical points are ranked as follows:
ben ≤ b¯en ≤ sen ≤ sen, brn ≤ b¯rn. (2.12)
(b) The optimal policy is characterized by Table 2.1, in which y∗n(xn) and z∗n(y∗n) are either
uniquely determined or take a value in a bi-valued set {·, ·}.
Table 2.1: Optimal policy structure for systems with fixed costs and capacity limits
(a) Expedited supplier and salvage
xn (−∞, ben) [ben, b¯en) [b¯en, svn] (svn, sn] (sn,∞)
fn(xn) g˜
1
n(xn) min{g˜1n(xn), g(xn)} g(xn) min{g˜2n(xn), g(xn)} g˜2n(xn)
y∗n(xn) Ben(xn) {Ben(xn), xn} xn {Sn(xn), xn} Sn(xn)
(b) Regular supplier







n) min{g˜rn(y∗n), αEfn−1(y∗n −Dn)} αEfn−1(y∗n −Dn)}
z∗n(y∗n) Brn(y∗n) {Brn(y∗n), y∗n} y∗n
As shown in Section 2.3, the optimal order and salvage decisions, in period n, can be
determined in two steps. In the first step, determine the optimal adjusted inventory position
y∗n(xn) for the expedited channel (hence the optimal order amount from the expedited
supplier or salvage amount) using Table 2.1 (a) after computing all necessary auxiliary
functions and critical points; this also involves the calculation of the value function f rn(y).
In the second step, with y∗n obtained from the first step, determine the optimal adjusted
target z∗n(y∗n) for the regular channel (which implies the optimal order amount from the
regular supplier) using Table 2.1 (b).
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Except for some highly artificial problem instances, the structure of the optimal policy
further simplifies to a three-region policy and a two-region policy in parts (a) and (b), re-











vanish, because the functions A1n(·), A2n(·) and Arn(·) have a single root.
2.4.1 Special Settings
In this subsection, we consider several special settings where the optimal policy structure
takes on simpler forms.
2.4.1.1 No Fixed Costs, No Capacity Limits, Salvage Opportunities
In this setting Kn = K
v
n = 0 and Cn = C
v
n =∞. Based on Table 1.4 (c) in Corollary 1.3, the
optimal policy structure for systems without fixed costs and capacity limits is summarized
by Table 2.2. The optimal inventory decision for the expedited channel (ordering from the
expedited supplier or salvaging) follows a double “base stock”–type policy. The inventory
position line is partitioned into three consecutive regions. In the left and right most regions,
it is optimal to order up to a base-stock level Ben from the expedited supplier or to salvage
down to a level Sn, respectively; in the middle region it is optimal to stay put. The optimal
inventory decision for the regular supplier is a simple base stock policy with an order-up-to
level Brn. Note that if salvaging is not allowed, the first stage policy is a simple base stock
policy, i.e., Sn =∞, eliminating the last column in subtable (a).
Table 2.2: Optimal policy structure for systems without fixed costs and capacity limits
(a) Expedited supplier and salvage
xn (−∞, Ben) [Ben, Sn] (Sn,∞)
y∗n(xn) Ben xn Sn
(b) Regular supplier
y∗n (−∞, Brn) [Brn,∞)
z∗n(y∗n) Brn y∗n
2.4.1.2 Fixed Costs, No Capacity Limits, No Salvage.
In this setting Kn > 0,K
v
n = 0, Cn = C
v
n = ∞. This case was addressed by Sethi et al.
(2003), when lr = 1 and le = 0, but allowing for forecast updates. Based on Table 1.4 (a)
from Corollary 1.3, the optimal policy structure is summarized by Table 2.3. Both channels
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take on the classical “(s, S)”–type policy. More specifically, the expedited channel adopts
a (ben, B
e





Table 2.3: Optimal policy structure for systems with fixed costs but without capacity limits
(a) Expedited supplier
xn (−∞, ben) [ben,∞)
y∗n(xn) Ben xn
(b) Regular supplier
y∗n (−∞, brn) [brn,∞)
z∗n(y∗n) Brn y∗n
2.4.1.3 No Fixed Costs, Capacity Limits, No Salvage.
In this setting, Kn = K
v
n = 0 and Cn < ∞, Cvn = ∞. Based on Table 1.5 (c) from
Corollary 1.4, under the optimal policy, both channels adopt a modified base-stock policy
as in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Optimal policy structure for systems without salvage option
(a) Expedited supplier
xn (−∞, b¯en − Cn) [b¯en − Cn, b¯en) [b¯en,∞)
y∗n(xn) xn + Cn b¯en xn
(b) Regular supplier
y∗n (−∞, b¯rn − Cn) [b¯rn − Cn, b¯rn)
z∗n(y∗n) y∗n + Cn b¯rn
2.4.1.4 Fixed Costs and Capacity Limits, No Salvage.
In this setting Kn > 0,K
v
n = 0 and Cn < ∞, Cvn = ∞. Based on Table 1.5 (a) from
Corollary 1.4, the optimal policy structure for systems with fixed costs and capacity limits
but without salvage option is summarized by Table 2.5, where
1+ben
= 1(ben > b¯
e













The optimal policy structures for the expedited and regular suppliers are similar in form.
There are four regions. In the far-left region, the optimal policy is to order as much as
possible—up to the capacity limit, while in the far-right region it is optimal to stay put. In
the remaining two intermediate regions, the optimal policy is less categorical: in the third
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region, it is optimal to either stay put or to place an order; in the second region, one of
two cases prevails: in one case it is optimal to either order as much as possible or stay put
and in the other it is optimal to order a quantity specified by the aforementioned functions,
B¯en(·) or B¯rn(·).
2.5 General Lead Times
In this Section, we address the general case, with arbitrary order lead time combinations
lr > le, rather than the special setting where lr − le = 1. (In § 2.5.1, we also address
general salvage lead time lv.) Sheopuri et al. (2010) show that a minimal state description
is of dimension ∆l, even in the simplest of models, i.e., in the absence of any fixed order
costs, capacity limits or salvage opportunities. One such “minimal” state description is
It ≡ (I let , I le+1t , . . . , I lr−1t ), where I lt = the net inventory level at the beginning of period
t plus all outstanding orders that will arrive by the beginning of period t + l. While of
dimension ∆l, this state description is a major simplification, beyond the straightforward
state description, which includes the inventory level and each of the le + lr outstanding
orders with the two suppliers.
Note that xt = I
lr−1
t represents the regular full inventory position at the beginning of
period t, including all outstanding orders with the expedited and regular supplier. The
fully optimal strategy is prohibitively difficult to compute, in particular when ∆l ≥ 3, say,
and even if computable, it would be prohibitively difficult to implement.
For ∆l ≥ 2, we therefore propose the following upper and lower bound approximations
and heuristics. For the sake of notational simplicity, we confine ourselves to infinite horizon
models with stationary inputs (parameters and demand distributions).
Under the lead time pair (le, lr), let z
∗(le, lr) [pi∗(le, lr)] denote the optimal cost value
[policy] and z(pi|le, lr) the cost value of an arbitrary policy pi. The following bounds apply
with lˆr = le + 1 and lˆe = lr − 1.
LB ≡ z∗(le, lˆr) ≤ z∗(le, lr) ≤ min{UB1 ≡ z∗(lˆe, lr),UB2 ≡ z(pi∗(lˆe, lr) |le, lr)}. (2.13)
The inequalities LB ≤ z∗(le, lr) ≤ UB1 follow from the simple sample path argument in
Zipkin (2008b), Section 5. Since pi∗(lˆe, lr) is a feasible policy under (le, lr), z∗(le, lr) ≤ UB2.
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In settings where the policy pi∗(lˆe, lr) is characterized by a few threshold parameters, a third
upper bound UB3 ≤ UB2 can be obtained by searching for the best parameter combination
within the same policy class.
We illustrate this approach with a study of problem instances without fixed costs or














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first panel in Table 2.6 investigates instances in which each supplier has a capacity
of 6—only 20% above the mean demand—or larger, so that single sourcing from either
supplier is feasible. The second and third panels maintain an aggregate capacity of 6 and
12, respectively, under various allocations to the individual suppliers; in some cases, given
this limited capacity, only dual sourcing or sourcing from one of the suppliers is feasible.
One period demands have mean [standard deviation] of 5 [2] and a Normal distribution,
truncated at 0 and 10.
We display the estimated cost per period under LB ,UB1,UB2 and UB3 along with
associated standard errors from which confidence intervals can be constructed. As shown,
both under LB and UB1, a pair of modified base-stock policy is optimal, under dual sourc-
ing. We conclude that uniformly, UB3 is the best of the three upper bounds. The remaining
gap between LB and UB3 is 10%, on average. This is an inflated representation of the true
gap since we omit the variable procurement cost, at its base price cr at the regular supplier,
from both cost measures. We conjecture that UB3 is much closer to the optimal cost value
than LB , since it represents the best policy within the class known to contain the optimal
policy under consecutive lead times. As a consequence, we report, in the numerical studies
in Section 2.6, either the exact optimal cost value—when computable—or UB3. Through-
out, “savings” refers to the % gap between the cost under dual sourcing versus the best
single sourcing policy.
2.5.1 Incompatible Salvage Lead Time: the Case lv < le
As mentioned, in the presence of salvage opportunities, often lv = le (or lv = lr) when
salvaging involves return shipments to the supplier. Sometimes, lv < le, in which case
a heuristic approach is required, similar to when order lead times fail to be consecutive.
Analogous to the above, we propose as a lower bound, reducing (le, lr) to (lv, lv + 1) and
finding the optimal policy under these lead times. Upper bounds UB1,UB2 and UB3 are
obtained by increasing (lv, le) to (lr − 1, lr − 1) as above.
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2.6 Numerical Studies: Managerial Insights
In this section, we report on three studies conducted to investigate the impact of various
model parameters on the system performance, with a particular focus on the benefits of
dual sourcing and the specific ways the expedited supplier is used as a complement to the
regular supplier. Some of the studies employ general lead time combinations to appreciate
how they impact on the above measures.
Systems with fixed costs (but no capacity limits or salvage opportunities):
As explained, under general lead times, we report on heuristic UB3, the best in the
class of single index pairs of (s, S) policies (se, Se, sr, Sr), which we have shown to contain
an optimal policy when lead times are consecutive. Table 2.7 exhibits our results for a set
of 30 instances. The first 7 columns specify the input parameters, in particular: (i) the
expedited lead time le; (ii) the regular lead time lr; (iii) the differential between the per
unit cost rates charged by the expedited and regular suppliers, c; (iv) K, the fixed cost
incurred for any order; (v) SL = p/(h+ p), the service level in a single source setting when
governed by a base-stock level, all with h = 5; (vi) [(vii)] the mean [standard deviation] of
the Normally distributed one-period demand. The remaining three vertical panels exhibit
the results under the optimal dual sourcing policy, within the above class of policies, and the
optimal policy under single sourcing with each of the suppliers. Beyond the optimal policy
parameters, the mean cost columns exhibit the average over 1000 replicas of the per-period
cost under a planning horizon of N = 1000 periods, with associated standard errors. The
dual sourcing panel, in addition, contains % Savings = the percentage savings realized by
the dual sourcing policy, compared with the optimal single sourcing policy; % Expedited =
the percentage of sales that is procured from the expedited supplier; and Expedite Freq =












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first horizontal panel explains the impact of an increase in lead time differences,
fixing le = 2. The benefit of dual sourcing increases from 1.1% to 10.2%; remarkably
the latter very significant savings are achieved even though the expedited supplier is used
infrequently—less than once in every three periods—and for only 14% of the total purchase
volume. In the second panel, we consider consecutive lead times but increase the lead
time values. This panel confirms that the benefit of dual sourcing are relatively small
when the lead time difference is small and decreasing as the absolute lead times increase.
Correspondingly, the expedited supplier is used very sparsely.
The next two panels exhibit the impact of the K/c ratio. In the third [fourth] panel,
the c [K] value is varied leaving the K [c] value fixed. Using our base instance as the
benchmark, when the c value is reduced, the expedited supplier is, understandably, used
for a larger portion of the purchase volume, and the benefits over single sourcing from that
supplier decrease as well.
Finally, the service level SL and the demand volatility have intuitive impacts: as ei-
ther one increases, the expedited supplier is used more frequently and the benefits of dual














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Table 2.8, we explore systems in the fully general model in which the two suppliers
have different capacity levels; under consecutive lead times, such systems can be solved
by the DP method of Section 2.3, even though the special policy structure in Section 2.4
cannot be guaranteed. The first and fourth panels in the table investigate how a smaller
expedited supplier may improve the performance of the system. In the first [fourth] panel,
the capacity level [advantage] of the regular supplier is kept constant at 10 [4] units. In the
third panel, the capacity of the expedited [regular] supplier is kept constant [increased].
The results in the first panel show that the availability of an expedited supplier has
major benefits even if she has limited capacity; for example, even when Cr = 10 and Ce = 2
the cost savings are 17.4%. In general, the benefits of dual sourcing are larger in capacitated
systems as opposed to uncapacitated systems, see Table 2.7 (above). As can be expected,
additional capacity at either supplier is always beneficial but the marginal benefit decreases
rapidly. The same is true for marginal aggregate capacity, see the third panel.
Table 2.6 in the previous section sheds light on the impact of differentiated capacity
levels in systems with non-consecutive lead times. In the first panel, where aggregate
capacity is ample, but that of an individual supplier limited, the benefits of dual sourcing
are very extensive, ranging between 18% and 39% under the heuristic UB3. Note, once
again, that these major savings are achieved even though the expedited supplier is used,
for, on average, only one sixth of the total volume. The second panel has instances where
dual sourcing is essential; neither one of the suppliers could be used by herself. In the third
panel, one of the suppliers is large enough to procure by herself; the savings due to dual
sourcing vary between 14% and 20% in this panel, even though the expedited supplier is
used for less than a fifth of the purchase volume.
General salvage lead times:
A final study reported in Appendix B.2 evaluates the benefits of a salvage opportunity in
systems with consecutive lead times, fixed order costs and supplier-specific capacity limits.
The systems can be solved with the DP method of Section 2.3. Varying model parameters
systematically, the salvage opportunity improves costs, on average, by 2% but sometimes
by as much as 8.2%. This is in contrast to the special case in Janakiraman and Seshadri
(2017) where no benefits were found.
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2.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper addresses a general periodic review model, to identify an optimal procurement
policy in the presence of two suppliers, differentiated by their lead time and per-unit cost
price. The model allows for salvage opportunities, capacity limits and fixed costs associated
with orders and salvage transactions. We have provided a full characterization of the optimal
procurement strategy in the general model as well as various special cases that arise when
only part of the above complications prevail. Our exact results are confined to the case
where the lead times of the two suppliers differ by a single period only (Even in the base
model without fixed cost, capacity limits or salvage opportunities, it is well known that
only a one-period lead time difference allows for an optimal policy that acts on a single
inventory measure.) However, our structural results for this special case suggest effective
heuristics for general lead time combinations, as demonstrated in Section 2.5.
Indeed, significant cost savings can be achieved with dual sourcing. Remarkably, such
savings can be obtained even when the expedited supplier is only used for a small part, say
5% of all procurement. The availability of the fast(er) supplier allows one to forgo major
inventory investments to achieve a given service level or to prevent costly stockouts under
a given inventory investment.
In practice, a second expedited supplier may only be available if a minimum sales volume
can be guaranteed, or a minimum frequency with which orders are placed. Future work
should address such “participation” constraints.
It is also important to extend our results to settings with more than two suppliers.
Generalizations of our structural results are possible when the lead time of any given supplier
differs from that of the next fastest supplier by a single period. This extension was carried
out by Feng et al. (2005) in the base model. Moreover, we believe that these results continue
to suggest effective heuristic strategies under general lead time differences.
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Chapter 3
Ride-Hailing Networks with Strategic Drivers: The Impact of Platform
Control Capabilities on Performance
3.1 Introduction
We are motivated by the emergence of ride-hailing platforms such as Uber, Lyft and Gett,
that face the problem of matching service supply (drivers) with demand (riders) over a
spatial network. We study the impact of operational platform controls on the equilibrium
performance of such networks, focusing on the interplay with two practically important
challenges for this matching problem: (i) Significant demand imbalances prevail across
network locations for extended periods of time, as commonly observed in urban areas during
rush hour (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2), so that the natural supply of drivers dropping off riders
at a location either falls short of or exceeds the demand for rides originating at this location.
These mismatches adversely affect performance as they lead to lost demand, to drivers idling
at low-demand locations, and/or to drivers repositioning, i.e., traveling without serving a
rider, from a low- to a high-demand location. (ii) Drivers are self-interested and decide
strategically whether to join the network, and if so, when and where to reposition, trading
off the transportation time and cost involved against their matching (queueing) delay at
their current location. These decentralized supply decisions may not be optimal for the
overall network.
Motivated by these challenges, we consider two platform control levers, demand-side
admission control and supply-side capacity repositioning. Admission control allows the
platform to accept or reject rider requests based on their destinations, thereby affecting
not only the supply of cars through the network, but also the queueing delays of drivers
to be matched at lower-demand locations, and in turn, their decisions to reposition to
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higher-demand locations. Repositioning control allows the platform to direct drivers to go
where they are needed the most, rather than having to incentivize them to do so, thereby
alleviating the demand/supply imbalance in the network.
To evaluate these control levers we study the steady-state behavior of a deterministic
fluid model of a two-location ride-hailing loss network with four routes (two for local and
two for cross-location traffic) in a game-theoretic framework. Demand for each route is char-
acterized by an arrival rate and a deterministic travel time. Three parties interact through
this network. Riders generate demand for each route, paying a fixed price per unit travel
time. Prices are fixed throughout, and for simplicity assumed to be route-independent,
though this is not necessary for our analysis. Drivers decide, based on their outside op-
portunity cost and their equilibrium expected profit rate from participation, whether to
join the network, and if so, whether to reposition from one location to the other, rather
than idling. Drivers have heterogeneous opportunity costs but homogenous transportation
costs; therefore, participating drivers are homogeneous in their strategies and in the eyes of
the platform. The platform receives a fixed commission (fraction) of the fare paid by the
rider and seeks to maximize its commission revenue. We consider three control regimes:
(i) Centralized Control with respect to admission and driver repositioning decisions; (ii)
Minimal Control : no admission control and decentralized (driver) repositioning decisions;
(iii) Optimal Admission Control at each location and decentralized repositioning.
Main Results and Contributions. First, we propose a novel model that accounts
for the network structure and flow imbalances, the driver incentives, and the interplay of
queueing, transportation times, and driver repositioning decisions—all essential features of
ride-hailing platforms.
Second, we fully characterize the steady-state system equilibria, including the drivers’
repositioning incentive-compatibility conditions, for the three control problems outlined
above, relying on the analysis of equivalent capacity allocation problems. The solutions
provide insights on how and why platform control impacts the system performance, both
financially, in terms of platform revenue and per-driver profits, and operationally, in terms
of rider service levels and driver participation, repositioning and queueing. One immediate
finding is that when capacity is moderate, accepting rider requests in a pro-rata (or FIFO)
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manner need not be optimal, and neither is the practice of accepting rider requests at a
location as long as it has available driver supply.
Third, we glean new insights on the interplay between the platform’s admission control
and drivers’ strategic repositioning decisions. Specifically, we show that the platform may
find it optimal to strategically reject demand at the low-demand location, even though there
is an excess supply of drivers, so as to induce repositioning to the high-demand location.
We provide intuitive necessary and sufficient conditions for this policy feature in terms of
the network characteristics and the driver economics. This deliberate degradation of the
rider service level at one location yields more efficient repositioning, and in turn a higher
service level at the other location. Thus, operational levers, as opposed to location-specific
or origin-destination pricing, can affect repositioning behavior.
Fourth, we derive upper bounds on the performance benefits that the platform and
the drivers enjoy due to increased platform control capability. These bounds show that
these benefits can be very significant for the platform, of the order of 50%, 100% or even
larger improvements, especially when the network operates in a moderate capacity regime,
so there are tangible supply/demand trade-offs across the network, and when there are
significant cross-location demand imbalances. Per-driver benefits are also most significant
when capacity is moderate, but are less significant in their magnitude because driver par-
ticipation decisions are endogenous—so, if platform controls increase the per-driver profit
significantly at a given participation level, more drivers choose to participate, reducing the
equilibrium per-driver benefit.
Flow Imbalances: Example Manhattan. We illustrate the magnitude and duration
of the demand imbalances alluded to above with data on flow imbalances at the route-
and location-level, for taxi rides in Manhattan. These flow imbalances are derived from
the publicly available New York City TLC (Taxi & Limousine Commission) Trip Record
Data.1 These data record for each taxi ride the start and end time, the geo pickup and
dropoff locations, and the fare paid. Although the data report censored demand (i.e., only
realized trips but not rider demand that was not filled), we believe the (uncensored) demand
1http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/trip record data.shtml
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imbalances are likely of the same order of magnitude as the (censored) flow imbalances;
indeed, in the high-traffic direction the flow likely underestimates demand by a larger margin
than in the opposite direction. We further note that, although our data do not include trips


















































































































































































































(b) Upper East Side–Midtown East, May 2016
Figure 3.1: Route-level flow imbalances in Manhattan
Figure 3.1 illustrates the route-level realized flow imbalances for two origin-destination
pairs in Manhattan, NY. Chart (a) shows the average number of trip originations per 10
minute-interval between Upper West Side (UWS) and Midtown West (MW) (to and fro),
and the logarithm of the ratio of number of trip originations between the two locations
per time bin; for each time bin the average is computed over all weekdays for one month.
Chart (b) shows the same quantities between the Upper East Side and Midtown East.
We observe a pronounced imbalance of almost one order of magnitude (about 10x) in the
morning rush hour and about half an order of magnitude (about 3x) in the evening rush
hour in the reverse direction. Therefore, focusing on origin-destination pairs in the network,
we observe strong flow imbalances, so the cross traffic between such two locations will not
replenish sufficient capacity for the originating trips in the high-demand location (UWS in
the morning) and will likely oversupply the low-demand location (MW in the morning).
Figure 3.2 shows that the realized flow imbalances persist even after aggregation to the
location-level. That is, the flow of other trips being completed in the high-demand location,
e.g., morning arrivals into the UWS from other locations, is insufficient to supply the
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necessary capacity for the UWS to MW trips: Charts (a) and (b) show the net imbalances
(total number of drop-offs minus total number of pickups) at two locations in Manhattan,
over the course of a day. These net imbalances are statistically significant and exhibit strong
and different intraday patterns.
(Inflow-outflow)
(a) Upper West Side, May 2016
Inflow-outflow
(Inflow-outflow)
(b) Midtown, May 2016
Figure 3.2: Location-level flow imbalances in Manhattan
Taken together, these observations on route- and location-level flow imbalances suggest
that self-interested strategic drivers actively reposition towards high-demand locations so
as to supply the needed capacity that would otherwise not be available at high-demand
locations/time-periods. They also suggest that platform controls may be able to use desti-
nation information to direct capacity where it is needed (something that does not happen
in the taxi market), and to incentivize or completely control a more efficient driver reposi-
tioning strategy.
Finally, we note that both Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show that imbalance periods
persist for multiple time bins, lasting typically for a couple of hours. To contrast, the
typical transportation times between these location pairs are of the order of 10-15min,
suggesting that network transients may settle down quickly relative to the duration of these
imbalances, which, in part, motivates our focus on the steady state fluid model equations
as opposed to a study of the transient process itself.
The paper proceeds as follows. This section concludes with a brief literature review.
In §3.2 we outline the system model and formulate the three optimization problems that
correspond to the three control regimes mentioned above. §3.3 studies the centralized
control regime, and §3.4 studies the two control regimes where drivers make self-interested
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repositioning decisions. Finally, §3.5 derives upper bounds on the performance benefits to
the platform and to the drivers due to increased platform control, and offers some numerical
illustrations.
Related Literature. This paper is related to the growing literature on the sharing
economy, with a specific focus on the operations of ride-hailing platforms. With a couple of
exceptions discussed below, this literature can be broadly grouped into two streams: papers
that study (i) a single location (or the system as a whole) with driver incentives, and (ii) a
network of locations without strategic drivers or driver incentives. In contrast to these two
streams, this paper studies a network model with driver incentives.
In single-location models with incentives, the strategic driver decision is whether to
enter the system; driver repositioning is a network consideration that is not captured in
these models. Several papers focus on the impact of surge or dynamic pricing and its im-
pact on equilibrium performance over static pricing policies. Banerjee et al. (2016) study a
stochastic single-location queueing model with price-sensitive riders (demand) and drivers
(capacity) and find (consistent with the literature on revenue maximization in large scale
queues) that static pricing is asymptotically (first order) optimal. Cachon et al. (2017) com-
pare five pricing schemes, with increasing flexibility in setting consumer price and provider
wage, and find that dynamic (surge) pricing significantly increases the platform’s profit
and benefits drivers and riders. Castillo et al. (2017) show analytically and empirically that
surge pricing avoids the “wild goose chase” effect when capacity is scarce—the phenomenon
where drivers have to travel far distances to pick up customers. Chen and Sheldon (2015)
use Uber data to show empirically that surge pricing incentivizes drivers to work longer and
hence increases systemwide efficiency. Hall et al. (2017) in a different empirical study based
on Uber data, find that the driver supply is highly elastic to wage changes; a fare hike only
has a short-lived effect on raising the driver hourly earnings rate, and is eventually offset
by endogenous entry. As mentioned above, our results confirm this empirical phenomenon.
Taylor (2017) and Bai et al. (2017) both study the price and wage decisions of on-demand
service platforms that serve delay-sensitive customers and earnings-sensitive independent
providers. Taylor (2017) examines the impact of delay sensitivity and provider independence
on the optimal price and wage, and shows that the results are different when uncertainty
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in customer and provider valuations prevails. Bai et al. (2017) extend the model in Taylor
(2017) by also considering the impact of demand and service rate and potential capacity, as
well as total welfare (in addition to platform profit) as the system performance measures.
Some papers consider strategic, self-interested agents (capacity) without queueing consid-
erations. Gurvich et al. (2016) allow the platform to determine the capacity size (staffing),
system-state-contingent compensation and a cap on effective capacity. Hu and Zhou (2017)
study the optimal price and wage decisions of an on-demand matching platform. They
show that a commission contract can be optimal or near-optimal under market uncertainty.
Benjaafar et al. (2015) study peer-to-peer product sharing, where individuals with varying
usage levels make decisions about whether or not to own; the roles of market participants’
as provider or consumer are endogenous, unlike in the above papers (and ours).
In the second stream that studies ride-hailing networks without incentives, papers pri-
marily either focus on routing of cars or on matching riders to drivers. Most papers rely on
the analysis of an approximating deterministic fluid model. An important paper is Braver-
man et al. (2017); they prove an asymptotic limit theorem that provides justification for the
use of a deterministic fluid network model (such as the one in this paper), and then study
the transient optimization problem of empty car repositioning under centralized control.
In contrast to this paper, Braverman et al. (2017) do not consider admission control and
focus on centralized repositioning decisions. The underlying model is the BCMP product-
form network. Iglesias et al. (2017) also consider centralized matching and repositioning
decisions in the context of a BCMP network model. Similar to our paper, both papers
model a closed loss network. Banerjee et al. (2017) study optimal dynamic pricing of a
vehicle sharing network, and show that state-independent (demand) prices derived through
a convex relaxation are near-optimal when capacity grows large; the paper provides explicit
approximation guarantees for systems with finite size. He et al. (2017) study the problem
of designing the geographical service region for urban electric vehicle sharing systems.
Hu and Zhou (2016) consider dynamic matching for a two-sided, heterogeneous-type,
discrete-time system with random arrivals and abandonment. They provide conditions
under which the optimal matching policy is a priority rule. Ozkan and Ward (2017) study
dynamic matching on a network, and through a linear programming relaxation propose an
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asymptotically optimal matching policy that outperforms the commonly-used heuristic of
matching a rider with the nearest available driver. Their model differs from the one in Hu
and Zhou (2016) in that it (i) assumes probabilistic rather than deterministic matching,
and (ii) establishes that customers and drivers in the same location may not be matched.
Feng et al. (2017) compare customers’ average waiting time under two booking systems,
on-demand versus street hailing, assuming all trips occur on a circle. Caldentey et al.
(2009), Adan and Weiss (2012) and Busˇic´ et al. (2013), among others, study multi-class
matching in the context of the infinite bipartite matching model. In the broader dynamic
queue matching context, Gurvich and Ward (2014) prove the asymptotic optimality of a
discrete review matching policy for a multi-class double-sided matching queue.
In contrast to these two streams, this paper studies a network model with strategic sup-
ply, i.e., drivers decide whether to join the system and where to provide service, given the
incentives offered by the platform. Bimpikis et al. (2017) study how a ride-sharing platform
with strategic drivers should price demand and compensate drivers across a network to op-
timize its profits, and show that the platform’s profits and consumer surplus increase when
demands are more balanced across the network; they focus on a discrete-time multi-period
model without driver queueing effects, where driver movement between any two locations
is costless and takes one time-period. Guda and Subramanian (2017) consider strategic
surge pricing and market information sharing in a two-period model with two local markets
without cross-location demand (there is no queueing and driver travel takes one period).
Buchholz (2017) empirically analyzes, using the NYC taxi data, the dynamic spatial equi-
librium in the search and matching process between strategic taxi drivers and passengers.
His counterfactual analysis shows that even under optimized pricing, performance can fur-
ther be improved significantly by more directed matching technology, which supports the
value of studying the impact of operational controls.
In contrast to Bimpikis et al. (2017), Guda and Subramanian (2017), and Buchholz
(2017), we focus on the impact of operational controls, as opposed to pricing, on system
performance, and provides insights and guidelines on the optimal operations of ride-hailing
networks. Consistent with the pricing results of Bimpikis et al. (2017), we find that cross-
network demand imbalances crucially affect performance, and that the impact of operational
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platform controls increases in such imbalances.
3.2 Model and Problem Formulations
We consider a deterministic fluid model of a ride-hailing network in steady state. Three par-
ties interact through this network, riders generate demand for rides, drivers supply capacity
for the rides, and the platform is instrumental in matching supply with demand. §3.2.1 in-
troduces the operational and financial model primitives; §3.2.2 describes the information
that is available to the parties and the controls that determine how supply is matched with
demand; §3.2.3 formulates the optimization problems for the three control regimes that we
study in this paper. Finally, §3.2.4 explains how to reformulate the problems specified in
§3.2.3 in terms of capacity allocation decisions.
Such an approximating fluid model was rigorously justified in Braverman et al. (2017)
for a system where drivers were not acting strategically; an adaptation of their arguments
could be used in our setting as well. We will focus directly on a set of (motivated) steady
state flow equations.
3.2.1 Model Primitives
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Figure 3.3: Model primitives
Network. The network has two locations (nodes), indexed by l = 1, 2, and four routes
(arcs), indexed by lk for l, k ∈ {1, 2}. Figure 3.3 depicts the network schematic and the
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model primitives that we define in this section. We denote by tlk the travel time on route lk
and by t the travel time vector. We impose no restrictions on travel times; specifically, we
allow t12 6= t21, to reflect, for example, different uptown/downtown routes. The travel times
are constant and, in particular, independent of the number of drivers that serve demand
for the platform. This assumes that the number of drivers has no significant effect on road
congestion and transportation delays.
Riders. Riders generate demand for trips. We assume that the platform charges a fixed
price of $p per unit of travel time, uniform across all routes.; i.e., a rider pays for a route-lk
trip a fee of $ptlk. Given the price p, the potential demand rate for route-lk trips is Λlk, and
Λ denotes the potential demand rate vector. The platform keeps a portion γ of the total fee
as commission and drivers collect the remainder. Riders are impatient, i.e., rider requests
not matched instantly are lost. We focus on the case Λ12 6= Λ21, i.e., the cross-location
demands are not balanced; without loss of generality, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1 (Demand imbalance). 0 < Λ12 < Λ21.
Drivers. Drivers supply capacity to the network. Let N be the pool of (potential)
drivers, each equipped with one car (unit of capacity). Drivers are self-interested and seek
to maximize their profit rate per unit time. They decide whether to join the network, and,
if so, whether to reposition to the other network location, i.e., travel without serving a rider,
in anticipation of a faster match.
Each driver has an idiosyncratic opportunity cost rate, denoted by co, that is assumed to
be an independent draw from a common distribution F , which is assumed to be continuous
with connected support [0,∞). Drivers join the network if their profit rate per unit time
equals or exceeds their outside opportunity cost rate. Therefore, if the per-driver profit rate
is $x, then the number of participating drivers, denoted by n, is n = NF (x) = NP (co ≤ x).
The per-driver profit rate x is itself a quantity that emerges in equilibrium and depends
on n, the drivers’ trip-related earnings and cost, the platform’s controls, and the driver
decisions, to be specified in §3.3 and §3.4.
Participating drivers incur a driving cost rate of $c per unit of travel time, which is
common to all drivers and independent of the car occupancy. Drivers serving rider demand
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earn revenue at rate $γ¯p per unit travel time, where γ¯ = 1 − γ, i.e., the price paid by the
rider, net of the platform commission. Therefore, the maximum profit rate that drivers can
earn equals γ¯p− c. However, their actual profit rate is lower if they spend time waiting for
riders (accruing zero profit during this wait) and/or repositioning from one location to the
other (incurring a cost c per unit time). The following assumption ensures that drivers can
earn a positive profit by repositioning2.
Assumption 3.2 (Positive profit from repositioning). ct12 < t21(γ¯p−c) and ct21 < t12(γ¯p−
c).
Given Assumption 3.1, only the first condition in Assumption 3.2 will prove to be
relevant.
Platform. The platform is operated by a monopolist firm that matches drivers with
riders with the objective of maximizing its revenue rate.3 The platform may have two
controls: a) demand-side admission control, and b) supply-side capacity repositioning, as
detailed in §3.2.3.
Information. Riders and drivers rely on the platform for matching, that is, potential
riders cannot see the available driver capacity, and drivers cannot see the arrivals of rider
requests.
The platform knows the model primitives introduced above, including the potential
demand rates Λ, the destination of each trip request, the travel times t, the driving cost c
and the opportunity cost rate distribution F . The driver opportunity cost rates are private
information, not known by the platform. Therefore, participating drivers are homogenous
to the platform. The platform knows the state of the system, i.e., each driver’s location,
travel direction and status at each point in time.
Riders do not need any network information since they are impatient—they simply
arrive with a trip request and leave if their request is not accepted or cannot be fulfilled
immediately.
2Assumption 3.2 also implies that γ¯p − c > 0, hence F (γ¯p− c) > 0, so at least some drivers choose to
join the network.
3The platform could, in practice, incorporate additional considerations in its objective or as control
constraints, e.g., to reward market penetration or penalize lost demand.
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Drivers do not observe the state of the system, but they have (or can infer) the in-
formation required to compute their individual expected profit rates, namely: the travel
times t; the steady-state delays until they get matched at each location, possibly zero; the
destination (routing) probabilities for matches at each location; and the probabilities that
they will choose or be instructed to reposition from one location to the other. These delays
and the routing and repositioning probabilities are endogenous quantities consistent with
the network equilibrium, to be detailed later on.
3.2.2 Matching Supply with Demand
Admission control. Let λlk ≤ Λlk denote the effective route-lk demand rate, i.e., the rate
of trip requests that are served. Let λ be the vector of effective demand rates and Λ − λ
the vector of lost demand rates. A trip request may be lost either if there is no available
driver capacity at the time and location of the request (recall that riders are impatient), or
if the platform chooses to reject the request (e.g., based on the requested destination), even
though driver capacity is available. In the regimes detailed in §3.2.3, the platform exercises
either no or optimal admission control.
Matching at each location. At each location drivers that become available (i.e., do not
reposition upon arrival) join a single queue, to be matched by the platform with riders origi-
nating at this location. (Drivers cannot reject the platform’s matching requests.) Through-
out we assume that the platform matches drivers to accepted ride requests according to a
uniform matching policy, such as First-In-First-Out (FIFO) or random service order. Since
participating drivers are homogeneous to the platform, this is not restrictive. This implies
that in steady state drivers queueing at location l encounter the same waiting time, denoted
by wl, and are directed to route-lk with probability
λlk
λl1+λl2
. Let ql denote the steady-state
number of drivers queueing at location l. By Little’s Law we have wl = ql/(λl1 + λl2) for
l = 1, 2. Let w and q denote, respectively, the vector of steady-state waiting times and
queue lengths.
Repositioning of capacity between locations. Let ν12 and ν21 be the rates of drivers
repositioning from location 1 and 2, respectively, and ν = (ν12, ν21). Up to three flows
emanate from location l. Drivers that are matched with riders leave at rates λl1 and λl2,
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and drivers that reposition to location k 6= l leave at rate νlk (without queueing at location
l ). Therefore, letting η (λ, ν) denote the corresponding vector of steady-state repositioning
fractions, we have
η1 (λ, ν) =
ν12
λ11 + λ12 + ν12
and η2 (λ, ν) =
ν21
λ21 + λ22 + ν21
. (3.1)
Repositioning decisions are either centralized or decentralized, as detailed in §3.2.3. Under
centralized repositioning the platform controls the repositioning flows ν (e.g., drivers are
employees or autonomous vehicles) and the fractions η emerge in response through (3.1);
in this case we assume the drivers are informed about η. Under decentralized repositioning
the participating drivers choose the fractions η to maximize their individual profit rates,
and the resulting flow rates ν satisfy (3.1). In both regimes, drivers are homogeneous once
they have joined the network, and the resulting repositioning fractions, η, are the same for
all participating drivers.
Steady-state system flow balance constraints. Assuming a participating driver capacity
equal to n, the effective demand rates λ, repositioning flow rates ν and waiting times
w must satisfy: (i) flow balance between locations, λ12 + ν12 = λ21 + ν21, and (ii) the
capacity constraint
∑
l,k=1,2 λlktlk + (ν12t12 + ν21t21) +
∑
l=1,2wl (λl1 + λl2) = n, where∑
l,k=1,2 λlktlk is the number of drivers serving riders, ν12t12 + ν21t21 is the number of
drivers repositioning between locations, and
∑
l=1,2wl (λl1 + λl2) is the number of drivers
queueing in the two locations.
3.2.3 Three Control Regimes: Problem Formulations
We study three control regimes referred to as Centralized Control, Minimal Control and,
Admission Control, that differ in terms of (i) whether the platform does or does not exercise
admission control, and (ii) whether the platform controls or the drivers control repositioning
decisions. Each regime yields an optimization problem in terms of the tuple (λ, ν, w, n),
the system flow constraints described in §3.2.2, and the incentives of the platform and
the drivers that we formalize in this section. In all three regimes drivers make their own
participation decision by comparing their outside opportunity cost to their per-driver profit
rate from joining the system.
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Platform revenue. The platform’s steady-state revenue rate is given by Π (λ) := γpλ · t,
where γp is the platform’s commission rate per busy driver and λ · t is the number of
busy drivers, or equivalently, the number of riders being served. The welfare of riders, as
measured by served demand, is therefore proportional to the revenue of the platform.
Driver profit and equilibrium constraints. Drivers are homogeneous once they have
joined the network, as explained in §3.2.2, so all participating drivers achieve the same
steady-state profit rate. We can compute the per-driver profit rate in two ways: (i) as
the per-driver portion of the cumulative driver profits, for the participation equilibrium
constraint, and (ii) from the perspective of an individual driver circulating through the
network, for the repositioning equilibrium constraint.
First, the per-driver profit rate can be computed as follows
pi (λ, ν, n) =
(γ¯p− c)∑l,k=1,2 λlktlk − c(ν12t12 + ν21t21)
n
,
where the numerator is the total profit generated by all n participating drivers. A partici-
pation equilibrium requires n = NF (pi(λ, ν, n)).
Second, from the perspective of an infinitesimal driver circulating through the network,
her profit rate, denoted by pi(η˜;λ,w), is a function of her repositioning fractions η˜, the
routing probabilities implied by λ and the delays w in the matching queues. The explicit
form of pi(η˜;λ,w) is discussed in §3.4.1. The effective demand rates λ and delays w emerge as
equilibrium quantities that depend on the platform control and the decisions of all drivers.
A participating driver’s repositioning strategy is a vector of probabilities that specify for
each network location the fraction of times that the driver will, upon arrival, immediately
reposition to the other location. Since participating drivers are homogeneous, it suffices
to focus on symmetric strategies, where drivers symmetrically choose the fractions η˜ to
maximize pi(η˜;λ,w). In equilibrium, we require that the unique repositioning fractions
η (λ, ν) induced by the aggregate flow rates (λ, ν) through (3.1) must agree with individual
drivers’ profit-maximizing repositioning decisions, i.e.,
η (λ, ν) ∈ arg max
η˜
pi(η˜;λ,w). (3.2)
Since every driver chooses η (λ, ν), each earns the same profit rate, so that pi(η (λ, ν) ;λ,w) =
pi (λ, ν, n) for all (λ, ν, w, n) that satisfy the system flow constraints described in §3.2.2.
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Centralized Control (C). In the centralized benchmark the platform has “maximum”





s.t λ12 + ν12 = λ21 + ν21, (3.4)∑
l,k=1,2
λlktlk + ν12t12 + ν21t21 +
∑
l=1,2
wl (λl1 + λl2) = n, (3.5)
0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ, ν ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, (3.6)
pi (λ, ν, n) =
(γ¯p− c)∑l,k=1,2 λlktlk − c(ν12t12 + ν21t21)
n
, (3.7)
n = NF (pi (λ, ν, n)) , (3.8)
where (3.4)–(3.6) are flow balance conditions and (3.7) and (3.8) enforce the participation
equilibrium.
Admission Control (A). This regime differs from the centralized benchmark in that
repositioning decisions are decentralized, i.e., controlled by drivers. The platform must
therefore also account for the repositioning equilibrium constraint (3.2) and solves:
(Problem A) max
λ,ν,w,n
{Π (λ) : (3.1)− (3.2) , (3.4)− (3.8)} . (3.9)
Minimal Control (M). In this regime the platform does not exercise any demand ad-
mission control, and drivers control repositioning decisions. The platform simply matches
rider trip requests in a pro-rata (or FIFO) manner to drivers, and never turns away requests
when there are drivers available to serve them. In addition to (3.1)–(3.2) and (3.4)–(3.8),
the network flows should satisfy the additional conditions (3.10)–(3.12) that we discuss
next.







, l = 1, 2, (3.10)
i.e., routes originating at a location receive equal service probabilities (pro-rata service).
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Second, drivers cannot be repositioning out of location l if the potential rider demand
at that location has not been fully served, i.e.,
(Λl1 + Λl2 − λl1 − λl2)νlk = 0, l = 1, 2, k 6= l, (3.11)
and demand requests originating at a location l can only be lost if this location has no
supply buffer, so no drivers are waiting, i.e.,
(Λl1 + Λl2 − λl1 − λl2)wl = 0, l = 1, 2. (3.12)
In the Minimal Control Regime, the set of feasible tuples is given by
M = {(λ, ν, w, n) : (3.1)− (3.2) , (3.4)− (3.8), (3.10)− (3.12)} . (3.13)
We will show in §3.4.2 that for fixed participating capacity n, the set M is a singleton.
3.2.4 Reformulation to Capacity Allocation Problems
It is intuitive and analytically convenient to reformulate the above problems in terms of the
driver capacities allocated to serving riders, repositioning (without riders), and queueing
for riders.
For route lk, let Slk denote the offered load of trips, and slk denote the (effective)
capacity serving riders. Let S and s denote the corresponding vectors, S =
∑
lk Slk the
total offered load, and s =
∑
lk slk the total service capacity. From Little’s Law,
Slk = Λlktlk and slk := λlktlk, l, k ∈ {1, 2}. (3.14)
Let rlk be the capacity repositioning from location l to k, r = (r12, r21), and r = r12 + r21,
where
rlk = νlktlk, l 6= k, (3.15)
and ql be the capacity queueing at location l. Let q = (q1, q2) and q = q1 + q2, where
ql = wl(λl1 + λl2), l = 1, 2. (3.16)
Using (3.14)–(3.16) we can transform the formulations in §3.2.3 into equivalent problems
with respect to (s, r, q, n). With some abuse of notation, we write the platform profit
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function as Π (s) = γps instead of Π (λ), and similarly the per-driver profit functions as
pi(η˜; s, q) instead of pi(η˜;λ,w) and pi (s, r, n) instead of pi (λ, ν, n), and the repositioning frac-
tions in (3.1) as η(s, r) instead of η(λ, ν). For instance, the driver participation constraints
(3.7)–(3.8) are represented by




n = NF (pi (s, r, n)) . (3.18)
3.2.5 Two-Step Solution Approach
We propose a two-step solution approach to solve the platform’s revenue maximization
problem in each regime X ∈ {M,A,C}4. In the above formulations, denote by CX the set
of decision variables (s, r, q, n) that satisfy all the constraints for regime X except the driver
participation constraints (3.17)–(3.18). That is, CC = {(s, r, q, n) : (3.4) − (3.6), (3.14) −
(3.16)}, CA = {(s, r, q, n) : (3.1)−(3.2), (3.4)−(3.6), (3.14)−(3.16)}, and CM = {(s, r, q, n) :
(3.1) − (3.2), (3.4) − (3.6), (3.10) − (3.12), (3.14) − (3.16)}. The platform’s optimization
problem and the associated optimal revenue rate in regime X are given by
Π∗X := maxs,r,q,n{Π(s) : (s, r, q, n) ∈ CX , (3.17)− (3.18)}. (3.19)
We solve (3.19) in the following two steps.




{Π(s) : (s, r, q, n) ∈ CX}. (3.20)
Let piX(n) be the resulting reduced form of the per-driver profit pi(s, r, n) given by
(3.17).
Step 2 Solve for the equilibrium capacity of participating drivers, n∗X , from (3.18), i.e.,
n∗X = NF (piX(n
∗
X)). (3.21)






4For regime M , this simplifies to a feasibility problem.
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The following lemma provides a validity condition for this two-step approach to indeed solve
(3.19). (All proofs are included in the Appendix.)
Lemma 3.1 (Validity condition for two-step approach). Under constraints (s, r, q, n) ∈
CX , if for each n the per-driver profit is maximized under the platform’s optimal capacity
allocation, i.e., from Step 1:
piX(n) = max
s,r,q
{pi(s, r, n) : (s, r, q, n) ∈ CX}, (3.22)




X) from Step 2.
We show below that regimes C and M always satisfy condition (3.22), whereas this is not
the case for regime A, in which case we modify the two-step solution approach accordingly.
The implication is that when condition (3.22) holds, the welfare of riders is in fact consistent
with the revenue of the platform.
3.3 Centralized Control (C)
In the centralized control regime (C) the platform controls demand admission and driver
repositioning so as to maximize its revenue, and drivers make participation decisions in
response to the resulting profit rate. The optimization problem for this regime is (3.3)–











s+ r + q = n, (3.25)
0 ≤ s ≤ S, r ≥ 0, q ≥ 0, (3.26)




n = NF (pi (s, r, n)) . (3.28)
Following the solution approach outlined in §3.2.5, we present the solution of (3.23)–
(3.28) in two steps. First, in Proposition 3.1 we solve for
ΠC(n) = max
s,r,q
{Π(s) : (3.24)− (3.26)}, (3.29)
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the optimal capacity allocation assuming an exogenously given capacity of participating
drivers, n. Then, we characterize the resulting reduced form of the per-driver profit
pi (s, r, n) in (3.27) as piC(n), and establish in Corollary 3.1 that there exists a unique
equilibrium capacity of participating drivers, n∗C , as the solution of n
∗
C = NF (piC(n
∗
C)).
Proposition 3.1 (Allocation of fixed driver capacity under regime C). Consider the prob-
lem (3.29) for fixed driver capacity n. Define the constants
nC1 := S − (Λ21 − Λ12) t21 and nC2 := S + (Λ21 − Λ12) t12, (3.30)
where nC1 < S < n
C
2 . The optimal capacity utilization has the following structure. (Fig-
ure 3.4 (a))
(1) Scarce capacity (n ≤ nC1 ). All drivers serve riders: s = n; r = 0; q = 0.
(2) Moderate capacity (nC1 < n ≤ nC2 ). Drivers serve riders or reposition from the low- to
the high-demand location: s+ r12 = n where r12 = t12/ (t12 + t21) (n− nC1 ), r21 = 0; q = 0.
(3) Ample capacity (n > nC2 ). Drivers serve all riders, reposition from the low- to the
high-demand location, or wait in queue: s = S; r12 = n
C
2 − S, r21 = 0; q = n− nC2 .
Note that nC1 is the maximum offered load that can be served without repositioning,
nC2 is the minimum capacity level required to serve the total offered load, S, i.e., with
the minimum amount of repositioning, and nC1 < S < n
C
2 due to the demand imbalance
Λ21 > Λ12 (Assumption 3.1).
The results in Proposition 3.1 are intuitive. In the scarce-capacity zone 1 (n ≤ nC1 )
drivers are serving riders 100% of the time. The exact allocation of n is arbitrary except
s12/t12 = s21/t21 implied by r = 0. For n = n
C
1 the platform only loses the excess demand
from the high- to the low-demand location, Λ21−Λ12, whereas destination-based admission
control allows the platform to selectively direct capacity to serve all local requests (route-
22).
In the moderate-capacity zone, the platform uses destination-based admission control
and capacity repositioning to optimize performance; all drivers are moving around, so no
capacity is “wasted” due to idling. Repositioning is only needed from the low- to the
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high-demand location.5
In the ample-capacity zone 3 (nC2 < n), in addition to serving all riders and repositioning
as needed, there is spare capacity that will ultimately idle waiting to be matched with riders.
The zone-3 solution in Proposition 3.1 is not unique; multiple allocations of r and q support
serving all demand. However, the solution with r21 = 0, i.e., no repositioning from location
2 to 1, maximizes the drivers’ profit rate for given n, and supports the maximum achievable
equilibrium capacity.
Let piC (n) denote the per-driver profit under the optimal capacity allocation in Propo-
sition 3.1, as a function of the number of drivers n. Substituting s and r from Proposition










nC1 + (n− nC1 ) t21t12+t21
)
− c, zone 2 (nC1 < n ≤ nC2 ),
1
n(γ¯pS − cnC2 ), zone 3 (n > nC2 ).
(3.31)
This profit rate reflects the drivers’ utilization profile: in zone 1 they serve riders all the
time (with revenue rate γ¯p and cost rate c); in zone 2 they serve riders only a fraction of
the time but still drive around all the time; and in zone 3 they also queue a fraction of the
time.
Corollary 3.1 (Driver participation equilibrium under regime C). Under centralized ad-
mission control and repositioning,
(i) the platform’s optimal capacity allocation maximizes the per-driver profit, i.e., condi-
tion (3.22) in Lemma 3.1 holds;
(ii) there exists a unique equilibrium capacity of participating drivers, denoted by n∗C , which
solves n∗C = NF (piC(n
∗
C)), where piC(n) is the continuously decreasing per-driver profit
in (3.31) and limn→∞ piC(n) = 0.
5The capacity dedicated into repositioning captures, in a discrete, two-location network, the “wild goose
chase” phenomenon described in Castillo et al. (2017).
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Corollary 3.1 proves the validity condition in Lemma 3.1, so that the two-step approach
yields an optimal solution to Problem C given by (3.23)–(3.28). The uniqueness of the
equilibrium participating capacity n∗C follows from the monotonicity of piC(n).
3.4 Regimes with Decentralized Repositioning
In §3.4.1 we provide an explicit characterization of a driver repositioning equilibrium. Subse-
quently we characterize the system equilibria for two regimes: in §3.4.2 for Minimal Control
(M) where the platform exercises no admission control, and in §3.4.3 for Admission Control
(A) where the platform optimizes over admission control decisions. Finally, in §3.4.4 we
summarize the key differences between the equilibria of all three regimes, C, M, and A.
3.4.1 Driver Repositioning Equilibrium
Recall from §3.2.2 that under decentralized repositioning, drivers symmetrically choose
their repositioning fractions η˜ to maximize their profit rate pi(η˜;λ,w), and by (3.1) and
(3.2) a driver repositioning equilibrium requires η (λ, ν) ∈ arg maxη˜ pi(η˜;λ,w). That is, a
set of flow rates (λ, ν) and delays w admit a driver repositioning equilibrium if, and only if,
the unique repositioning fractions η (λ, ν) that are consistent with (λ, ν) are every driver’s
best response to (λ,w). Using (3.14)–(3.16) to map (λ, ν, w) to (s, r, q) , we henceforth
express the functions η(λ, ν) and pi(η˜;λ,w) as η(s, r) and pi(η˜; s, q), respectively. Lemma
3.2 characterizes the profit rate function pi(η˜; s, q). Its explicit expression is given in the
proof in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.2 (Per-driver profit rate). Let the function T (η˜; s, q) denote a driver’s expected
steady-state cycle time through the network, i.e., the average time between consecutive ar-
rivals to the same location. Let T s(η˜; s), T r(η˜) and T q(η˜; s, q) denote the expected time a
driver spends during a cycle serving riders, repositioning and queueing, respectively, where
T s(η˜; s) + T r(η˜) + T q(η˜; s, q) = T (η˜; s, q). The drivers’ expected steady-state profit rate is
an explicit function that satisfies
pi(η˜; s, q) =
(γ¯p− c)T s(η˜; s)− cT r(η˜)
T s(η˜; s) + T r(η˜) + T q(η˜; s, q)
. (3.32)
96
We have the following formal definition of a driver repositioning equilibrium.
Definition 3.1 (Driver repositioning equilibrium). A capacity allocation (s, r, q) forms a







+ s12 + r12







η(s, r) ∈ arg max
η˜
pi(η˜; s, q). (3.34)
Observe that under Assumption 3.1, it is not optimal to reposition from the high-
demand location (2) to the low-demand location (1). Therefore, we focus hereafter on driver
repositioning equilibria with η2 = 0 and r21 = 0. Condition (3.34) in Definition 3.1 yields
an explicitly defined set of capacity allocations (s, r, q) that admit a driver repositioning
equilibrium. We call this the set of driver-incentive compatible capacity allocations, denoted
by D, and specify it in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2 (Driver-incentive compatibility). There exists a driver repositioning equi-
librium with η2 = 0 if, and only if, the capacity allocation (s, r, q) is driver-incentive com-
patible, that is:
(s, r, q) ∈ D :=
(s, r, q) ≥ 0 : r21 = 0, q1

≤ q∗1(s) + k(s)q2 if r12 = 0
= q∗1(s) + k(s)q2 if r12 > 0
 , (3.35)
where q∗1(s) and k(s) are specified in (C.7), and q∗1(s) = k(s) = 0 if s11 + s12 = 0, and
q∗1(s), k(s) > 0 if s11 + s12 > 0. For (s, r, q) ∈ D the unique driver repositioning equilibrium
is given by (3.33).
The structure of the driver-incentive compatible capacity allocation set D is intuitive.
Inducing drivers not to reposition from location 1 (i.e., r12 = 0) requires a relatively
short location-1 queue, i.e., q1 ≤ q∗1(s) + k(s)q2. Inducing drivers to reposition from lo-




1(s) + k(s)q2; in this case, drivers are indifferent between repositioning to location 2
6Observe that the conditions r12 > 0 and q1 > q
∗
1(s) + k(s)q2 are mutually incompatible. The latter
condition implies that every driver repositions from location 1, but then no location-1 demand is served so
that q1 = 0.
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and queueing at location 1, and (3.33) identifies the unique randomization probability for the
corresponding symmetric driver repositioning equilibrium. Proposition 3.2 also foreshad-
ows the critical role that demand admission control plays in shaping drivers’ repositioning
incentives, to be discussed in detail in §3.4.3.
In light of Proposition 3.2, constraint (3.35) alone suffices to account for decentralized
repositioning in the problem formulations of regimes M and A: Given a driver-incentive
compatible allocation, the corresponding repositioning equilibrium fractions are immedi-
ately determined by (3.33).
3.4.2 Minimal Control (M)
In the minimal control regime (M) the platform exercises no admission control and drivers
make their own repositioning and participation decisions. We express the feasible set M,
given by (3.13) as the set of feasible capacity allocations (s, r, q, n). Using (3.14)–(3.16) the






, l = 1, 2, (3.36)
(Sl1 + Sl2 − sl1 − sl2)rlk = 0, l = 1, 2, k 6= l, (3.37)
(Sl1 + Sl2 − sl1 − sl2)ql = 0, l = 1, 2. (3.38)
Substituting (3.35) for (3.1)–(3.2) based on Proposition 3.2, and noting that (3.4)–(3.8)
correspond to (3.24)–(3.28), the set of feasible capacity allocations under minimal control
is given by
M = {(s, r, q, n) : (3.24)− (3.28), (3.36)− (3.38), (3.35)} . (3.39)
Following the solution approach outlined in §3.2.5, we specify the system equilibrium
in two steps. First, we characterize in Proposition 3.3 the unique equilibrium capacity
allocation of a fixed number n of participating drivers, and get
ΠM (n) = max
s,r,q
{Π(s) : (3.24)− (3.26), (3.36)− (3.38), (3.35)} (3.40)
Then, we establish in Corollary 3.2 that there exists a unique equilibrium capacity of par-
ticipating drivers.
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Proposition 3.3 (Allocation of fixed capacity under regime M). Consider the problem




















1 (S) , (3.41)
where nC1 and n
C








3 . There is a unique
feasible driver capacity utilization (s, r, q) to (3.40) with the following structure. (Figure 3.4
(b))
(1) Scarce capacity (n ≤ nM1 ). All drivers serve riders: s = n; r = 0; q = 0.
(2) Moderate capacity—no repositioning but queueing (nM1 < n ≤ nM2 ). Drivers serve all
riders at the low- and a fraction Λ12Λ21 of riders at the high-demand location, or queue at the
low-demand location: s = nM1 where s1k = S1k, s2k = S2k
Λ12
Λ21
for k = 1, 2; r = 0; q1 =
n− nM1 < q∗1 (S), q2 = 0.
(3) Moderate capacity—repositioning and queueing (nM2 < n ≤ nM3 ). Drivers serve all rid-
ers at the low- and more than a fraction Λ12Λ21 of riders at the high-demand location, reposition
from the low- to the high-demand location, or queue at the low-demand location: s > nM1
where s1k = S1k for k = 1, 2; r12 > 0, r21 = 0; q1 = q
∗
1(S), q2 = 0.
(4) Ample capacity (n > nM3 ). Drivers serve all riders, reposition from the low- to the high-
demand location, or queue at both locations in an incentive-compatible split: s = S; r12 =
nC2 − S, r21 = 0; q1 = q∗1(S) + k(S)q2, q2 > 0.
Proposition 3.3 differs in two ways from Proposition 3.1 for Centralized Control (regime
C). First, because the platform exercises no admission control in regime M, the maximum
offered load that can be served without repositioning, given by nM1 , is lower than under
optimal admission control (regime C), i.e., nM1 = n
C
1 − (1− Λ12/Λ21)S22. Specifically, with
destination-based admission control the platform could direct the scarce capacity to serve
all local traffic at the high-demand location. Second, and most importantly, because repo-
sitioning is decentralized in regime M, drivers can only be induced to reposition to the
high-demand location if there is a sufficiently long queueing delay at the low-demand loca-
tion. So, at lower capacity (zone 2), the low-demand queue builds up, but is not sufficient
to incentivize drivers to reposition to the high-demand location. Only at sufficiently high
capacity levels (zone 3) is the queue long enough for drivers to reposition. Since queueing
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is required to get sufficient repositioning to occur, the minimum capacity level required to
serve the total offered load, nM3 , exceeds the corresponding requirement under centralized
control, nC2 , by exactly the size of the queue that will provide the repositioning incentive.
Let piM (n) denote the per-driver profit under the equilibrium capacity allocation of
Proposition 3.3, as a function of the number of drivers n. (See the Proof of Corollary 3.2
in the Appendix for an explicit expression of piM (n).) It is easy to verify that piM (n) is
continuously decreasing in n and limn→∞ piM (n) = 0.
Corollary 3.2 (Driver participation equilibrium under regime M). Under no admission
control and decentralized repositioning,
(i) the platform’s optimal capacity allocation maximizes the per-driver profit, i.e., condi-
tion (3.22) in Lemma 3.1 holds;
(ii) there exists a unique equilibrium capacity of participating drivers, denoted by n∗M ,
which solves n∗M = NF (piM (n
∗
M )), where piM (n) is the continuously decreasing per-
driver profit.
Corollary 3.2 proves the validity condition in Lemma 3.1, so that the two-step approach
yields an optimal solution at which M as a singleton given by (3.39) is obtained. The
uniqueness of the equilibrium participating capacity n∗M follows from the monotonicity of
piM (n).
3.4.3 Admission Control (A)
3.4.3.1 Optimal Allocation of Fixed Capacity
In regime A the platform is free to choose the optimal admission control policy, while drivers
make their own repositioning and participation decisions. The corresponding capacity al-
location problem, the analog of (3.9), is given by
(Problem A) max
s,r,q,n
{Π (s) : (3.24)− (3.28), (3.35)} . (3.42)
Contrasting with (3.39), the platform’s control need not satisfy (3.36)–(3.38). We proceed
as before in two steps, but will modify the two-step solution approach in §3.4.3.3 to handle
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a special feature of the optimal platform control in this regime: the platform’s potential
strategic demand rejection discussed in §3.4.3.2. In that case the validity condition in
Lemma 3.1 may not hold and the exact equilibrium is more complicated. In Proposition 3.4,
we first solve for
ΠA(n) = max
s,r,q
{Π(s) : (3.24)− (3.26), (3.35)}, (3.43)
the optimal capacity allocation assuming an exogenously given capacity of participating
drivers, n.
Proposition 3.4 (Allocation of fixed capacity under regime A). Consider the problem
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3 and the optimal capacity utilization has the following
structure. (Figure 3.4 (c))
(1) Scarce capacity (n ≤ nA1 ). All drivers serve riders: s = n; r = 0; q = 0.
(2) Moderate capacity—no repositioning but queueing (nA1 < n ≤ nA2 ). Drivers serve all
riders except a fraction 1− Λ12Λ21 from the high- to the low-demand location, and queue at the
low-demand location: s = nA1 ; r = 0; q1 = n− nA1 < q∗1 (s), q2 = 0.
(3) Moderate capacity—repositioning, with or without queueing (nA2 < n ≤ nA3 ). Compared
to zone 2, drivers serve more riders at the high- but possibly fewer riders at the low-demand
location, they reposition from the low- to the high-demand location, and may queue at the
low-demand location: s > nA1 ; r12 > 0, r21 = 0; q1 = q
∗
1(s) ≥ 0, q2 = 0.
(4) Ample capacity (n > nA3 ): Drivers serve all riders, reposition from the low- to the high-
demand location, or queue at both locations in an incentive-compatible split: s = S; r12 =
nC2 − S, r21 = 0; q1 = q∗1(S) + k(S)q2, q2 > 0.
Proposition 3.4 differs in two ways from Proposition 3.3 for Minimal Control (regime
M). First, because the platform exercises admission control in regime A, the maximum
offered load that can be served without repositioning is the same as under Centralized
Control, i.e., nA1 = n
C






as discussed in §3.4.2. The exact allocation of n at scarce capacity (zone 1) is arbitrary
except s12/t12 = s21/t21, the same as in regime C.
Second and more importantly, whereas under Minimal Control the demand served on
each route increases in the total available driver capacity n, this may not hold under
optimal admission control: Compared to zone 2, in zone 3 the platform may reject, and
therefore serve fewer, rider requests at the low-demand location even if there are available
drivers, and even though there is more capacity in the network. The idea is to make it less
attractive for drivers to queue at the low-demand location by decreasing the served demand
rate, rather than by relying on the buildup of a long queue. This frees cars to reposition
and subsequently serve riders.7 We term this policy feature strategic demand rejection as it
reduces the revenue at the low-demand location, in order to incentivize drivers to reposition
and generate more revenue at the high-demand location. We elaborate on the rationale and
specify optimality conditions for this key result in §3.4.3.2 below.
3.4.3.2 Strategic Demand Rejection to Induce Driver Repositioning
Proposition 3.4 states that under moderate-capacity conditions (zone 3, nA2 < n ≤ nA3 ),
drivers may serve fewerriders at the low-demand location (1), compared to when there is
less capacity in the network (zone 2). In this case the optimal admission control policy
exhibits a somewhat counterintuitive behavior, whereby the platform rejects some or all
rider requests in the low-demand location, even though there is an excess supply of drivers,
that is, empty cars are leaving and possibly also waiting to get matched at this location.
This strategic demand rejection sacrifices revenue at the low-demand location, so as to
incentivize drivers to reposition from the low- to the high-demand location where they can
generate more revenue for themselves and for the platform. Specifically, rejecting rider
requests at the low-demand location creates an artificial demand shortage that drivers
offset by choosing to reposition more frequently to the high-demand location, rather than
joining the low-demand matching queue. The end result is a shorter queue at the low-
demand location (the waiting time may increase or decrease). In terms of Proposition 3.2,
7This property of the optimal platform’s control seems to be in contrast to the literature in ride-hailing
networks.
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rejecting demand at location 1 alters the driver-incentive compatible capacity allocation by
reducing the queue-length threshold q∗1(s), which frees up driver capacity to reposition and
serve riders at the high-demand location. By controlling congestion, the platform has an
operational lever to incentivize drivers to reposition, as opposed to, for example, increasing
their wage.
This control action can only be relevant when capacity is moderate; when capacity is
scarce all drivers are busy; when capacity is ample, all riders are served. For the moderate-
capacity zone (3), Proposition 3.5 identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the
optimality of strategic demand rejection in terms of the model primitives. To simplify














where ρ1 and ρ2 are the shares of the local-demand offered load at location 1 and 2, re-
spectively, τ is the ratio between cross-location travel times, and κ is the ratio of driving
cost to drivers’ service revenue (“relative driving cost”). Assumption 3.2 requires that
κ < τ/(1 + τ).
Proposition 3.5 (Optimality of strategic demand rejection in regime A). Under optimal
platform admission control and decentralized repositioning, it is optimal at moderate ca-
pacity, i.e., for some n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ], to strategically reject rider requests at the low-demand

















Note that condition (3.46) is necessary but not sufficient, for demand rejection to be
optimal at equilibrium. §3.4.3.3 explains the reason in detail and provides a sufficient
condition for demand rejection to be optimal at equilibrium. To gain some intuition we
discuss (3.46) under the simplifying assumption that τ = 1.
Effect of ρ2, the share of the local-demand offered load at the high-demand location.
8
Intuitively, if the local-demand share at the high-demand location ρ2 is low, then this
8For τ = 1 and κ > 0 the right-hand side (RHS) of (3.46) decreases in ρ2 from +∞ for ρ2 = 0 to −∞
as ρ2 → 1, so that (3.46) holds for ρ2 below some threshold.
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location is less attractive because of the higher likelihood that a driver will get matched
to a rider going back to the low-demand location; drivers have a weak “natural” incentive
to reposition to the high-demand location, so encouraging them to do so requires rejecting
demand at the low-demand location.
Effect of ρ1, the share of the local-demand offered load at the low-demand location.
9
Holding ρ2 fixed, which fixes the RHS of (3.46), the condition cannot hold for sufficiently
large ρ1, i.e., if the local demand at the low-demand location is dominant: In this case
drivers in the low-demand location may get stuck serving local requests and queueing in
between, which adversely affects their profit rate and makes repositioning naturally more
attractive.
Effect of Λ12/Λ21, the cross-location demand imbalance. The LHS of (3.46) is positive
and decreases to zero as Λ21 increases from Λ12 to ∞, where Λ12/Λ21 < 1 by Assumption
3.1. Therefore, (3.46) holds for sufficiently large Λ12, provided the RHS is strictly positive
(i.e., the local-demand share at the high-demand location, ρ2, is below some threshold,
as discussed above). Intuitively, more cross-location demand at the high-demand location
increases the value of rejecting demand at the low-demand location in order to induce
drivers to reposition.
Effect of κ, the relative driving cost. (3.46) can only hold for sufficiently large κ > 0.
When repositioning becomes significantly more expensive than queueing (for which drivers
incur no direct cost), the platform needs to strengthen the incentive for repositioning over
queueing at the low-demand location by rejecting demand there.
3.4.3.3 Equilibrium Characterization
As discussed above, when the platform exerts strategic demand rejection, there is a shorter
queue at the low-demand location and more drivers are incentivized to reposition from the
low- to the high-demand location. The per-driver profit at a given participation level may
therefore go down, as drivers pay for repositioning but not for queueing. Therefore, even
when the necessary condition for strategic demand rejection, (3.46), holds, the platform
9The left-hand side (LHS) of (3.46) increases in ρ1 from Λ12/Λ21 for ρ1 = 0 to ∞ as ρ1 → 1, so that
condition (3.46) holds if both local-demand shares, ρ1 and ρ2, are below some threshold.
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may be able to generate more revenue without rejecting location-1 demand. In particu-
lar, because at fixed participation level, strategic demand rejection maximizes revenue per
driver but may reduce per-driver profit, the platform faces the following trade-off: increase
revenue through strategic demand rejection at the expense of reducing the per-driver prof-
its and limiting driver participation; or increase revenue with less (or no) strategic demand
rejection, to boost per-driver profits and driver participation.
In this section we present a modification to the two-step approach that identifies how
to find the solution in regime A when Lemma 3.1 does not hold, and we obtain a sufficient
condition for strategic demand rejection to be optimal in equilibrium.
We propose the following modified two-step solution approach that bounds the equi-
librium participating capacity n∗A between two participation levels, the lower participation
that is obtained if the platform exercises strategic demand rejection to maximize its rev-
enue at each given participation level, and the higher participation that is obtained if the
platform completely forgoes strategic demand rejection.
Modified Two-Step Solution Approach
Step 1 Solve for the optimal capacity allocation for fixed capacity of participating drivers, n
ΠA(n) = max
s,r,q
{Π(s) : (s, r, q, n) ∈ CA}, (3.47)
and solve for the optimal capacity allocation in the absence of demand rejection in
the low-demand location when n ∈ (nA1 , nA3 ]:
ΠˆA(n) = max
s,r,q
{Π(s) : (s, r, q, n) ∈ CA, s1k = S1k for k = 1, 2, n ∈ (nA1 , nA3 ]}. (3.48)
Let piA(n) and pˆiA(n) be the resulting per-driver profit functions, respectively.
Step 2 Solve for the equilibrium capacity of participating drivers, nA, from
NF (piA(n
+
A)) ≤ nA ≤ NF (piA(n−A)), (3.49)
where n+A = lim↓0 nA+ and n
−
A = lim↓0 nA−, and solve for the equilibrium capacity
of participating drivers in the absence of strategic demand rejection, nˆA, from
nˆA = NF (pˆiA(nˆA)). (3.50)
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The actual equilibrium participating capacity n∗A ∈ [nA, nˆA] can be identified by
solving for Π∗A in (3.19) with n restricted to n ∈ [nA, nˆA].
As reasoned above, the per-driver profit need not be maximized under the platform’s
optimal capacity allocation when it involves strategic demand rejection. In this case the
original two-step approach is not valid by Lemma 3.1 and we propose the above modified
version. Moreover, while pˆiA(n) is continuously decreasing in n to a limit value of zero, piA(n)
also decreases in n to zero but is discontinuous under strategic demand rejection. Either
policy ensures a unique participation equilibrium. These observations and the modified
two-step approach are formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 (Driver participation equilibrium under regime A). Under optimal admission
control and decentralized repositioning:
(i) Allowing strategic demand rejection, the platform’s optimal capacity allocation may
not maximize per-driver profit, i.e., condition (3.22) in Lemma 3.1 does not hold;
there exists a unique equilibrium participating capacity nA which solves (3.49).
(ii) Disallowing strategic demand rejection, the platform’s optimal capacity allocation max-
imizes per-driver profit, i.e., condition (3.22) in Lemma 3.1 holds; there exists a unique
equilibrium participating capacity nˆA which solves (3.50).
(iii) The actual equilibrium participating capacity is n∗A ∈ [nA, nˆA]. When regime A does
not involve strategic demand rejection, i.e., condition (3.46) does not hold, n∗A = nA =
nˆA.
(iv) A sufficient condition for strategic demand rejection to be optimal is ΠˆA(nˆA) < ΠA(nA).
Proposition 3.6 identifies a plausible sufficient condition for strategic demand rejection
to be optimal in equilibrium under regime A, i.e., for Lemma 3.3 (iv) to hold.
Proposition 3.6 (Sufficient condition for strategic demand rejection in regime A). There
exists a positive threshold level of local-demand offered load at the high-demand location,
denoted by Sˆ22, such that if S22 ∈ [0, Sˆ22), then strategic demand rejection is optimal under
any equilibrium with moderate participating capacity n∗A ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ).
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Proposition 3.6 relies on the following intuition that holds in the absence of local demand
at the high-demand location 2. For drivers at the low-demand location 1, repositioning to
the high-demand location 2 is maximally unattractive if they find no local demand there
(S22 = 0), because this condition minimizes their utilization between the time when they
leave and the time when they return to the low-demand location. Therefore, giving drivers
the incentive to reposition without strategic demand rejection requires a very long queue
at the low-demand location and therefore substantial excess capacity, which reduces their
profits significantly. As a result, strategic demand rejection allows the platform to boost
revenues with only modest adverse effect on driver profits.
3.4.4 Graphical Depiction of Control Regimes C, M, and A
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 depict the broad features that are identified in Propositions 3.1, 3.3 and
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(c) Regime A
Figure 3.4: Optimal capacity allocation in three control regimes
riders under all three control regimes. (2) When capacity is ample, all riders are served,
and the three control regimes agree again. But, importantly, (3) with optimal admission
control and centralized repositioning the platform can serve the entire rider demand with less
capacity and without any drivers queueing at any location; in contrast, with decentralized
repositioning, in order to create the appropriate incentives, drivers need to queue. (4)
With admission control, the platform can (i) prioritize rider demand at the high-demand













































1 2 3 4
(c) Regime A
Figure 3.5: Driver time allocation in three control regimes
of repositioning, and (ii) reject rider demand at the low-demand location to incentivize
driver repositioning.
Switching to the driver’s view (Figure 3.5), additional platform control capability ensures
that drivers are busy for a larger fraction of their time, and thus more profitable.
3.5 The Impact of Platform Controls on System
Performance
In this section we compare the equilibrium performance of the three control regimes
{M,A,C} from the viewpoint of the platform, the drivers, and the rider service level.
3.5.1 Ranking of Platform Revenue, Per-Driver Profit, and Driver
Capacity
We start by ranking the platform revenue, the per-driver profit, and the driver capacity
under the three control regimes. Let ΠX(n) denote the platform revenue rate under the
equilibrium capacity allocation in regime X ∈ {M,A,C}, as a function of the participating
driver capacity n. Proposition 3.7 establishes that for fixed participating capacity both the
platform and the drivers are better off with increasing platform control capabilities.
Proposition 3.7 (Ranking of equilibrium profits for fixed capacity). For fixed participating
capacity n control capabilities have the following impact on profits:
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(1) The platform revenue rate increases with increasing platform control capability (M →
A→ C):
ΠM (n) ≤ ΠA(n) ≤ ΠC(n). (3.51)
(2) Centralized control maximizes the per-driver profit rate:
max {piM (n), piA(n)} ≤ piC(n). (3.52)
(3) Under decentralized repositioning, if (3.46) is not satisfied then optimal admission con-
trol increases the per-driver profit rate:
piM (n) ≤ piA(n). (3.53)
Parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 3.7 are as expected. Part (1) of Proposition 3.7 also
implies that riders benefit from increasing platform control capability: From the riders’
viewpoint, an important performance metric is the network-wide service level, defined as
the fraction of the total rider demand that is served. This service level equals the ratio
of total service capacity to total offered load, i.e., s/S. Since the platform revenue rate
is proportional to the total service capacity, i.e., Π (s) = γps by (3.23), the network-wide
service level is proportional to the platform revenue rate, and therefore increases with
increasing platform control capability by Part (1) of Proposition 3.7.
Part (3) of Proposition 3.7 establishes that optimal admission control typically benefits
drivers, provided that condition (3.46) is not satisfied. Conversely, if condition (3.46) holds
then by Proposition 3.5 the platform chooses to strategically reject demand in the low-
demand location at moderate capacity levels to induce driver repositioning; as a result,
drivers incur higher driving costs and may be worse off than without admission control (the
platform is still better off).
Proposition 3.8 establishes that the equilibrium driver participation increases with in-
creasing platform control capabilities, and as under fixed capacity, so do the resulting




X := piX (n
∗
X) denote,
respectively, the platform revenue rate and the per-driver profit rate, under the equilibrium
capacity allocation and levels in regime X ∈ {M,A,C}.
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Proposition 3.8 (Ranking of equilibrium profits and capacity). (1) The equilibrium plat-
form revenue rate increases with increasing platform control capability (M → A→ C):
Π∗M ≤ Π∗A ≤ Π∗C . (3.54)
(2) Centralized control maximizes the equilibrium driver participation and per-driver profit
rate:
max{n∗M , n∗A} ≤ n∗C and max{pi∗M , pi∗A} ≤ pi∗C . (3.55)
(3) Under decentralized repositioning, if (3.46) is not satisfied, then optimal admission
control increases drivers’ participation and profit rate:
n∗M ≤ n∗A and pi∗M ≤ pi∗A. (3.56)
Parts (2) and (3) follow from Parts (2) and (3) of Proposition 3.7, respectively, and





increases in the participating capacity n. Part (1) follows because the platform revenue
functions ΠC(n), ΠM (n) and ΠA(n) are increasing in n. Propositions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 imply
that the performance improvements reported in Proposition 3.8 are strictly positive if, and
only if, the equilibrium driver capacity is in the moderate-capacity zone where increased
control capability is effective.Corollary 3.3 makes these conditions precise.
Corollary 3.3 (Conditions for performance gains). Platform controls strictly improve prof-
its under the following equilibrium conditions:











A if and only if n
∗
M ∈ (nM1 , nM3 ), (3.57)
where nM1 and n
M
3 are defined in (3.41).











C if and only if n
∗
A ∈ (nA1 , nA3 ), (3.58)
where nM1 and n
M
3 are defined in (3.44).
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The equilibrium iff capacity conditions in (3.57) are satisfied when the potential driver
supply and the outside opportunity cost distribution are such that (i) more drivers are
willing to participate at the maximum profit rate (γp−c) than are needed to meet the rider
demand that can be served without repositioning (so n∗M > n
M
1 ), but (ii) not enough drivers
are willing to participate at the reduced profit rate resulting from the queueing delays and
repositioning costs that are necessary to serve all riders (so n∗M < n
M
3 ). Both of these con-
ditions seem plausible, and as such we expect admission control to benefit the platform and
the drivers in practical settings. A similar argument indicates that in practical parameter
regimes the iff capacity conditions in (3.58) also hold, i.e., that centralized repositioning is
beneficial.
3.5.2 Upper Bounds on the Gains in Platform Revenue and Per-Driver
Profit
In this section we provide upper bounds on the gains in platform revenue and per-driver
profit due to increased platform control as explicit functions of the network primitives ρ1, ρ2,
and τ defined in (3.45) across all feasible driver outside opportunity cost rate distributions.
Proposition 3.9 (Upper bounds on platform revenue gains). Fix N ≥ nM3 = nA3 .









































The key insight is that the potential revenue gains from both admission control and
centralized repositioning increase as a function of the cross-location demand imbalance
(Λ21/Λ12), and the cross-location travel time imbalance (τ = t21/t12). The condition N ≥
nM3 = n
A
3 requires that the potential driver supply is large enough to serve all riders under
decentralized repositioning. The upper bound on the gain from admission control (the
RHS in (3.59)) is attained if, under minimal control the platform can only meet the rider
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demand that does not require repositioning, and admission control allows the platform to
increase driver participation enough to serves all riders. The upper bound on the gain
from repositioning control in (3.60) has a similar interpretation. The upper bound in (3.59)
exceeds the bound in (3.60), because regime A allows the platform to serve more riders
without repositioning. The bounds in (3.59) and (3.60) can be approached arbitrarily
closely for specific choices of the opportunity cost distribution F (·), as discussed in Section
S2 of the Supplemental Materials.
Table 3.1 numerically illustrates the magnitude of the upper bounds in (3.59) and (3.60)
as a function of the cross-location demand imbalance Λ21/Λ12.
Table 3.1: Upper bounds in (3.59) and (3.60) on platform revenue gain (tlk = 1,∀lk, Λ12 =
Λ22 = 1)
(a) Balanced cross-local demand at low-demand location (ρ1 = 0.5)
cross demand imbalance (Λ21Λ12 ) 1 2 5 10
from admission control 0% 43% 150% 319%
from central. repositioning 0% 25% 100% 225%
(b) Imbalanced cross-local demand at low-demand location (ρ1 = 0.25)
(Λ21Λ12 ) 1 2 5 10
from admission control 0% 53% 189% 407%
from central. repositioning 0% 30% 120% 270%
Turning attention to the per-driver profit gain, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.10 (Upper bound on per-driver profit gains). Fix N ≥ nM3 = nA3 and
assume that (3.46) is not satisfied. The per-driver profit gain from admission control (under










τ − (1− ρ2 + τ)κ. (3.61)
In contrast to the bounds on the platform revenue gains in Proposition 3.9 that can
only be attained when more control yields repositioning, the bound in (3.61) can only
be attained in the absence of repositioning, i.e., when admission control increases drivers’
utilization to 100% with only a small increase in their participation. In the online appendix
we illustrate this tension between the drivers’ and the platform’s gains from control, along
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with the properties of the opportunity cost distribution F (·) that are required to attain
the bound in (3.61). In a nutshell, if a small change in per-driver profit rate increases
the capacity of participating drivers significantly, then the platform may extract significant
gains while drivers are only marginally better off; conversely, if it takes a large change
in per-driver profit rate to attract incremental participating driver capacity, then drivers
extract significant incremental profits, while the platform benefit is moderate.
3.5.3 Value of Platform Control: Numerical Illustration
We conclude with a numerical illustration of the value of platform control. Taking Minimal
Control with commission rate γ = 0 as the base case, we consider the performance effects
of Centralized Control with γ = 0 and γ = 0.2. We assume unit travel times, i.e., tlk = 1
for l, k = 1, 2, fix the price per unit time $p = 3, the driver cost rate $c = 1, the offered load
vector S = (1, 1, x, x) and consider the cases x = 2 and x = 5, corresponding to moderate
and large demand imbalance, respectively. We assume that drivers’ outside opportunity
costs are uniformly distributed on [0, p− c].
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Figure 3.6: Impact of Centralized vs. Minimal control on performance (x = S2k/S1k, k =
1, 2)
The graphs in Figure 3.6 depict the effects of Centralized Control on four equilibrium
performance measures, the total driver profit and platform revenue (left panel), the per-
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driver profit rate (center panel), and the rider service level (right panel), in the top row for
cross-location imbalance S21 = 2 and in the bottom row for S21 = 5. These measures are
shown as functions of the offered-load-to-driver-pool ratio S/N , where S is fixed. Because
F (p− c) = 1, all drivers in the pool would participate at the maximum achievable profit rate
p− c, i.e., if they could serve riders all the time and the platform extracted no commission
(γ = 0). However, due to the cross-location demand imbalance, serving all riders involves
repositioning (plus queueing under Minimal Control) which reduces the per-driver profit
rate below p − c, and requires more participating cars than demand (so n > S), so that
serving all riders in equilibrium is only feasible if S/N < 1.
We make the following observations, which appear robust to other system parameters
(and possibly to other general network structures).
Total driver profit and platform revenue. Panels (a) and (b) show the effects of Central-
ized Control on the total driver profit and platform revenue, in percentage terms relative to
Minimal Control with γ = 0 (100%). Irrespective of the commission rate, both the drivers
and the platform are best off at intermediate values of the offered-load-to-driver-pool ratio
S/N . At intermediate values of S/N , drivers are always better off under Centralized Con-
trol with a zero commission rate (γ = 0), but are only better off when the cross network
imbalance is significant (x = 5); it is natural to assume that S/N is itself moderate, say in
the interval (.5, 2), since otherwise the platform may choose to change the price that riders
pay to increase or to reduce demand, respectively.
Per-driver profit vs. total driver profit. Panels (c) and (d) show the effects of Centralized
Control on the per-driver profit, in percentage terms relative to Minimal Control with γ = 0.
Comparing with the total driver profits, we see that the change in the per-driver profit is
always significantly lower in magnitude relative to the change in total driver profits, because
participation is endogenous and large relative profit gains will be spread among an increasing
supply of participating drivers, or relative profit losses will be moderated by a decreasing
supply.
Rider service level. Panels (e) and (f) show the rider service level. In the Minimal
Control regime, the service level drops significantly when the load ratio S/N increases; this
is aggravated when the demand imbalance is higher. Centralized platform control boosts
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the service level significantly at moderate values of S/N . However, at at higher values of
S/N , when capacity is scarce, the adverse effect of the commission (γ = 0.2) on driver
participation may dominate the benefits of Centralized Control, resulting in a lower service
level; e.g., see panel (e) for S/N > 1.
In summary, in the presence of demand imbalance, platform control capabilities can
generate significant value for all parties at moderate load ratios, provided that the commis-




Surge Pricing and Dynamic Matching for Hotspot Demand Shock in
Ride-Hailing Networks
4.1 Introduction
Ride-hailing platforms such as Uber, Lyft and Via face non-stationary demand that exhibits
not only predictable time-of-day and day-of-week fluctuations, but also unpredictable de-
mand shocks that occur at a hotspot due to special events (e.g., the end of a concert, a
random disruption in public transportation, etc.). In presence of such shocks, the problem
of dynamically pricing and spatially matching rider demand and driver supply faces four
challenges: (i) The demand shock is of uncertain magnitude and/or duration. (ii) The rid-
ers are price- and delay- sensitive, and specifically they only accept matching delays that do
not exceed their idiosyncratic delay tolerance. (iii) The drivers are geographically dispersed
and behave strategically in deciding whether to proactively reposition toward the hotspot,
given their distance to and their expected payoff at the hotspot. (iv) Due to their travel
delay and payoff risk, the drivers’ response to a hotspot wage surge is both delayed and
uncertain. Motivated by these challenges, we study the platform’s optimal dynamic pricing
and matching control problem, focusing on two questions:
(i) What is the platform’s optimal surge pricing policy (in terms of rider price and driver
wage) and matching policy under a demand shock of uncertain duration?
(ii) How do the optimal policy and the system performance depend on the interplay of
three key timescales—rider patience, demand shock duration, and drivers’ travel delay
to the hotspot?
This work contributes to the literature on the sharing economy, with focus on ride-hailing
networks. The key novelty of this chapter is that it jointly considers (i) non-stationary
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demand, (ii) geographically dispersed supply and (iii) delayed incentives. Existing studies
focus on networks without incentives (e.g., Hu and Zhou (2015), O’Mahony and Shmoys
(2015), Braverman et al.(2016), Iglesias et al. (2016), Ozkan and Ward (2017), Freund et
al. (2017)), on single-location models with incentives (e.g., Bai et al. (2016), Benjaafar et
al. (2016), Cachon et al. (2016), Castillo et al. (2017), Gurvich et al. (2016), Riquelme et
al. (2016), Taylor (2016)), or on stationary networks with incentives (Afche et al. (2018),
Bimpikis et al. (2017)). Guda and Subramanian (2017) study surge pricing under non-
stationary demand in a two-location, two-period model. Castro et al. (2017) study surge
pricing and spatial supply response without timescale considerations.
We study the transient behavior of a ride-hailing network over a geographic area with
non-stationary demand at a hotspot. Riders are price- and delay-sensitive: they only accept
matches that cost less than their willingness-to-pay and arrive within their delay tolerance.
Drivers are dispersed over the geographic area and decide, upon receiving a hotspot wage
surge signal, whether to reposition toward the hotspot. They trade off local and certain
matches at the regular wage with hotspot matches at the surged wage that are subject to
the risk of being left unmatched when the shock ends. The platform seeks to maximize its
extra profit from the demand shock by jointly determining the pricing and matching policy.
Specifically, the platform responds to a demand shock with uncertain magnitude and/or
duration, (i) by dynamically controlling the rider price and driver wage, at a constant or
varying level over a fixed or random surge duration, where the features of these policies
are designed to moderate demand and incentivize drivers to proactively reposition toward
the hotspot; (ii) by spatially matching riders with drivers, subject to drivers’ incentive-
compatibility constraints (they trade off non-hotspot local matches with more profitable
hotspot matches), riders’ delay tolerance, and overall service level constraints.
We formulate and solve the platform’s profit maximization problem under two system
regimes: (1) centralized system: drivers are treated like “autonomous vehicles” and there is
no wage decision; (2) decentralized system: drivers are strategic and need to be incentivized
by a hotspot wage surge. We also characterize the impact of the key timescale parameters,
namely, the rider patience, the demand shock duration, and drivers’ travel delays, on the
optimal policy and the system performance.
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We contribute to the literature on three dimensions.
(i) Novel model of dynamic pricing and spatial matching under non-stationary demand.
The model we propose captures the interplay between non-stationary demand, geo-
graphically dispersed supply, and delayed and risky supply response and incentives.
The uncertain demand shock leads to a dynamic and stochastic hotspot surge price
and wage policy, and given the driver dispersion, yields delayed and uncertain supply
and incentives: a wage surge only affects the available supply after some (travel) delay;
and drivers only benefit from repositioning if they reach the hotspot “on time”.
(ii) Optimal dynamic pricing and spatial matching policy. We study and compare the
performance of various pricing policies under centralized and decentralized regimes.
For policies that equate the price/wage surge duration to the demand surge duration,
the decentralized system matches drivers from within a nearer distance, offers a higher
hotspot wage and charges riders a higher price. In responding to the wage surge,
drivers account for their risk of missing out by reaching the hotspot too late, so that
only nearby drivers reposition to the hotspot. Motivated by this result, we study price
policies that improve performance by optimally controlling the duration of the wage
surge vis- -vis the demand surge duration to mitigate drivers’ repositioning risk.
(iii) Impact of key timescales on the optimal policy and system performance. The optimal
rider price and driver wage at the hotspot, and the matching distance of non-hotspot
supply, depend crucially on the rider patience. Our results, contrasted with extreme
timescale parameter settings, provide intuition on asymptotic system behaviors where
riders are impatient (loss model) or infinitely patient (static planning), drivers that
can relocate to the hotspot quickly (light traffic) or slowly (heavy traffic), and the
demand shock duration is short (unpredictable events) or relatively long (predictable
intraday pattern). In the decentralized system, farther drivers are matched when the
rider patience is higher, the demand shock duration is longer, and drivers’ travel delays
to the hotspot are shorter; the hotspot surge price is higher when the rider patience
is lower, the demand shock duration is shorter, and drivers’ travel delays are shorter.
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4.2 Model and Problem Formulation
4.2.1 Hotspot Demand Shock
Hotspot Demand Shock. The hotspot demand shock has a magnitude, Λ(p) ≤ Λ¯, a decreas-
ing function of the rider price charged at the hotspot. We consider the shock duration to
be deterministic or exponential with mean T¯ , T ∼ exp(1/T¯ ).
Matching Decision. The platform offers wage surge signal to drivers within distance
ut, the wage surge range, at time t. The offered wage within ut should be high enough to
incentivize drivers to reposition to the hotspot. The surge duration is denoted by τ , which
can be the same as the demand shock duration T or longer.
Drivers can be matched if they are in the rider patience zone—within distance θ from
the hotspot. Therefore the actual matching rate at time t is the sum of instantaneous driver
available rate within distance θ and the driver entering rate at distance θ. Let φxt be the
matching rate at time t. We have
xt = min{ut, θ}+
∫ t
0
1(us ≥ θ + t− s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.1)
where the first term is the instant matching rate and the second term counts the entering
rate through the θ-zone. To get the second term, refer to Figure 4.1 (a). First note that
drivers entering the θ-zone at time t may be those that start repositioning at time s and
distance t − s from the θ-zone, for s ∈ [0, t], which is depicted by the −45 degree dashed
line; then integrating over [0, t] the time ds when the wage surge range at time s is larger













(a) General case (b) Assuming #̇% ≥ −1
Figure 4.1: Derivation of xt
Notice from Figure 4.1 (a) that, in the general case, xt involves summing the time
segments before t where u is above or on the −45 degree line, which can be mathematically
cumbersome. To simplify the exposition without loss of generality, we focus on the control
policies where u is continuous and does not decrease too fast so that xt has a straightforward
form. This is formalized by the following assumption and proposition.
Assumption 4.1. ut is continuous in t and u˙t ≥ −1, ∀t ≥ 0.
Under Assumption 4.1, we can derive xt given us, s ∈ [0, t] in the following proposition.
(All proofs are in the Appendix.)
Proposition 4.1. Given the surge range profile us ≥ 0, s ∈ [0, t] and assuming Assumption
4.1, the matching rate at time t is given by
xt =

ut if 0 ≤ ut < θ
θ + t if ut ≥ θ and t < u0 − θ
θ + δu(t) if ut ≥ θ and t ≥ u0 − θ
(4.2)
= (ut ∧ θ) + δu(t), (4.3)
where
δu(t) := max{0 ≤ s ≤ t : ut−s ≥ θ + s} (4.4)
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is the “delay of control” at time t—the state at time t is determined by the control δu(t)
time units ago. When {ut−s ≥ θ + s} = ∅, we follow the convention that δu(t) = 0.
Figure 4.1 (b) illustrates the derivation of xt under Assumption 4.1. When u˙t ≥ −1, ∀t ≥
0, the integral in (4.1) involves at most one time segment of length δu(t) instead of several
disconnected time segments. As a result, xt is only determined by the control δu(t) time
units ago.
The following corollary of Proposition 4.1 gives the derivative of x as a function of u
and its derivative.




u˙t if 0 ≤ ut < θ
1 if ut ≥ θ and t < u0 − θ
1− 11+u˙t−δu(t) if ut ≥ θ and t ≥ u0 − θ
, (4.5)
where u˙t−δu(t) denotes the derivative of u at time t−δu(t). If u˙t−δt = −1, x is discontinuous
at t with a downward jump and x˙t does not exist.
The third case in (4.5) captures the monotonic relationship between u˙ and x˙ (with time





(−1, 0) (−∞, 0)
−1 −∞
Table 4.1: Relationship between u˙t−δu(t) and x˙t when ut ≥ θ and t ≥ u0 − θ
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Figure 4.2: Exemplary control and state trajectories
Figure 4.2 shows exemplary control and state trajectories that contain all three cases in
Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.1. The delayed effect of u on x, xt = ut−δu(t), is depicted
by the three red dashed squares as examples. To distinguish the timelines of control u and
state x and avoid ambiguity, we use tu and tx respectively, instead of t, when necessary.
Let tx be the timeline of x (so xtx is an explicit form of xt), then let
tu := tx − δu(tx) (4.6)
be the timeline of u. The following lemma relates xtx , t
x and utu , t
u in terms of their value
and derivatives.
Lemma 4.1. For any tx ≥ (u0 − θ)+, xtx = utu. Furthermore,
(i) If 0 ≤ utx < θ, dtxdtu = 1.
(ii) If utx ≥ θ and u˙tu > −1, then
dtx
dtu
= 1 + u˙tu ≡ 1
1− x˙tx . (4.7)
If utx ≥ θ and u˙tu = −1, then xt is discontinuous at tx and dtx = 0.
Using Lemma 4.1, we can prove the following key lemma which relates the integral of
functions of utu and xtx .










4.2.2 Rider Price and Driver Wage
Let p0 and w0 be the constant rider price and driver wage at non-hotspot locations, respec-
tively. We assume the platform does not change non-hotspot pricing at any time. Next we
consider the pricing at the hotspot.
Hotspot rider price pt is a function of the matching rate, pt = p(xt), where p(x) is the
highest price to get φx ≤ Λ¯ hotspot demand:
Λ(p) = φx⇒ p(x) = Λ−1(φx). (4.9)
At time t, the platform’s hotspot revenue rate is therefore φp(xt)xt.
Let wt(y) be the incentive compatible (IC) hotspot wage at time t that makes a (marginal)
driver at distance y indifferent between staying local and repositioning to the hotspot. The
wage is quoted when the driver starts to reposition but is paid when the driver is matched.
When the IC condition—hence drivers’ repositioning decision—is time independent (which
is true under deterministic or exponential surge duration), the IC wage is also time indepen-
dent, denoted by w(y). Thereafter we are restricted to w(y) without explicit notification.
We consider two classes of wage quoting policies: broadcast and personalized message.
Under the broadcast policy, a common wage is quoted to all drivers (but paid individually
upon matching). Given that the platform chooses wage surge range ut and the IC wage
w(y) is increasing in y, all drivers that start repositioning at t will be paid w(ut) if matched
eventually. Hence the platform’s wage payment rate at time t is






1(us ≥ θ + t− s)ws(us)ds
]
. (4.10)
Under time-independent wage w(y) and using Proposition 4.1, we can show (DETAILS can
be a lemma) that (4.10) is simplified as




Note that if all repositioning drivers can be matched (which is true under deterministic
shock duration), we may adopt the wage-payable rate W˜ bt = w(ut)ut. In this case the
common wage w(ut) is IC to the marginal drivers at ut but overpaying drivers at x < ut.
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Under the personalized message policy, each driver at x is quoted his/her own IC wage
w(x). Hence the platform’s wage payment rate at time t is






1(us ≥ θ + t− s)ws(θ + t− s)ds
]
. (4.12)
Under time-independent wage w(y) and using Proposition 4.1, we can show (DETAILS can
be a lemma) that (4.12) is simplified as




4.2.3 Sequence of Events
In this continuous time model, the sequence of events is as follows.
(1) Platform determines wage surge range ut at time t.
(2) Platform quotes surged wage to drivers at u ∈ [0, ut] at time t using broadcast or
personalized message policy.
(3) Drivers within [0, ut] reposition toward the hotspot and are matched immediately (if
within [0, θ]) or later (if within (θ, ut] by the end of the surge duration).
(4) Matching rate φxt realized (xt yielded by us, 0 ≤ s ≤ t through (4.1))
(5) φxt riders are matched and charged total price φp(xt)xt;





4.3 Deterministic Demand Shock Duration
Given deterministic shock duration T > 0, the platform determines the wage surge range
ut > 0, t ∈ [0, τ ] and quotes the implied IC wage using the broadcast or personalized
message policy. As T is deterministic, optimal surge duration τ = T since (i) τ ≥ T—if it is
optimal to surge (τ > 0), then it is optimal to surge at least until T , otherwise there is lost
extra hotspot profit; and (ii) τ ≯ T—there is no hotspot demand after T ⇒ no matching
needed ⇒ no wage surge.
124
Since the demand shock duration and surge duration are both T known to all drivers,
only drivers that can be within the patience zone θ before the shock ends will reposition.
This gives rise to the IC wage determined by the following equation, where the wage is used






, y ≤ θ + T − t. (4.14)
It follows that the effective wage surge range needs to satisfy ut ≤ θ + T − t, for t ∈ [0, T ].






{[p(xt)xt −Wt]− (p0 − w0)ut} dt (4.15)
s.t. 0 ≤ xt ≤ θ + t, t ∈ [0, T ] (4.16)
0 ≤ ut ≤ θ + T − t, t ∈ [0, T ] (4.17)
xt = min{ut, θ}+
∫ t
0
1(ut−s ≥ θ + s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.18)
We next consider three wage policies with increasing flexibility:
(i) Static broadcast: set ut as a constant u in the above optimization problem and choose
W bt given by (4.11) in (4.15).
(ii) Dynamic broadcast: choose W bt given by (4.11) in (4.15).
(iii) Dynamic personalized message: choose W pt given by (4.13) in (4.15).
4.3.1 Static Broadcast Wage Policy
Under this policy the platform chooses a constant wage level w(u0) that is incentive com-
patible with surge range u0. The effective surge range ut hence follows the structure:
ut =

min{u0, θ + T − t} if u0 ≥ θ
u0 if u0 < θ
.
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{[p(xt)xt − w(u0)ut]− (p0 − w0)ut} dt (4.19)
s.t. ut =

min{u0, θ + T − t} if u0 ≥ θ
u0 if u0 < θ
, t ∈ [0, T ] (4.20)
xt = (ut ∧ θ) + δt, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.21)
Proposition 4.2 (Static Broadcast). Under the static broadcast wage policy, the optimal
wage surge range is u∗t = min{u∗0, θ + T − t}, t ∈ [0, T ] in which





G(u0)u0[T − (u0 − θ)] +
∫ u0
θ




where G(u) is the extra profit per hotspot match defined as
G(u) := (p(u)− w(u))− (p0 − w0). (4.23)
4.3.2 Dynamic Broadcast Wage Policy






{[p(xt)xt − w(ut)ut]− (p0 − w0)ut} dt (4.24)
s.t. 0 ≤ ut ≤ θ + T − t, t ∈ [0, T ] (4.25)
xt = (ut ∧ θ) + δt, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.26)
Proposition 4.3 (Dynamic Broadcast). Under the dynamic broadcast wage policy, the
optimal wage surge range is
u∗t = arg max
0≤u≤θ+T−t
G(u)u, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.27)
where G(·) is defined in (4.23).
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4.3.3 Dynamic Personalized Message Wage Policy












− (p0 − w0)ut
}
dt (4.28)
s.t. 0 ≤ ut ≤ θ + T − t, t ∈ [0, T ] (4.29)
xt = (ut ∧ θ) + δt, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.30)
Proposition 4.4 (Dynamic Personalized Message). Under the dynamic personalized mes-
sage wage policy, the optimal wage surge range is
u∗t = arg max
0≤u≤θ+T−t
Gp(u)u, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.31)








− (p0 − w0). (4.32)
4.3.4 Comparing the Three Wage Policies




t be the optimal solution in Propositions 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, re-
spectively, then ust ≤ ubt ≤ upt .
Theorem 1 compares/ranks the optimal surge range. Next to compare performance
measures and possible bounds on the improvement.
4.4 Exponential Demand Shock Duration
In this section we consider exponential demand shock duration, T ∼ exp(1/T¯ ). The plat-
form determines the wage surge range ut > 0, t ∈ [0, τ ] and quotes the implied wage using
the personalized message policy. We consider two types of surge duration τ : (i) restricted
surge duration where the surge ends when the demand shock ends, i.e., τ = T , and (ii)
relaxed surge duration where the surge may extend beyond the demand shock duration,
i.e., τ ≥ T , in order to incentivize faraway drivers.













1(τ − t ≥ (y − θ)+)wt(y)dydt
s.t. 0 ≤ xt ≤ θ + t, t ∈ [0, T ]
xt = min{ut, θ}+
∫ t
0










m (y +m− s)
y +m
fτ−t(s)ds.
We next consider the two surge duration types.
4.4.1 Restricted Surge Duration
The platform offers surged price and wage during the demand shock duration. As is men-
tioned in 4.2.2, since the surge duration coincides with the exponential shock duration, the
drivers’ repositioning decision is time independent but only location dependent, hence the



























ut if 0 ≤ ut < θ
θ + t if ut ≥ θ and t < u0 − θ
θ + max{δ ≥ 0 : ut−δ − θ ≥ δ} if ut ≥ θ and t ≥ u0 − θ










m (y +m− s)
y +m
fT (s)ds.
The following Lemma from Klinger (1969) transforms the expectation of an integral
over a random duration to an integral over the infinite horizon.








g(x,u, t)(1− F (t))dt. (4.34)
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T¯ (1− x˙t1(xt ≥ θ))xte−
t
T¯ dt,

























− (p0 − w0)e
(xt−θ)+












w(s)ds, L(x) := (p0 − w0)e
(x−θ)+
T¯ x, (4.37)













φ [R(xs)− (1− x˙s1(xs ≥ θ))L(xs)] e−
s
T¯ ds and V (x) := V (x, 0).
Since the cost function depends on time only through the discounting factor e−s/T¯ and the




V (x) = max
x˙≤1
{φ [R(x)− (1− x˙1(x ≥ θ))L(x)] + V ′(x)x˙}
= max
x˙≤1





T¯{φR(x) + V ′(x) + φ[1(x ≥ θ))− 1]L(x)} if φ1(x ≥ θ))L(x) + V ′(x) > 0
T¯ φ[R(x)− L(x)] if φ1(x ≥ θ))L(x) + V ′(x) = 0




1 if φ1(x ≥ θ))L(x) + V ′(x) > 0
any value ≤ 1 if φ1(x ≥ θ))L(x) + V ′(x) = 0
−∞ if φ1(x ≥ θ))L(x) + V ′(x) < 0
.
Therefore the optimal state trajectory {xt : t ≥ 0} is one where xt first increases at speed
1 from θ to x¯ which solves the second case:
1(x ≥ θ))L(x) + T¯ [R′(x)− L′(x)] = 0, (4.39)
and then stays at x¯. It follows that u∗0 = x¯.
4.4.1.1 Static Personalized Message Wage Policy





[R(xt)− (1− x˙t)L(xt)] e−
t
T¯ dt. (4.40)
Assuming R(x) is concave and unimodal (e.g., a linear price function p(x) and convex total
wage rate
∫ x
0 w(s)ds can imply this), since L(x) is convex, R(x) − (1 − x˙t)L(x) is concave
and unimodal for any fixed x˙t. Therefore, for policy class with x˙t = 0, the optimal solution
is
x∗t ≡ x∗ = arg maxx {R(x)− L(x)}, t ≥ u0 − θ. (4.41)
4.4.1.2 Dynamic Personalized Message Wage Policy
We consider if any deviation from the optimal static wage policy x∗ can yield extra profit.
In specific, we consider the deviation pattern that first increases x from x∗ at a constant
speed to x′, and then decreases x at (another) constant speed back to x∗. The intuition is as
follows: when increasing x, x˙t > 0 makes the profit rate in (4.40) higher than R(x)−L(x),
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while when decreasing x, x˙t < 0 makes the profit rate lower. However due to the exponential
decaying factor e−
t
T¯ , the profit gain in the increasing phase may exceed the profit loss in
the decreasing phase, resulting in a net gain.
The following lemma characterizes the profit gain (loss) from the aforementioned wage
deviation pattern.
Lemma 4.4. The profit gain from deviation x∗ v→ x′ u→ x∗ (increase x from x∗ to x′ at













































[(R(x∗)− L(x∗))− (R(x)− L(x))]
}
dx < 0, (4.43)
where the inequality follows for any v, u > 0 since x∗ maximizes R(x)− L(x).
Proposition 4.5. If T¯ = ∞, the static policy is optimal; if T¯ < ∞, there exists x′ > x∗
and v ≥ 0, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 such that repeated deviation x∗ v→ x′ u→ x∗ yields higher expected profit
than the static policy.
The intuition is that when the expected shock/surge duration is short, increasing x to
capture more matching may benefit more than the potential loss from the decreasing phase,
when the shock is more likely to have ended already. Based on the equivalent formulation
with an exponential decaying factor as in (4.35), the extra gain from the increasing phase
is discounted less than the extra loss from the decreasing phase.
4.4.2 Relaxed Surge Duration
Now we consider relaxed surge duration where the platform may surge longer than the de-
mand shock duration, i.e., τ ≥ T , in order to incentivize faraway drivers. By surging longer,
the platform shares some or all fail-to-match risk with the drivers and pays less hotspot
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wage to incentivize drivers. We study two specific policies of relaxed surge durations: (1)
guaranteed wage and (2) minimum surge duration.
With τ ≥ T , since it is profitless to offer surge signal (and wage) to any driver after the
demand shock, we make the following assumption on the wage surge range ut.
Assumption 4.2. ut = 0 for T ≤ t ≤ τ .
4.4.2.1 Guaranteed Wage
Under this policy the platform guarantees that all drivers who reposition before the demand
shock ends will be paid a certain guaranteed wage, depending on the starting position of the
drivers. This implies a time-varying leftover surge duration τ(t) = max{T − t, (ut − θ)+}
seen by drivers at time t. With guaranteed wage payment all repositioning drivers face
no fail-to-match risk, and hence their repositioning decision is time independent but only
location dependent. Denote w˜(x) as the incentive compatible hotspot wage for drivers at
distance x under the guaranteed wage policy. Consequently the incentive compatible wage
is lower than that under the restricted surge duration policy.
Lemma 4.5. w˜(x) ≤ w(x) for x ≥ 0. More specifically, w˜(x) = w(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ θ and
w˜(x) < w(x) for x > θ.






























ut if 0 ≤ ut < θ
θ + t if ut ≥ θ and t < u0 − θ
θ + max{δ ≥ 0 : ut−δ − θ ≥ δ} if ut ≥ θ and t ≥ u0 − θ














The following proposition shows that under certain static personalized message wage
policy, the optimal choice between restricted surge duration and guaranteed wage depends
on the expected demand shock duration T¯ .
Proposition 4.6. Under static personalized message wage policy with control ut ≡ u0 ≥
θ, t ≥ 0, there exists a threshold level T¯ ∗ > 0 such that the guaranteed wage yields lower
expected platform profit than the restricted surge duration if T¯ < T¯ ∗ and vice versa if
T¯ > T¯ ∗.
4.4.2.2 Minimum Surge Duration
Under this policy the platform announces a minimum surge duration τ0 > 0 such that the
actual surge duration is never shorter than τ0, i.e., τ = max{T, τ0}. The time dependent
incentive compatible hotspot wage wt(x) is given by:
wt(x) =

w˜(x) if (x− θ)+ ≤ (τ0 − t)+
w(x) if (x− θ)+ > (τ0 − t)+
, (4.46)
where w˜(x) and w(x) denote the (time independent) IC hotspot wage for drivers at distance
x that have guaranteed wage payment (no fail-to-match risk) and that face exponential
surge/shock duration (hence full fail-to-match risk risk), respectively.
Depending on the relative length of T and τ0, the platform’s wage payment to reposi-
















0 w˜(x)dxdt if τ = τ0 > T∫ T
0
∫ xt
0 [1(t ≤ τ0)w˜(x) + 1(t > τ0)w(x)] dxdt if τ = T ≥ τ0
, (4.47)
where the first equation uses Assumption 4.2 and the second equation follows from (4.46).
Hence the expected wage payment is φET∼exp(1/T¯ ) Eq.(4.47).
Lemma 4.6. Under the minimum surge duration policy, there exists a unique τ∗0 ≥ 0 that
minimizes the platform’s expected wage payment to repositioning drivers.
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{p(xt)xt − (p0 − w0)ut} e−
t
T¯ dt− φET∼exp(1/T¯ ) Eq.(4.47)
s.t. xt =

ut if 0 ≤ ut < θ
θ + t if ut ≥ θ and t < u0 − θ
θ + max{δ ≥ 0 : ut−δ − θ ≥ δ} if ut ≥ θ and t ≥ u0 − θ






















m (y +m− s)
y +m
fT (s)ds.
Under certain static personalized message wage policy, the following proposition com-
pares the minimum surge duration policy with the guaranteed wage and restricted surge
duration policies at different levels of demand shock duration.
Proposition 4.7. Under static personalized message wage policy with control ut ≡ u0 ≥
θ, t ≥ 0, the minimum surge duration policy yields higher platform profit than the guaranteed
wage policy when T ≤ τ∗0 , and than the restricted surge duration policy when T ≥ τ∗0 .
Corollary 4.2. When T¯ → 0, restricted surge duration policy yields the highest platform
profit; when T¯ →∞, guaranteed wage policy yields platform profit; when T¯ is intermediate,
minimum surge duration yields the highest platform profit.
4.5 Summary
Chapter 3 focuses on operational controls to manage the steady-state equilibrium; this
chapter, on the other hand, addresses transient but significant demand shocks at a hotspot,
and focus on the drivers’ strategic response to surge signals given delayed incentives. The
platform responds to a demand shock with uncertain magnitude and/or duration at a
hotspot, by optimizing (i) surge pricing, which is meant to moderate demand, and surge
wages meant to incentivize drivers to proactively reposition toward the hotspot, and (ii)
dynamic matching, which trades off non-hotspot local matches for more profitable hotspot
matches.
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The distinctive features of this chapter lie on the focus of system transient under non-
stationary demand, the network setting, and drivers’ strategic response to surge signals
given delayed incentives. Our focus on the time effects sheds light on the interplay between
rider patience, demand shock duration and driver’s travel delay, which together play a
crucial rule on the optimal operations of ride-hailing platforms.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1.4 is rather involved and lengthy and requires us to first demon-
strate the preservation result in the special case where β1 = β2 = 0, as per the following
Lemma.




{K1δ(y − x) + g(y)},
f2(x) = min
y∈[x−C′2,x]
{K2δ(x− y) + g(y)},
f(x) = min{f1(x), f2(x)}.
are also strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex for any C
′
1 ≥ C1, C ′2 ≥ C2.
Proof of Lemma A.1. (I) First, we show f1(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 . Let
∆1 = K1 + f1(x+ a)− f1(x)− a
b
(
f1(y)− f1(y − b)−K2
)
. (A.1)
It suffices to show that ∆1 ≥ 0 for y ≤ x, a ∈ [0, C1] and b ∈ (0, C2]. To this end, we
consider the following four different cases for the pair of values f1(x+ a) and f1(y − b).
(a) f1(x+ a) = g(x+ a) and f1(y − b) = g(y − b). In this case, we have
∆1 = K1 + g(x+ a)− f1(x)− a
b
(
f1(y)− g(y − b)−K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ a)− g(x)− a
b
(
g(y)− g(y − b)−K2
)
≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of f1(·), and the second inequality
follows from the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of g(·).
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(b) f1(x+ a) = g(x+ a) and f1(y − b) = g(y − b+ u) +K1 with some u ∈ [0, C ′1]. In this
case, we have
∆1 = K1 + g(x+ a)− f1(x)− a
b
(
f1(y)− g(y − b+ u)−K1 −K2
)
.
Based on the value of f1(y) we consider the following two subcases:
(b.1) f1(y) ≤ g(y − b+ u) +K1 +K2. Since a ∈ [0, C1] ⊂ [0, C ′1] we know f1(x) ≤
g(x+ a) +K1, hence
∆1 ≥ K1 + g(x+ a)− f1(x) ≥ K1 + g(x+ a)− (g(x+ a) +K1) ≥ 0.
(b.2) f1(y) > g(y − b+ u) +K1 +K2. Knowing that 0 ≤ u ≤ C ′1, first we show u < b.
Obviously, this is true if C ′1 < b. Otherwise consider b ≤ C ′1, suppose on the
contrary that b ≤ u ≤ C ′1, then y ≤ y − b + u ≤ y + C ′1 and by the definition of
f1(·) we have
f1(y) ≤ g(y − b+ u) +K1,
which together with the subcase assumption f1(y) > g(y − b + u) + K1 + K2
implies that K2 < 0, contradicting the fact that K2 ≥ 0. Hence we have shown
that 0 ≤ u < b, which implies b− u ∈ (0, C2]. Therefore
∆1 ≥ K1 + g(x+ a)− f1(x)− a
b− u
(
f1(y)− g(y − b+ u)−K1 −K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ a)− g(x)− a
b− u
(
g(y)− g(y − b+ u)−K2
)
≥ 0,
where the second inequality follows from f1(x) ≤ g(x) and f1(y) ≤ g(y) +
K1 by the definition of f1(·), and the last inequality follows from the strong
(C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of g(·).
(c) f1(x+ a) = g(x+ a+ u) +K1 with some u ∈ [0, C ′1] and f1(y − b) = g(y − b).
Since u ∈ [0, C ′1], we have f1(x) ≤ g(x+ u) +K1 and therefore
∆1 = K1 + g(x+ a+ u) +K1 − f1(x)− a
b
(
f1(y)− g(y − b)−K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ u+ a)− g(x+ u)− a
b
(
g(y)− g(y − b)−K2
)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of g(·).
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(d) f1(x+ a) = g(x+ a+ u) +K1 and f1(y − b) = g(y − b+ w) +K1 with some
u,w ∈ [0, C ′1]. In this case, ∆1 defined by (A.1) can be written as
∆1 = K1 + g(x+ a+ u) +K1 − f1(x)− a
b
(
f1(y)− g(y − b+ w)−K1 −K2
)
. (A.2)
Based on the value of f1(y) we consider the following two subcases:
(d.1) f1(y) ≤ g(y − b+ w) +K1 +K2. In this case if a + u ≤ C ′1, we know f1(x) ≤
g(x+ a+ u) +K1 and hence by (A.2) we have
∆1 ≥ K1 + g(x+ a+ u) +K1 − f1(x)
≥ K1 + g(x+ a+ u) +K1 − (g(x+ a+ u) +K1) = K1 ≥ 0.
If a+ u > C ′1, again by (A.2) we have




f1(y)− g(y − b+ w)−K1 −K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ a+ u)− g(x+ C ′1)





f1(y)− g(y − b+ w)−K1 −K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ a+ u)− g(x+ C ′1)





g(y + w)− g(y + w − b)−K2
)
≥ 0,
where the first inequality is from the definition of f1(·), the second inequality
follows from the fact that 0 < a + u − C ′1 ≤ a and the case assumption f1(y) ≤
g(y− b+w) +K1 +K2, the third inequality is again implied by the definition of
f1(·) such that f1(y) ≤ g(y + w) + K1, and the last inequality follows from the
strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of g(·) noticing that 0 < a+u−C ′1 ≤ a ≤ C1 and
x+ C ′1 ≥ y + w.
(d.2) f1(y) > g(y − b+ w) +K1 +K2. With the same proof as in (b.2) we can show
151
that 0 ≤ w < b, implying b− w ∈ (0, C2], hence using u ∈ [0, C ′1] we have,
∆1 ≥ K1 + g(x+ a+ u) +K1 − f1(x)− a
b− w
(
f1(y)− g(y − b+ w)−K1 −K2
)




g(y)− g(y − b+ w)−K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ u+ a)− g(x+ u)− a
b− w
(
g(y)− g(y − b+ w)−K2
)
≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from ab ≤ ab−w , since 0 < b− w ≤ b, the second
inequality follows from the definition of f1(·) such that f1(x) ≤ g(x+u)+K1 and
f1(y) ≤ g(y) +K1, and the last inequality follows from the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-
convexity of g(·).
Combining (a)-(d) we have shown that f1(x) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 .




{Kδ(y − x) + g(y)}, fg2,CK(x) = min
y∈[x−C,x]
{Kδ(x− y) + g(y)},
where both f1 and f2 are functions of g, C,K, and x. In part (I) we have essentially proved
that g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 implies fg1,C′1K1(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 for C
′
1 ≥ C1, and in this part we
want to show that g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 also implies fg2,C′2K2(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 for C
′
2 ≥ C2.
Applying Lemma 1.1 (i), if g(x) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 , then h(x) := g(−x) ∈ SCC2K2,C1K1 ,
and hence by part (I) we know fh1,C′2K2





{K2δ(y − x) + h(y)} = min−y∈[−x−C′2,−x]
{K2δ(−x− (−y)) + h(y)}.




{K2δ(−x− y′) + h(−y′)}
= min
y′∈[−x−C′2,−x]







(−x) ∈ SCC2K2,C1K1 . Applying Lemma 1.1 (i) again we see fg2,C′2K2(x) ∈
SCC1K1,C2K2 , confirming the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of f2(x).
(III) Finally we show f(x) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 . Let
∆ = K1 + f(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(
f(y)− f(y − b)−K2
)
. (A.3)
We consider the following four different cases for the pair of values f(x + a) and f(y − b)
to show that ∆ ≥ 0 for all y ≤ x, a ∈ [0, C1] and b ∈ (0, C2]. Notice that the definition of
f(x) implies f(x) ≤ f1(x) and f(x) ≤ f2(x).
(a) f(x+ a) = f1(x+ a) and f(y − b) = f1(y − b). We have
∆ = K1 + f1(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(
f(y)− f1(y − b)−K2
)
≥ K1 + f1(x+ a)− f1(x)− a
b
(
f1(y)− f1(y − b)−K2
)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows directly from the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of
f1(x).
(b) f(x+ a) = f1(x+ a) and f(y − b) = f2(y − b). We can rewrite (A.3) as
∆ = K1 + f1(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(
f(y)− f2(y − b)−K2
)
. (A.4)
Per definition, f2(y−b) = g(y−b) or f2(y−b) = g(y−b−u)+K2 with some u ∈ (0, C ′2].
We consider these two subcases:
(b.1) f2(y − b) = g(y − b). Since f1(y−b) ≤ g(y−b) by the definition, we have f(y−b) =
f1(y − b) and this subcase becomes case (a) and ∆ ≥ 0 follows.
(b.2) f2(y − b) = g(y − b− u) +K2 for some u ∈ (0, C ′2]. Then (A.4) becomes
∆ = K1 + f1(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(
f(y)− g(y − b− u)−K2 −K2
)
≥ K1 + f1(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(
g(y − u)− g(y − u− b)−K2
)
,
where the inequality follows from f(y) ≤ f2(y) ≤ g(y−u)+K2, by the definitions
of f and f2. Now if f1(x+ a) = g(x+ a), we have
∆ ≥ K1 + g(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(
g(y − u)− g(y − u− b)−K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ a)− g(x)− a
b
(




where the second inequality follows from f(x) ≤ g(x) and the last inequality
follows from the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of g(x). Otherwise if f1(x+a) =
g(x+ a+ w) +K1 for some w ∈ (0, C ′1], we have
∆ ≥ K1 + g(x+ a+ w) +K1 − f(x)− a
b
(
g(y − u)− g(y − u− b)−K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ a+ w) +K1 − f1(x)− a
b
(
g(y − u)− g(y − u− b)−K2
)




g(y − u)− g(y − u− b)−K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ w + a)− g(x+ w)− a
b
(
g(y − u)− g(y − u− b)−K2
)
≥ 0,
where the second and third inequalities follow from f(x) ≤ f1(x) and f1(x) ≤
g(x+w) +K1 with w ∈ (0, C ′1], respectively, and the last inequality follows from
the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of g(x).
(c) f(x+ a) = f2(x+ a) and f(y − b) = f2(y − b). The proof is analogous to case (a).
(d) f(x+ a) = f2(x+ a) and f(y − b) = f1(y − b). We can rewrite (A.3) as
∆ = K1 + f2(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(
f(y)− f1(y − b)−K2
)
. (A.5)
By its definition, f1(y − b) = g(y − b) or f1(y − b) = g(y − b + w) + K1 with some
w ∈ (0, C ′1]. We consider these two subcases:
(d.1) f1(y − b) = g(y − b). Since f2(y−b) ≤ g(y−b), per definition, we have f(y−b) =
f2(y − b) and this subcase becomes case (c) and ∆ ≥ 0 follows.
(d.2) f1(y − b) = g(y − b+ w) +K1 with some w ∈ (0, C ′1]. Then (A.5) becomes
∆ = K1 + f2(x+ a)− f(x)− a
b
(
f(y)− g(y − b+ w)−K1 −K2
)
. (A.6)
We first show that f(y) ≤ g(y − b+ w) +K1 +K2 always holds in this subcase.
To this end, note that b ∈ (0, C2] and w ∈ (0, C ′1], if w ≥ b, then w − b ∈ [0, C ′1)
and hence
f(y) ≤ f1(y). = inf
u∈[y,y+C′1]
{K1δ(u−y)+g(u)} ≤ g(y+(w−b))+K1 ≤ g(y−b+w)+K1+K2,
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otherwise if w < b, then b− w ∈ (0, C2) and hence
f(y) ≤ f2(y) = inf
u∈[y−C′2,y]
{K2δ(y−u)+g(u)} ≤ g(y−(b−w))+K2 ≤ g(y−b+w)+K1+K2.
We have thus proved that given b ∈ (0, C2] and w ∈ (0, C ′1],
f(y) ≤ g(y − b+ w) +K1 +K2. (A.7)
Similarly we can prove that given a ∈ [0, C1] and u ∈ (0, C ′2],
f(x) ≤ g(x+ a− u) +K1 +K2. (A.8)
Next we consider the possible values of f2(x + a). If f2(x + a) = g(x + a), then






≥ K1+g(x+a)−f1(x) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of f1(x). On the other hand
if f2(x+ a) = g(x+ a− u) +K2 with some u ∈ (0, C ′2], then by (A.6), (A.7) and
(A.8)
∆ = K1 + g(x+ a− u) +K2 − f(x)− a
b
(
f(y)− g(y − b+ w)−K1 −K2
)
≥ 0.
Consequently, combining (a)-(d) we have proved that f(x) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 . The proof of
this proposition is also completed.





{K1 + β1(y − x) + g(y)}, min
x−C2≤y≤x
{K2 + β2(y − x) + g(y)}, g(x)
}
.
Thus, continuity of g0(·) follows by showing that minx≤y≤x+C1{K1 + β1(y − x) + g(y)} is
continuous in x and minx−C2≤y≤x{K2 +β2(y−x)+g(y)} is continuous in x. Both continuity
results follow from Berge’s Maximum Theorem result, since the minimands are continuous
functions and the feasible sets are continuous correspondences of x, see e.g. Theorem 9.14
in Sundaram (1996).
It is not hard to see g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 ⇒ g1(·), g2(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 : Lemma 1.1 (iii)
shows that g(y) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 ⇒ g(y)+β1y ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 for any β1; then by Lemma A.1,
155
g1(x) + β1x = miny∈[x,x+C′1]{K1δ(y − x) + β1y + g(y)} ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 , and hence g1(x) ∈
SCC1K1,C2K2 using Lemma 1.1 (iii) again. Similarly we can show g2(x) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 .
Note that if β1 6= β2 we cannot directly apply Lemma A.1 to claim strong (C1K1, C2K2)-
convexity of g0(·).
For any x ≥ y, u ∈ [0, C1] and t ∈ (0, C2], we need to show that
0 ≤ ∆ = K1 + g0(x+ u)− g0(x)− u
t
(
g0(y)− g0(y − t)−K2
)
. (A.9)
As is in the proof of Lemma A.1 (III), we consider the following four cases for the pair of
values g0(x+ u) and g0(y − t):
(a) g0(x+ u) = g1(x+ u), g0(y − t) = g1(y − t);
(b) g0(x+ u) = g1(x+ u), g0(y − t) = g2(y − t);
(c) g0(x+ u) = g2(x+ u), g0(y − t) = g2(y − t);
(d) g0(x+ u) = g2(x+ u), g0(y − t) = g1(y − t).
First note that both g1(·), g2(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 , therefore case (a) and (c) can be easily
proved in the same way as (a) and (c) of Lemma A.1 (III), respectively.
For case (b), given g0(x + u) = g1(x + u) ≤ g2(x + u), if g1(x + u) = g2(x + u), this
becomes case (c). Otherwise, g1(x + u) < g2(x + u); then, by Corollary 1.1 (ii), we have
g1(y − t) ≤ g2(y − t) since y − t ≤ x + u. Thus, g0(y − t) = g1(y − t) = g2(y − t), so that
case (a) applies.
Thus, only case (d) remains to be proven. Notice that if g2(x+ u) = g(x+ u), then the
relations
g2(x+ u) = g0(x+ u) ≤ g1(x+ u) ≤ g(x+ u) = g2(x+ u)
implies g0(x+ u) = g1(x+ u) = g2(x+ u), so that case (a) applies. Similarly if g1(y − t) =
g(y− t), we can deduct that g0(y− t) = g1(y− t) = g2(y− t) and case (c) applies. Therefore
we only need to consider the distinct situations where
g1(y − t) = g˜1(y − t) = K1 + g(B(y − t)) + β1(B(y − t)− y + t) < g(y − t), (A.10)
g2(x+ u) = g˜2(x+ u) = K2 + g(S(x+ u)) + β2(S(x+ u)− x− u) < g(x+ u), (A.11)
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where B(·) and S(·) are defined by (1.27) and (1.28) with C1 and C2 replaced by C ′1 and
C ′2, respectively. For notational simplicity, we henceforth denote B(y − t) and S(x+ u) by
B˜ and S˜, respectively. Noticing that B˜ ∈ (y − t, y − t + C ′1], S˜ ∈ [x + u − C ′2, x + u) and
u ∈ [0, C1], t ∈ (0, C2], it is easy to see that
g0(y) ≤

g1(y) ≤ K1 + β1(B˜ − y) + g(B˜), if y ≤ B˜, (since B˜ ≤ y − t+ C ′1 < y + C ′1)




g1(x) ≤ K1 + β1(S˜ − x) + g(S˜), if x < S˜, (since S˜ < x+ u ≤ x+ C ′1)
g2(x) ≤ K2 + β2(S˜ − x) + g(S˜), if x ≥ S˜. (since S˜ ≥ x+ u− C ′2 ≥ x− C ′2)
(A.13)
We therefore distinguish among the 4 cases determined by the relative position of y vis-a`-vis
B˜ and x vis-a`-vis S˜.
(a) y ≤ B˜, x < S˜. In this case, by (A.12) and (A.10) we have
g0(y) ≤ K1 + β1(B˜ − y) + g(B˜) = g1(y − t)− β1t. (A.14)
Taking (A.11), (A.13) and (A.14) into (A.9), we get
∆ = K1 + g2(x+ u)− g0(x)− u
t
(
g0(y)− g1(y − t)−K2
)




g1(y − t)− β1t− g1(y − t)−K2
)












where the second inequality follows from
β2(S˜ − x− u)− β1(S˜ − x) = (β2 − β1)(S˜ − x− u)− β1u ≥ −β1u
by S˜ < x+ u and the assumption β1 ≥ β2.
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(b) y ≤ B˜, x ≥ S˜. In this case, taking (A.11), (A.13) and (A.14) into (A.9) we have
∆ = K1 + g2(x+ u)− g0(x)− u
t
(
g0(y)− g1(y − t)−K2
)









K2 + (β1 − β2)u ≥ 0.
(c) y > B˜, x ≥ S˜. In this case, taking (A.10)–(A.13) into (A.9) we have
∆ = K1 + g2(x+ u)− g0(x)− u
t
(
g0(y)− g1(y − t)−K2
)




K2 + β2(B˜ − y) + g(B˜)−K1 − g(B˜)− β1(B˜ − y + t)−K2
)












where the third inequality follows from
β2(B˜ − y)− β1(B˜ − y + t) = (β2 − β1)(B˜ − y + t)− β2t ≤ −β2t
by B˜ > y − t and the assumption β1 ≥ β2.
(d) y > B˜, x < S˜. Note that in this case we must have u ∈ (0, C1], since if u = 0 there
cannot be x < S˜ by S˜ ∈ [x+ u− C ′2, x+ u). It then follows that
g0(x) ≤ g2(x) ≤ K2 + β2(S˜ − u− x) + g(S˜ − u), (since x− C ′2 ≤ S˜ − u < x) (A.15)
g0(y) ≤ g1(y) ≤ K1 + β1(B˜ + t− y) + g(B˜ + t). (since y < B˜ + t ≤ y + C ′1) (A.16)
Depending on the order of B˜ + t and S˜ − u, we consider the following two situations:
(d.1) B˜ + t ≤ S˜ − u. The following ranking applies:
y − t < B˜ < y < B˜ + t ≤ S˜ − u < x < S˜ < x+ u,
where the first inequality follows from B˜ = B(y−t) > y−t and the last inequality
from S˜ = S(x+ u) < x+ u.
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Taking (A.10), (A.11) and (A.15), (A.16) into (A.9) we get
∆ = K1 + g2(x+ u)− g0(x)− u
t
(
g0(y)− g1(y − t)−K2
)




K1 + β1(B˜ + t− y) + g(B˜ + t)−K1 − g(B˜)− β1(B˜ − y + t)−K2
)
= K1 + g(S˜)− g(S˜ − u)− u
t
(
g(B˜ + t)− g(B˜)−K2
)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of strong (C1K1, C2K2)-
convexity of g(·) with x = S˜ − u, y = B˜ + t and u ∈ [0, C1] and t ∈ (0, C2].
(d.2) B˜ + t > S˜ − u. Now the following rankings apply:
y − t < B˜ < y < B˜ + t, S˜ − u < B˜ + t, S˜ − u < x < S˜ < x+ u. (A.17)
Note that (A.15) and (A.16) still hold.
Using (A.10) and (A.11), (A.9) can be written as
∆ = K1 + g2(x+ u)− g0(x)− u
t
(
g0(y)− g1(y − t)−K2
)




g0(y)−K1 − g(B˜)− β1(B˜ − y + t)−K2
)
.
Having mentioned that u > 0 in this case, ∆ ≥ 0 is equivalent to
g0(y) + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2
t




Conditioning on the signs of the two numerators on the left hand side of (A.18),
three subcases need to be considered:
(i) g0(y) + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2 ≤ 0. Then using (A.13),
g0(y) + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2
t
− g(S˜) + β2S˜ − g0(x)− β2x+K1 +K2
u
≤ −g(S˜) + β2S˜ − g0(x)− β2x+K1 +K2
u
≤ −g(S˜) + β2S˜ − [K1 + g(S˜) + β1(S˜ − x)]− β2x+K1 +K2
u
=
(β1 − β2)(S˜ − x− u)−K2
u
+ (β1 − β2) ≤ β1 − β2,
where the last inequality follows from S˜ < x+u and the assumption β1 ≥ β2.
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(ii) g(S˜) + β2S˜ − g0(x)− β2x+K1 +K2 ≥ 0. Then using (A.12),
g0(y) + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2
t
− g(S˜) + β2S˜ − g0(x)− β2x+K1 +K2
u
≤ g0(y) + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2
t
≤ [K2 + g(B˜) + β2(B˜ − y)] + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2
t
=
(β1 − β2)(y − t− B˜)−K1
t
+ (β1 − β2) ≤ β1 − β2,
where the last inequality follows from B˜ > y−t and the assumption β1 ≥ β2.
(iii) g0(y) + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2 > 0 and g(S˜) + β2S˜ − g0(x)− β2x+
K1 +K2 < 0. Before proving (A.18) we first show that, in view of (A.17),
there exist t0 and u0 with 0 < y − B˜ ≤ t0 ≤ t and 0 < S˜ − x ≤ u0 ≤ u such
that
g(y − t0) = K1 + β1(B˜ − y + t0) + g(B˜), (A.19)
g(x+ u0) = K2 + β2(S˜ − x− u0) + g(S˜). (A.20)
For v ∈ [y − B˜, t], let
h(v) = g(y − v)− [K1 + β1(B˜ − y + v) + g(B˜)],
which is a continuous function. Then, since
h(y − B˜) = g(B˜)− [K1 + β1 · 0 + g(B˜)] = −K1 ≤ 0,
h(t) = g(y − t)− [K1 + β1(B˜ − y + t) + g(B˜)] = g(y − t)− g˜1(y − t) ≥ 0,
by the mean value theorem there exists t0 ∈ [y − B˜, t] such that h(t0) = 0,
i.e., g(y − t0) = K1 + β1(B˜ − y + t0) + g(B˜). Similarly we can show the
existence of a value u0 satisfying 0 < S˜ − x ≤ u0 ≤ u and (A.20).
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Next we proceed to prove (A.18). We have
g0(y) + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2
t
− g(S˜) + β2S˜ − g0(x)− β2x+K1 +K2
u
≤ g0(y) + β1y − g(B˜)− β1B˜ −K1 −K2
t0
− g(S˜) + β2S˜ − g0(x)− β2x+K1 +K2
u0
=
g0(y)− [K1 + β1(B˜ − y + t0) + g(B˜)]−K2 + β1t0
t0
− K1 + [K2 + β2(S˜ − x− u0) + g(S˜)]− g0(x) + β2u0
u0
=
g0(y)− g(y − t0)−K2
t0
− K1 + g(x+ u0)− g0(x)
u0
+ β1 − β2
≤ β1 − β2,
where the first inequality follows from the conditions specifying case (iii);
the last inequality follows from the strong (C1K1, C2K2)-convexity of g(·)
and the fact that g0(·) ≤ g(·), specifically,
K1 + g(x+ u0)− g0(x)− u0
t0
(
g0(y)− g(y − t0)−K2
)
≥ K1 + g(x+ u0)− g(x)− u0
t0
(
g(y)− g(y − t0)−K2
)
≥ 0,
which implies (noticing t0 and u0 are both positive)
g0(y)− g(y − t0)−K2
t0
− K1 + g(x+ u0)− g0(x)
u0
≤ 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.4. The proof is analogous to that in Sections C.1 and C.2 in the
electronic companion of Huh et al. (2011). The proof is given in three parts:
Condition SC (a): X ′l1 > X l1: We compare two inventory level vectors X1 and X′1. Assume
that these two vectors are identical except X ′l1 > X l1 form some l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L − 1}. Let
∆ = X ′l1 −X l1. We will then prove parts (i), (iii) and (iv) of Condition (SC) (a). (Part (ii)
is not applicable since we consider the X ′l1 > X l1 case in in this part.)
For any Markov policy δ, let δ′ be the following policy. If l < L−1, then X ′L−11 = XL−11 .
Let the δ′ policy order or salvage the same quantity as the δ policy in every period. We
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call this the “mimic” policy of δ. If l = L− 1, then the δ′ policy initiates the same salvage
batches as the δ policy, but does not order anything for the first ∆ units ordered by the δ
policy, and then matches δ’s orders unit-by-unit. Recall ut = X
L
t −XL−1t is the number of
units ordered by δ in period t ≥ 1. Then, the order quantity u′t of the δ′ policy is given by,





t′=1 ut′ −∆]+ if
∑t−1
t′=1 ut′ < ∆
ut otherwise
.
Note that u′t is a feasible inventory adjustment quantity. In every period t ≥ 1: let t∗ denote
the first period in which u′t∗ > 0. Then u′t = 0 or u′t = ut for all t < t∗ and u′t = ut for all
t > t∗, both feasible. Moreover,









u′t = ut∗ ,




t ≤ ∆ by the definition of
t∗. We say δ′ is a “wait-and-mimic” policy of δ.
The remainder of the proof is analogous to that in Huh et al. (2011).
Condition SC (a): X ′l1 < X l1: The proof is is analogous to that in Huh et al. (2011) with
the following adaptation: In case l < L− 1, let δ′, the mimic policy of δ, order and salvage
the same quantity as the δ policy in every period. For the case where l = L− 1, the policy
δ′ mimics δ for the first T0 periods, i.e., it orders and salvages the same quantity as policy
δ; thereafter, the specification of δ′ is identical to that in Huh et al. (2011).
Condition SC (b): Analogous to the proof in Huh et al. (2011).
A.2 Additional numerical examples
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Figure A.1: Numerical example: high fixed ordering cost (big K)
Figure A.2: Numerical example: low fixed ordering cost (small K)
Figure A.3: Numerical example: large ordering capacity (big C)
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Figure A.4: Numerical example: small ordering capacity (small C)
Figure A.5: Numerical example: high unit cost (big c)
Figure A.6: Numerical example: low unit cost (small c)
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Figure A.7: Numerical example: small α
Figure A.8: Numerical example: long lead time (big l)
Figure A.9: Numerical example: zero lead time (l = 0)
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Figure A.10: Numerical example: high service level (big p)
Figure A.11: Numerical example: volatile demand (big σ)
Figure A.12: Numerical example: stable demand (small σ)
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1. We prove this theorem by induction. By our assumption, the
theorem holds for n = 0. Suppose the result holds for period n − 1, i.e., fn−1(·) ∈
SCCn−1Kn−1,Cvn−1Kvn−1 and fn−1(x) = O(|x|p). We first prove that fn(x) = O(|x|p). Since
fn−1(x) = O(|x|p), there exists a constant A > 0 such that |fn−1(x)| ≤ A|x|p; so that







EDp−ln |z|l ≤ Bmax{|z|p, 1}
for some constant B > 0. Let z∗(y) achieve the minimum in (2.8), then |f rn(y)| ≤
Kn + c
r
n|z∗| + αB|z∗|p ≤ Kn + crn(|y| + Cn) + αBmax{1, (|y| + Cn)p} = O(|y|p). By the
same argument, and since Ln(y) = O(|y|p), gn(y) = O(|y|p) and f1n(x), f2n(x) and fn(x) are
all O(|x|p).
We then prove that fn(x) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn . Since fn−1(·) ∈ SCCn−1Kn−1,Cvn−1Kvn−1 , by
Lemma 1.1 (iii) and (iv) in Chapter 1, and Assumption 2.3,
αEfn−1(z −Dn) ∈ SCCn−1(αKn−1),Cvn−1(αKvn−1) ⊂ SCCnKn,CvnKvn . (B.1)
It then follows from Proposition 1.3 in Chapter 1 and Assumption 2.3 that
f rn(y) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn . Since Ln(·) is convex, we have
gn(y) = Ln(y) + f
r
n(y) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn (B.2)
by Lemma 1.1 (iii). Finally by Proposition 1.3 again, f1n(x), f
2
n(x), fn(x) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn .
Proof of Theorem 2.2. brn ≤ b¯rn is immediate from their definitions. To prove the re-
mainder of Theorem 2.2, note that, in each period n, the value functions f1n(·), f2n(·), fn(·)
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satisfy a single stage problem of the following structure:
g1(x) = min
y∈[x,x+C1]
{K1δ(y − x) + β1(y − x) + g(y)},
g2(x) = min
y∈[x−C2,x]
{K2δ(x− y) + β2(y − x) + g(y)},
g0(x) = min{g1(x), g2(x)},
where g1(·) = f1n(·), g2(·) = f2n(·) and g(·) = gn(·). Define auxiliary functions
g˜1(x) = K1 + min
y∈[x,x+C1]
{β1(y − x) + g(y)},
g˜2(x) = K2 + min
y∈[x−C2,x]
{β2(y − x) + g(y)},
as counterparts of g1(x) and g2(x), under definitive inventory adjustment, i.e., definitively
incurring fixed costs for ordering or salvaging, respectively, and let Ai(x) = g˜i(x)− g(x) be
the increase in minimal cost if forced to order (for i = 1) or salvage (for i = 2).
We define the following critical points with the convention that the infimum (supremum)
of an empty set equals +∞ (−∞).















, s = sup{x : A2(x) ≥ 0}, s = inf{x : A2(x) < 0}.
These critical points play important roles in the structure of the optimal strategy. By
its definition, B is the (smallest) global minimizer of g˜1(x) if C1 = ∞, i.e., the smallest
order-up-to level for sufficiently small x if ordering is better than staying put. Similarly,
S is the (largest) global minimizer of g˜2(x) if C2 = ∞, .i.e., the biggest salvage-down-to
level for sufficiently large x if salvaging is better than staying put; b is the smallest among
all inventory levels where ordering is not better than staying put; b¯ is the largest among
all inventory levels where ordering is better than staying put; s is the largest among all
inventory levels where salvaging is not better than staying put; s is the smallest among all
inventory levels where salvaging is better than staying put.
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Note that by definition we have
g1(x) = min{g(x), g˜1(x)}, A1(x) < 0 ∀x < b, A1(x) ≥ 0 ∀x > b¯,
g2(x) = min{g(x), g˜2(x)}, A2(x) < 0 ∀x > s, A2(x) ≥ 0 ∀x < s.
The lemma below, which follows from Proposition 1.2 in Chapter 1, characterizes the
ranking of the critical points.
Lemma B.1 (Critical Points). Assume β1 ≥ β2 and g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2, then
(i) −∞ ≤ b ≤ b¯ ≤ s ≤ s ≤ ∞;
(ii) −∞ ≤ b ≤ B ≤ S ≤ s ≤ ∞;
(iii) If C2 =∞ and K1 ≥ K2, then b¯ ≤ B; if C1 =∞ and K1 ≤ K2, then S ≤ s;
(iv) If C1 = ∞ and K2 = 0, then b = b¯; if C2 = ∞ and K1 = 0, then s = s. If
C1 = C2 =∞ and K1 = K2 = 0, then b = b¯ = B,S = s = s.
In this lemma, (i) ranks four critical points. (ii) ranks and locates the global minimizers
B and S between b and s. (iii) and (iv) lead to simple policy structures, in certain special
cases. In particular (2.12) follows from Lemma B.1 (i) and (b) follows from
By Assumption 2.1, cen ≥ cvn. By (B.2) in the proof of Theorem 2.1, gn(y) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn .
Applying Theorem 1.2 in Chapter 1 with properly defined critical points, we immediately
obtain the optimal policy structure for ordering with the expedited supplier and salvaging,
as given by Table 2.1 (a). For the regular supplier, since αEfn−1(z −Dn) ∈ SCCnKn,CvnKvn
by (B.1) in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we can apply Theorem 1.2 again and use Corollary 1.2
to obtain the optimal policy structure given by Table 2.1 (b).











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Let {s(n∗X), r(n∗X), q(n∗X)} denote the optimal solution to (3.20) at
the equilibrium participating capacity n∗X obtained from (3.21), then clearly
{s(n∗X), r(n∗X), q(n∗X), n∗X} is a feasible solution to (3.19), with objective value ΠX(n∗X).
Note that better solutions to (3.19), if any, can only be achieved at n > n∗X since ΠX(n)
increases in n (as will be shown later in each regime X). However, any such solution
(s, r, q, n) ∈ CX at n > n∗X does not satisfy constraint (3.18) because










where the first inequality follows from (3.22), the second inequality is due to piX(n) decreas-
ing in n (as will be shown later in each regime X), and the last inequality follows from the as-
sumption that F (·) is continuously increasing on [0,∞). Therefore, {s(n∗X), r(n∗X), q(n∗X), n∗X}
is also the optimal solution to (3.19) and we have Π∗X = ΠX(n
∗
X).
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We start with the following observations about the optimal
solution.
(i) Allocating all capacity n towards serving riders (i.e., r = 0, q = 0) is feasible (hence
optimal) if and only if n ≤ nC1 . To see this, let




Then nC1 = S
C
1 · 1 = S − (Λ21 − Λ12)t21 is the maximum service capacity without
repositioning (r = 0). Therefore with r = 0 and q = 0, s ≤ nC1 ⇔ n ≤ nC1 by (3.25);
if n > nC1 , then r = 0, q = 0 is not feasible.
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(ii) Allowing for repositioning capacity r12 ≥ 0, the maximum service capacity achievable




, with r21 = 0 if r12 ∈ [0, nC2 − S]
S, with r21 = (S12 + r12)
t21
t12
− S21 > 0 if r12 > nC2 − S
.
To see this, from (3.24) we have s21 = (s12 + r12)
t21
t12





s11 + s12 + (s12 + r12)
t21
t12




where the maximum is achieved at s11 = S11, s12 = S12, s22 = S22, r21 = 0. Note
that the service capacity reaches its upper bound S when r12 reaches n
C
2 − S, i.e.,
nC1 + (n
C
2 − S) t21t12 = S. For r12 > nC2 − S, the maximum service capacity stays at S
with s = S, but r21 = (S12 + r12)
t21
t12
− S21 > 0 by (3.24).
With these observations, we can derive the optimal structure given by the Proposition.
Zone (1) follows directly from observation (i). In zone (2) and (3) where n > nC1 , by
observation (ii), the optimization problem with least repositioning travel cost (i.e., avoiding







: nC1 + r12
t21
t12
+ r12 ≤ n, r12 ∈ [0, nC2 − S], r21 = 0
}
.
When nC1 < n ≤ nC2 (zone (2)), the inequality constraint is binding and the optimal solution
is
r12 = (n− nC1 )
t12
t12 + t21









, q = 0.
For n > nC2 (zone (3)), the inequality constraint is not binding. With all the demand served
(s = S), the extra capacity waits in queues and the optimal solution is
r12 = n
C
2 − S, r21 = 0, s = S, q ∈
{
(q1, q2) : q1 + q2 = n− nC2
}
.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. (i) The validity condition (3.22) in Lemma 3.1 requires that the
per-driver profit is maximized subject to (3.24)–(3.26) at any n > 0 under the platform’s
optimal capacity allocation prescribed by Proposition 3.1. Note that





By Proposition 3.1, s = n, r = 0 for n in the scarce capacity zone (0, nC1 ], clearly pi(s, r, n)
is maximized; for n in the ample capacity zone (nC2 ,∞), s = S and r = (nC2 −S, 0) involves
the minimum repositioning capacity r = nC2 − S, hence pi(s, r, n) is also maximized.
For fixed n in the moderate capacity zone (nC1 , n
C
2 ], further increasing pi(s, r, n) requires
(γ¯p− c)∆s− c∆r > 0 ⇒ ∆r < γ¯p− c
c
∆s.
Since s is maximized under the platform’s optimal capacity allocation, it can only be de-






∆s ≤ 0, (C.2)
where the second inequality follows from Assumption 3.2. We next show that (C.2) cannot
hold due to the platform’s optimal capacity allocation and the flow balance constraint:
• By Proposition 3.1, the platform’s optimal capacity allocation in the moderate ca-
pacity zone (nC1 , n
C
2 ] has s11 = S11, s12 = S12, s22 = S22 and r12 > 0, r21 = 0, hence
s11, s12, s22 cannot be increased while r21 cannot be reduced. It then follows from
∆r12 + ∆r21 = ∆r < 0 by (C.2) that r12 must be reduced. To conclude, any change
of these capacity variables must satisfy
∆s11,∆s12,∆s22 ≤ 0, ∆r12 < 0, ∆r21 ≥ 0. (C.3)
























where the two inequalities follow from ∆s12 ≤ 0 and ∆r21 ≥ 0 in (C.3), respectively.
By (C.3) and (C.4), we have
∆s =
∑




which is a clear contradiction with ∆s > t21t12 ∆r from (C.2). Therefore pi(s, r, n) is indeed
maximized subject to (3.24)–(3.26) and the validity condition holds.
(ii) The existence and uniqueness of the participation equilibrium follows directly from
the fact that piC(n) is continuously decreasing in n with zero limit value as n→∞.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Drivers’ expected steady-state profit rate under policy pi(η˜; s, q)
in (3.32) follows from Renewal Reward Theory. We next derive its specific expression for
η = (η1, 0). W.L.O.G., we calculate the time functions over cycles starting and ending at
the low-demand location (1). Let plk = λlk/(λl1 + λl2) denote the probability of serving a
lk-ride at location l. The expected service, repositioning and queueing time functions are
as follows:
• The expected service time in a cycle is given by
















where 1−p21p21 t22 gives the expected time serving local demand at location 2. This
follows from the fact that the number of local rides at location 2 a driver serves
(“failures”) before picking a ride back to location 1 (“success”) follows a geometric
distribution of “success” probability p21.
• The expected repositioning time in a cycle is simply T r(η) = η1t12.
• The expected queueing delay in a cycle is given by











where 1p21W2 gives the expected queueing time at location 2. This follows from the
fact that the number of queueing delays (“trials”) at location 2 a driver encounters
before picking a ride back to location 1 (“success”) follows a geometric distribution
of “success” probability p21. Wl = Ql/(λl1 + λl2) is the queueing time at location l
due to Little’s Law.
Substituting the above time functions in (3.32) we have:
pi(η1; s, q) =
(γ¯p− c)
[
(1− η1)s21 t12t21 (s11 + s12) + (η1s11
t12
t11
+ s12)(s21 + s22)
]




(1− η1)s21 t12t21 (s11 + s12 + q1) + (η1s11
t12
t11










Proof of Proposition 3.2. With η2 = 0, and hence r21 = 0 by (3.33), the repositioning






























(1− η1)s21 t12t21 (s11 + s12 + q1) + (η1s11 t12t11 + s12)(s21 + s22 + q2) + η1s21 t12t21 (s11 t12t11 + s12)
]2






+ (s21 + s22)s12
(s21 + s22)−
(







(s11 + s12)− s11 cγ¯p
(s21 + s22)−
(












+ s12 + r12) from (3.33), by (C.6):
(i) When r12 = 0, η1(s, r) = 0 requires ∂pi/∂η1 ≤ 0, hence q1 ≤ q∗1(s) + k(s)q2;
(ii) When r12 > 0 and s11 + s12 > 0, η1(s, r) ∈ (0, 1) requires ∂pi/∂η1 = 0, hence q1 =
q∗1(s) + k(s)q2 with q∗1(s), k(s) > 0;
(iii) When r12 > 0 and s11 + s12 = 0, η1(s, r) = 1 and q
∗
1(s) = k(s) = 0, all drivers
reposition at location 1 without waiting in a queue.
It follows that the driver-incentive compatible capacity allocation set given by (3.35).
Proof of Proposition 3.3. We want to show there is a unique feasible capacity utilization
satisfying (3.24)–(3.26), (3.36)–(3.38) and (3.35), i.e., (s, r, q, n) ∈M given by (3.39). Note





, s21 = (s12 + r12)
t21
t12







We will focus on s12, r12, q, and recover the remaining quantities using (C.8). The other














r12 + q1 + q2 = n, (C.9)
q1

≤ q∗1(s) + k(s)q2 if r12 = 0
= q∗1(s) + k(s)q2 if r12 > 0
, (C.10)
(S12 − s12)r12 = 0, (C.11)
(S12 − s12)q1 = 0,
(
S21 − (s12 + r12) t21
t12
)
q2 = 0, (C.12)
0 ≤ s12 ≤ S12, 0 ≤ t21
t12
(s12 + r12) ≤ S21, r12 ≥ 0, q ≥ 0. (C.13)
We make the following observations about the feasible solution.
(i) The allocation where all capacity serves rider demand, i.e., r12 = 0, q = 0, s12 =
n
nM1
S12, is feasible if and only if n ≤ nM1 . (a) “⇒”: this is immediate; this also implies
that if n > nM1 , then r12 > 0 or q > 0. (b) “⇐”: given n ≤ nM1 , suppose first that
r12 > 0, then (C.11) implies that s12 = S12, thus s > n
M
1 and n > n
M
1 , a contradiction;
second, that q1 > 0, then (C.12) implies that s12 = S12, thus s ≥ nM1 and n > nM1 , a
contradiction; or third, that q2 > 0, then (C.12) implies that s21 = S21, r12 > 0, thus
n > nM1 is still a contradiction. Hence n ≤ nM1 ⇒ r12 = 0, q = 0, s12 = nnM1 S12, which
satisfies (C.9)–(C.13) and is thus feasible.
(ii) When n > nM1 , any feasible solution must serve all demand at location 1, i.e., s12 =
S12, and moreover, q
∗
1(s) ≡ q∗1(S). By (i), n > nM1 implies that r12 > 0 and/or q 6= 0,
and either of these assertions implies that s12 = S12 by (C.11) and (C.12). To show





+ (1 + S22S21 )
(1 + S22S21 )− (1 + S22S21 + t12t21 ) cγ¯p
s12,
which is equal to a constant multiplying s12. For s12 = S12, we have that q
∗
1(s) ≡ q∗1(S).
With these two observations, we derive the feasible solution given by the Proposition.
Zone (1): the result follows directly from observation (i).
176
Zone (2): for nM1 < n ≤ nM2 := nM1 + q∗1(S), observation (ii) gives s12 = S12 and
q∗1(s) = q∗1(S), so (C.9), (C.10) and (C.13) immediately imply that r12 = 0. Putting
s12 = S12 and r12 = 0 into (C.12) we get q2 = 0. It also follows from (C.9) that q1 = n−nM1 .
In this zone q1 increases with n while r12 = q2 = 0. The feasible solution is summarized as









, q = (n− nM1 , 0).
Zone (3): for nM2 < n ≤ nM3 := nC2 + q∗1(S), if s12 = S12 and r12 = 0, then q2 = 0 by
(C.12), which implies that q1 ≤ q∗1(S) by (C.10). By (C.9), this contradicts the fact that
n > nM2 . It follows that r12 > 0, and (C.10) yields q1 = q
∗
1(S) + k(s)q2. Together with
s12 = S12, it is then easy to verify that (C.9), (C.12) and n ≤ nM3 imply that q2 = 0. In this
zone r12 increases with n while q1 = q
∗
1(S), q2 = 0 and the feasible solution is as follows:
r12 > 0, s =
(
S11, S12, (S12 + r12)
t21
t12






, q = (q∗1(S), 0).
Zone (4): for n > nM3 , the above argument still implies that r12 > 0 and q1 = q
∗
1(S) +




− S12 = nC2 − S and s = S. In this zone q1 and q2 increase with n while s and
r stay constant. The feasible solution is given by
r = (nC2 − S, 0), s = S, q = (q∗1(S) + k(S)q2, q2).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. (i) By Proposition 3.3, at any n > 0 there is a unique feasible
driver capacity allocation under the constraints in (3.40), hence the per-driver profit is
naturally maximized and the validity condition (3.22) in Lemma 3.1 is satisfied.






γ¯p− c zone (1) (n ≤ nM1 ),
nM1





γ¯p− c zone (3) (nM2 < n ≤ nM3 ),
1
n(γ¯pS − cnC2 ) zone (4) (n > nM3 ).
(C.14)
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It is easy to see that piM (n) is continuously decreasing in n and that limn→∞ piM (n) = 0.
Therefore, the participation equilibrium condition (3.28), n = NF (piM (n)), has a unique
solution n∗M .
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We have the following observations about the optimal solu-
tion.
(i) Allocating all capacity n towards serving riders (i.e., r12 = 0, q = 0) is feasible (hence
optimal) if and only if n ≤ nA1 := nC1 . This is the same as observation (i) in the Proof
of Proposition 3.1. Also notice that constraint (3.35) is satisfied.
(ii) If for some capacity level n1 the service capacity s > n
A
1 , then for all capacity levels
n2 ≥ n1 the optimal solution involves repositioning. First, note that by the definition
of nA1 , s > n
A
1 , which implies that r12 > 0 (which holds at n1), and hence we only
need to show that the optimal service capacity at n2 is higher than n
A
1 . It suffices to
find one feasible solution at n2 that has the same service capacity as at n1, which is
higher than nA1 . To achieve this, let the service capacity vector s and the repositioning
capacity r12 > 0 at n2 be the same as those at n1, respectively, and put the extra
capacity n2 − n1 into q satisfying q1 = q∗1(s) + k(s)q2. In this way all constraints are
still satisfied while the service capacity s > nA1 remains unchanged.










1 defined in (C.1) such that S
A
1 ·1 = nA1 .





optimal service capacity is higher than nA1 , which then, by observation (ii), will prove
the result. To show this, for an arbitrarily small  > 0, let n be the minimum feasible
total capacity to provide service vector SA1 + (0, 0, , 0), and hence service capacity
nA1 +  > n
A








1 + (0, 0, , 0)),












((s11 + s12)γ¯p− s11c)s22 t12t21[
(s21 + s22)γ¯p− (s21 + s22 + s21 t12t21 )c
]2 > 0, ∀s22 > 0, s11 + s12 > 0,
(C.15)
i.e., q∗1(s) increases wrt s21 when s22, s11 + s12 > 0. Therefore, the optimal service




(iv) r12 = 0 for n ∈ [nA1 , nA1 + δ] for a small δ > 0. We first prove this for the optimal
solution at n = nA1 +δ by establishing that for any feasible q1 it must be that q1 < q
∗
1(s),
from which we deduce r12 = 0 from (3.35). Then, observation (ii) yields the same result
for n ∈ [nA1 , nA1 + δ]. Pick
δ = min
q∗1(SA1 ), (S12)2S12 (1 + t21t12)+ S21 + S22
 ,






















First note that the optimal solution at nA1 + δ must have s ≥ nA1 , since a feasible
solution s = SA1 , r12 = 0, q1 = 0, q2 = δ yields s = n
A
1 . Therefore
r12, q1 ≤ δ, s21 ≥ S12 t21
t12
, s12 ≥ S12 − δ > 0, (C.17)
where the first inequality follows from s ≥ nA1 and capacity constraint (3.25), the










+ (s21 + s22)s12
(s21 + s22)−
(



















where the the second inequality follows from the second and third inequalities in
(C.17), and the last inequality is by (C.16). Finally the first inequality in (C.17)
leads to q1 ≤ δ < q∗1(s), which implies that r12 = 0 by constraint (3.35). Hence
we have shown r12 = 0 at n = n
A
1 + δ. By observation (ii), the optimal solution at
n ∈ [nA1 , nA1 + δ] has service capacity s = nA1 and no repositioning.
(v) An optimal solution can serve all demand (s = S) if and only if n ≥ nA3 := nC2 +q∗1(S).
“⇐”: given n ≥ nC2 + q∗1(S), it is easy to verify that the capacity allocation s = S, r =
(nC2 − S, 0) and q1 = q∗1(S) + k(S)q2 with q1 + q2 = n − nC2 is feasible and serves all
demand (hence optimal). “⇒”: an optimal (hence feasible) solution that serves all
demand must have s = S, r = (nC2 − S, 0) and q1 = q∗1(S) + k(S)q2. By (3.25) this
yields n = nC2 + q
∗
1(S) + k(S)q2 + q2 ≥ nC2 + q∗1(S) = nA3 .
With these five observations, we can derive the optimal solution given by the Proposition.
Zone (1) follows directly from observation (i) and zone (4) follows from observation (v).
In (nA1 , n
A
3 ], not all drivers are serving riders and not all riders are served. There exists a






3 which separates zone (2) and (3) apart: in zone
(2), (nA1 , n
A
2 ], optimal solution has service capacity s = n
A
1 , no repositioning (r = 0), and
extra capacity queues at location 1 with q = (n − nA1 , 0); whereas in zone (3), (nA2 , nA3 ],
optimal solution involves repositioning (r12 > 0), serves s > n
A
1 , and extra capacity queues
at location 1 with q = (q∗1(s), 0).1 Note that nA2 > nA1 by observation (iv). nA2 < nA3 follows
from nA2 ≤ nA1 +q∗1(SA1 ) by observation (iii) and nA1 +q∗1(SA1 ) < nC2 +q∗1(S) = nA3 by property
(C.15). Furthermore, the fact that optimal solution involves repositioning at any capacity
level in zone (3) follows from observation (ii).
The following proofs of Lemma 3.3 and Propositions 3.7–3.8 refer to two technical
lemmas, Lemmas C.1 and C.2. The statements and proofs of these lemmas as well as the
proof of Proposition 3.5 are relegated to the Supplemental Materials.
1The steady state system flow equations do not differentiate between queueing in locations 1 and 2 in this
capacity regime. A more detailed transient analysis would show that when the platform makes admission
control decisions, it would choose to clear the queue in the high-demand location given that the demand
exceeds the available capacity, and drivers would only queue in the low-demand location.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. (i) When condition (3.46) holds, there is strategic demand rejection







γ¯p− c zone (1) (n ≤ nA1 ),
nA1
n (γ¯p− c) zone (2) (nA1 < n ≤ nA2 ),
1
n [(γ¯p− c)s∗ − cr∗] zone (3) (nA2 < n ≤ nA3 ),
1
n(γ¯pS − cnC2 ) zone (4) (n > nA3 ).
(C.18)
Note that there is no (simple) explicit expression in zone (3), in which the platform
may reject riders at the low-demand location if condition (3.46) holds. Nevertheless,
we show in Lemma C.2 (see Supplemental Materials) that piA(n) is decreasing in n and




A)) ≤ nA ≤ NF (piA(n−A)). (C.19)
In this case the validity condition for the two-step solution approach in Lemma 3.1 may
not hold.
(ii) When condition (3.46) does not hold, there is no strategic demand rejection at the
low-demand location. The platform’s optimal capacity allocation for n ∈ (nˆA2 , nA3 ] follow
pattern (1) in Lemma C.1 (see Supplemental Materials): only s21 is increasing. The proof
of the validity condition (3.22) in Lemma 3.1 is similar to that of regime C (in the proof
of Corollary 3.1): First, the logic for the scarce and ample capacity zones, (0, nA1 ] and
(nA3 ,∞), is identical to that in the proof of Corollary 3.1. Second, in zone 2–moderate
capacity without repositioning, (nA1 , nˆ
A
2 ], there is zero repositioning capacity so that r = 0
cannot be reduced, hence inequality (C.2) in the proof of Corollary 3.1 is immediately
violated and it follows that the per-driver profit pi(s, r, n) is maximized. Third, in zone
3–moderate capacity with repositioning, (nˆA2 , n
A
3 ], the argument is identical to that in zone
3 of regime C. In particular, any feasible deviation from the platform’s optimal capacity
allocation cannot increase the per-driver profit.
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To establish the unique solution nˆA to the participation equilibrium nˆA = NF (pˆiA(nˆA)),
just notice that pˆiA(n) is continuous following pattern (1) in Lemma C.1 (see Supplemental
Materials), and case (i) in Lemma C.2 shows that pˆiA(n) decreases in n.
(iii) First, by definition nA and nˆA (and their associated optimal capacity allocations)
are both feasible solutions to problem (3.19) with X = A. Next, we show that no better
equilibrium can be established at n < nA or n > nˆA. On the one hand, if there exists an
equilibrium at n < nA with associated optimal service vector s, then it must be suboptimal
since
Π(s) ≤ ΠA(n) ≤ ΠA(nA),
where the first inequality is by definition that ΠA(n) is the maximum platform revenue at
n subject to (s, r, q, n) ∈ CA, and the second inequality follows from the monotonicity of
ΠA(·) given by Proposition 3.4. On the other hand, any solution (s, r, q, n) ∈ CA at n > nˆA
does not satisfy the driver participation constraint because










where the first inequality follows from the validity condition (3.22) in Lemma 3.1 that
is proved in part (ii), the second inequality is due to pˆiA(n) decreasing in n shown by
Lemma C.2 in the Supplemental Materials (see, in particular, case (i) in its proof), and the
last inequality follows from the assumption that F (·) is continuously increasing on [0,∞).
Therefore, the actual equilibrium participating capacity n∗A must lie in [nA, nˆA]. When
regime A does not involve strategic demand rejection, i.e., condition (3.46) in Proposition
5 does not hold, ΠA(n) = ΠˆA(n) and hence n
∗
A = nA = nˆA.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. We first prove the case S22 = 0 and then establish the thresh-
old level Sˆ22 > 0.
(1) When S22 = 0, we have the following four properties (i)–(iv) regarding the platform
revenue and per-driver profit under optimal capacity allocation allowing or disallowing
strategic demand rejection:
(i) Condition (3.46) in Proposition 3.5 immediately holds.
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In the following, we show that under S22 = 0 (hence s22 = 0), the 3 patterns of optimal
capacity allocation as a function of participating capacity n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ) established in
Lemma C.1 and its proof in the Supplemental Materials can be significantly simplified.

















































< ∂n∂s12 and all are independent of the service capacity on each route,
i.e., the second derivatives are all zero. Noticing that s1(n
A
3 ) = s2(n
A
3 ) = s3(n
A
3 ) = S
and the patterns specified in Lemma C.1, a direct implication is that
s3(n) ≥ s2(n) > s1(n), n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ),
i.e., pattern (3) yields the largest service capacity at any n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ) and strictly dom-
inates pattern (1) which disallows strategic demand rejection. In fact, the platform’s
optimal capacity allocation follows pattern (3) when strategic demand rejection is al-
lowed and follows pattern (1) when disallowed. Consequently, we have nA2 = s3
−1(nA1 ),
the left end of the pattern (3) interval, and nˆA2 = s1
−1(nA1 ), the left end of the pattern
(1) interval, together with the following two properties:













2 ) and strictly
increases on [nˆA2 , n
A





Similarly, the per-driver profit rate as a function of participating capacity n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 )
under each pattern established in the proof of Lemma C.2 in the Supplemental Materials
can be simplified as follows. Setting S22 = 0, we immediately find pi
′(n) = 0 within
each pattern given by (C.53)–(C.57). Note that under pattern (1), pi′(n) < 0 for
n < s1
−1(nA1 ) = nˆA2 . As a result, we have the following property about per-driver
profits:
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stays constant on (nˆA2 , n
A








(2) If n∗A ∈ (nA2 , nˆA2 ), there must be nA2 < nA < nˆA < nˆA2 following from piA(n) < pˆiA(n)
in (1.iv) and the monotonicity assumption on F (·). Hence by ΠA(n) > ΠA(nA2 ), ∀n ∈
(nA2 , nˆ
A
2 ) and ΠˆA(n) ≡ ΠA(nA2 ),∀n ∈ (nA2 , nˆA2 ) due to (1.iii), there must be ΠˆA(nˆA) =
ΠA(n
A
2 ) < ΠA(nA). By Lemma 3.3 (iv) strategic demand rejection is optimal.





A). By Lemma 3.3 (iv) strategic demand rejection is optimal.
By continuity, the above results still hold for sufficiently small S22. Specifically, we have
the following observations:
(i) The platform’s optimal revenues allowing or disallowing strategic demand rejection,
ΠA(n) and ΠˆA(n), are both continuous in n and S22.
(ii) The resulting per-driver profits allowing or disallowing strategic demand rejection,
piA(n) and pˆiA(n), are both continuous in n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ) and S22.
(iii) The drivers’ opportunity cost distribution F (·) is continuous and strictly increasing.
(iv) Due to (ii) and (iii), the equilibrium participating capacities allowing or disallowing
strategic demand rejection, nA and nˆA, are both continuous in S22.
Since we have shown in the first part that ΠˆA(nˆA) < ΠA(nA) always holds for n
∗
A ∈ (nA2 , nA3 )
at S22 = 0, it follows from (i) and (iv) that ΠˆA(nˆA) < ΠA(nA) still holds for sufficiently small
S22 > 0. We also know that condition (3.46) in Proposition 3.5 does not hold for sufficiently
large S22, hence by continuity there exists Sˆ22 > 0 such that ΠˆA(nˆA) < ΠA(nA), ∀S22 ∈
[0, Sˆ22), i.e, strategic demand rejection is optimal in a neighborhood of S22 = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.7. (1) Given a level of participating capacity n, the platform
revenue rate under the three control regimes {M,A,C} is computed as follows:
ΠM (n) = arg max
s,r,q
{Π(s) : (3.24)− (3.26), (3.36)− (3.38), (3.35)},
ΠA(n) = arg max
s,r,q
{Π(s) : (3.24)− (3.26), (3.35)},
ΠC(n) = arg max
s,r,q
{Π(s) : (3.24)− (3.26)}.
These formulations share the same objective function, but have a decreasing set of con-
straints from M → A→ C, from where (3.51) holds.
(2) and (3): Based on (3.31), (C.14) and (C.18), it is straightforward to verify that
piM (n) ≤ piC(n) for any n, and to verify that piM (n) ≤ piA(n) ≤ piC(n) for n ≤ nA2 and
n > nA3 (i.e., zone (1), (2) and (4) in Proposition 3.4 for regime A). For n
A
2 < n ≤ nA3 (zone
(3) of regime A), using Lemma C.1 one can verify that piA(n) ≤ piC(n) always holds, and
piM (n) ≤ piA(n) holds if (3.46) is not satisfied. This proves (3.52) and (3.53).
Proof of Proposition 3.8. Note the following properties about ΠX(·), piX(·) and n∗X :
(i) Proposition 3.7 (1), ΠM (n) ≤ ΠA(n) ≤ ΠC(n),∀n. It is also easy to verify that ΠX(n)
is continuously increasing in n for X ∈ {M,A,C}. This property follows immediately
for the centralized control regime X = C. For regimes X ∈ {M,A}, one can verify
that increasing capacity can be allocated into IC queues as in (3.35) without any
reduction in the capacity that serves rider demand.
(ii) piX(n) is decreasing in n with limn→∞ piX(n) = 0 for X ∈ {M,A,C}. Moreover, piX(·)
is continuous for X ∈ {M,C}, and is continuous for X = A if (3.46) is not satisfied.
This follows from (3.31), (C.14), (C.18) and Lemma C.2.
(iii) Let pi1(n), pi2(n) : R+ → R+ be candidate per-driver profit functions that are decreas-
ing in n (but may be discontinuous) with limn→∞ pii(n) = 0, i = 1, 2. Let n∗i be
defined as NF (pii(n
∗+
i )) ≤ n∗i ≤ NF (pii(n∗−i )) and pii(n∗i ) satisfies NF (pii(n∗i )) = n∗i if
n∗i is a discontinuity of pii(·). If pi1(n) ≤ pi2(n),∀n, then n∗1 ≤ n∗2 and pi1(n∗1) ≤ pi2(n∗2).
To see n∗1 ≤ n∗2, by definition of n∗1 and pi1(n) ≤ pi2(n), ∀n, we have
n∗1 ≤ NF (pi1(n∗−1 )) ≤ NF (pi2(n∗−1 )). (C.20)
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1 , by definition of n
∗
2 and (C.20) we have
n∗2 ≥ NF (pi2(n∗+2 )) ≥ NF (pi2(n∗−1 )) ≥ n∗1,
contradicting n∗2 < n∗1. Hence, it must be that n∗1 ≤ n∗2. It then follows from
NF (pii(n
∗
i )) = n
∗
i , i = 1, 2 that pi1(n
∗
1) ≤ pi2(n∗2).
With these three properties and Proposition 3.7, we are ready to prove the three parts in
this Proposition. Parts (2) and (3) follow from Property (ii), (iii) and Proposition 3.7 (2),
(3). The ranking of n∗X given by (3.55) and Property (i) imply that Π
∗
M ≤ Π∗C and Π∗A ≤ Π∗C
in Part (1). The only thing left to show is Π∗M ≤ Π∗A and we complete this considering
whether (3.46) holds.
If (3.46) is not satisfied, then Part (3) implies that n∗M ≤ n∗A and hence Π∗M ≤ Π∗A by
Property (i).
If (3.46) is satisfied, then piA(·) may be discontinuous in zone (3) of regime A. Consider
the value of n∗M and notice (C.14) and (C.18): In zone (1) or (4) (n
∗
M ≤ nM1 < nA1 or
n∗M ≥ nM3 = nA3 ), piM (n∗M ) = piA(n∗M ) and hence n∗A = n∗M , Π∗A = Π∗M ; in zone (2)
(nM1 < n
∗
M ≤ nM2 ), it is obvious that nM1 < n∗A since piA(n) = piM (n) for n ≤ nM1 ,
therefore Π∗M = ΠM (n
M













piA(n) > piM (n
∗













Therefore Π∗M ≤ Π∗A for any n∗M , and this completes the proof of Part (1).
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Using the expressions of piX(n) for X ∈ {M,A,C} in (3.31),
(C.14), (C.18), respectively, and Proposition 3.7 (3), we have
piA(n)

> piM (n) n ∈ (nM1 , nM3 ), (3.46) not satisfied
= piM (n) n ≤ nM1 or n ≥ nM3
, piC(n)





(1) For performance gains from admission control (control regime A over M), if n∗M ≤
nM1 or n
∗











3 and (3.46) is not satisfied, then
it must be n∗M < n
∗
A. To see this, (C.21) implies that piA(n
∗
M ) > piM (n
∗
M ), therefore
n∗M = NF (piM (n
∗
M )) < NF (piA(n
∗
M )). Since (3.46) is not satisfied, n
∗




from the monotonicity of piA(·) we deduce that n∗M < n∗A. As a result, Π∗M < Π∗A and
pi∗M < pi
∗
A following the proof of Proposition 3.8.
(2) For performance gains from centralized repositioning (control regime C over A) we
have a similar argument as the above proof of Part (1) and the details are omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.9. (1) According to Corollary 3.3, if (3.46) is not satisfied, the
platform revenue rate gain from admission control is positive only when n∗M ∈ (nM1 , nM3 ).
This yields
Π∗M ≥ ΠM (nM1 ) = γpnM1 , (C.22)
where the equality holds for n∗M ∈ (nM1 , nM2 ]. By Corollary 3.3, n∗M ∈ (nM1 , nM3 ) also implies




A ∈ (nM1 , nM3 ) since otherwise n∗M = n∗A and pi∗M = pi∗A. This yields
Π∗A ≤ ΠA(nM3 ) = ΠA(nA3 ) = γpS, (C.23)
where the equality is approached by n∗A → nM3 = nA3 .
Given that N ≥ nM3 = nA3 , n∗X = NF (piX(n∗X)) can take on values in [0, nM3 ] depending
on the choice of F (·), for X ∈ {M,A,C}. Consequently, the bounds in (C.22) and (C.23)

























A → γpS. (Refer to Figure C.1 (a) and (c) for an illustration.) This
holds for opportunity cost distributions F (·) satisfying
F−1(nM2 /N) = piM (n
M
2 ) and F




i.e., the value of F at piM (n
M
2 ) is fixed at n
M
2 /N (⇒ n∗M = nM2 ) and F grows sufficiently
fast to nM3 /N = n
A






+ (⇒ n∗A → nA3 = nM3 ); in words, there is a




(2) According to Corollary 3.3, the platform revenue rate gain from centralized reposi-
tioning is positive only when n∗A ∈ (nA1 , nA3 ). This yields
Π∗A ≥ ΠA(nA1 ) = γpnA1 , (C.24)
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where the equality holds for n∗A ∈ (nA1 , nA2 ]. By Corollary 3.3, n∗A ∈ (nA1 , nA3 ) also implies
that pi∗A < pi
∗
C . Thus, n
∗
C ∈ (nA1 , nA3 ), since otherwise n∗A = n∗C and pi∗A = pi∗C . This yields
Π∗C ≤ ΠC(nA3 ) = γpS, (C.25)
where the equality holds for n∗C ∈ [nC2 , nA3 ).
Given that N ≥ nM3 = nA3 , n∗X = NF (piX(n∗X)) can take on values in [0, nA3 ] depending
























To achieve this upper bound, we need n∗A ∈ (nA1 , nA2 ] and n∗C ∈ [nC2 , nA3 ) so that Π∗A = γpnA1
and Π∗C = γpS. Noticing Proposition 3.7 (2) and Property (ii) in the proof of Proposition 3.8
about piA(·), piC(·), this holds for opportunity cost distributions F (·) satisfying
F (piA(n
A
2 )) ≤ nA2 /N and F (piC(nC2 )) ≥ nC2 /N (C.26)
when piA(n
A
2 ) < piC(n
C
2 ). When piA(n
A
2 ) ≥ piC(nC2 ), (C.26) cannot be satisfied by any F and
hence the upper bound is not tight.
Proof of Proposition 3.10. Since piM (n) = piA(n) = piC(n) for n ≤ nM1 and n ≥ nM3 ,
the per-driver profit rate gain from admission control only (regime A over M) and from
admission control plus centralized repositioning (regime C over M) can be positive only for
n∗M ∈ (nM1 , nM3 ), and n∗A, n∗C ∈ (nM1 , nM3 ) simultaneously. It follows from the (decreasing)
monotonicity of piX(·), X ∈ {M,A,C} that












− 1 = 1− ρ2
τ − (1− ρ2 + τ)κ.
To achieve this upper bound, we need n∗M ∈ [nM2 , nM3 ) and n∗A, n∗C ∈ (nM1 , nA1 ] so that the
equalities in (C.27) are satisfied. If nM2 ≤ nA1 = nC1 , these conditions hold for F (·) satisfying
F (piM (n
M
2 )) ≥ nM2 /N and F (piA(nA1 )) ≤ nA1 /N. (C.28)








C.2.1 Supplemental Lemmas and Proofs for Control Regime A
Under regime A, the lower capacity threshold nA2 of zone (3)—moderate capacity with
repositioning—and the optimal capacity allocation within this zone, do not have explicit
expressions (see Proposition 3.4). Lemmas C.1 and C.2 fill in the remaining details.
Given a level of participating capacity n, Proposition 3.4 shows that the optimal capacity
allocation in zone (3) has r12 > 0, r21 = 0 and q = (q
∗
1(s), 0). Therefore, the constraints of







+ q∗1(s) = n (C.29)
and 0 ≤ s ≤ S, t12t21 s21 > s12. Note that s determines r12 by the second term and q by q∗1(s).
Lemma C.1 shows that there are three possible optimal capacity allocation patterns at
any level of participating capacity in zone (3). These patterns differ in terms of whether
demand is rejected at the low-demand location, and if so, for which route(s).
Lemma C.1. Under control regime A, the optimal capacity allocation of any fixed partici-
pating capacity n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ] (moderate capacity zone with repositioning) is determined by s
that takes one of the following 3 patterns with the largest service capacity, maxi∈{1,2,3} si(n):2
(1) No demand rejection at the low-demand location: only s21 is increasing in this zone.
s1(n) = (S11, S12, s21, S22) subject to (C.29), n ∈ (s1−1(nA1 ), nA3 ].
(2) Rejecting cross-traffic demand at the low-demand location: for small n, s21 is increas-
ing while s12 = 0; for large n, s21 = S21 and s12 is increasing.
s2(n) = (S11, s12, s21, S22) subject to (S21−s21)s12 = 0 and (C.29), n ∈ (s2−1(nA1 ), nA3 ].
2Note that si(n) denotes the total service capacity out of participating capacity n following pattern i,
and its inverse function si
−1(s) gives the required participating capacity for total service capacity s under
pattern i.
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(3) Rejecting local and cross-traffic demand at the low-demand location: for small n, s21 is
increasing while s11 = s12 = 0; for medium n, s21 = S21, s11 is increasing and s12 = 0;
for large n, s21 = S21, s11 = S11 and s12 is increasing.
s3(n) = (s11, s12, s21, S22) subject to (S21 − s21)s11 = (S11 − s11)s12 = 0
and (C.29), n ∈ (s3−1(nA1 ), nA3 ].
Proof. By Proposition 3.4, the optimal capacity allocation of given participating capacity
n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ] has r12 > 0, r21 = 0 and q = (q∗1(s), 0). Therefore, for fixed n, Problem A
reduces to maxs,r,q{Π(s) : (3.24)−(3.26), (3.35)}, and it can be reformulated as maximizing










+ q∗1(s) ≤ n (C.31)
0 ≤ sij ≤ Sij , ∀i, j. (C.32)
Note that g(s) is the total capacity expressed with respect to s. Relaxing the equality
constraint (3.25) to the inequality constraint (C.31) does not matter since positive q2 and
q1 = q
∗




s21 − s12 > 0 is omitted since a violation results in s21 ≤ t21t12S12 ⇒ s ≤ nA1 , clearly
suboptimal in zone (3).
To prove the lemma, we first establish that any optimal solution to problem (C.30)–
(C.32) for n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ] must satisfy the following four necessary conditions:
(a) All capacity is used within this zone and s21 has a lower bound:




≤ s21 ≤ S21. (C.34)
(b) Rejecting local demand at the high-demand location (s22) is suboptimal:
s22 = S22. (C.35)
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(c) Rejecting cross-traffic demand (s12) is more profitable than rejecting local demand (s11)
at the low-demand location:
(S11 − s11)s12 = 0. (C.36)
(d) Neither demand stream at the low-demand location is partially served unless s21 is fully
served:
s12(S12 − s12)(S21 − s21) = 0, (C.37)
s11(S11 − s11)(S21 − s21) = 0. (C.38)
We establish conditions (a)–(d) using the KKT conditions for the reformulated maxi-
mization problem (C.30)–(C.32). Before writing the KKT conditions, we first derive the first









































(s11(γ¯p− c) + s12γ¯p)s22 t12t21[
(s21 + s22)γ¯p−
(





]2 γ¯p > 1, (C.41)
∂g(s)
∂s22










]2 γ¯p < 1. (C.42)
For second partial derivatives, we do not need the ones involving s22. Fixing s22 and letting
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0 0 γ¯p





































where the last inequality is strict when s11 + s12 > 0.
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Let α, βij , βij be the dual variables associated with the capacity constraint (C.31), the




+ βij − βij = 1, ∀i, j, (C.44)
(complementary slackness) α(n− g(s)) = βij(Sij − sij) = βijsij = 0, ∀i, j, (C.45)
(dual feasibility) α, βij , βij ≥ 0, ∀i, j, (C.46)
(primal feasibility) g(s) ≤ n, (C.47)
(primal feasibility) 0 ≤ sij ≤ Sij , ∀i, j. (C.48)
The complementary slackness constraints (C.45) and dual feasibility constraints (C.46)
establish the relationship between primal and dual variables: βij = 0 (βij = 0) when sij
is not at its upper (lower) bound; sij must be at its upper (lower) bound when βij > 0
(β
ij
> 0); α = 0 when g(s) < n and g(s) = n when α > 0. Moreover, βij · βij = 0. We
omit explicit references to the primal and dual feasibility constraints (C.46)–(C.48) in the
following proof.
Now we are ready to prove the four conditions in this lemma.
(a) When s 6= S, pick any sij < Sij , then βij = 0 by (C.45). By (C.44) this implies that
α 6= 0 and hence g(s) = n by (C.45). When s = S, g(s) = n = nA3 . These prove (C.33).
For (C.34), s21 ≥ S12 t21t12 > 0 follows directly from s > nA1 in zone (3). By (C.45),
s21 > 0 also implies that β21 = 0.
(b) Using β
21
= 0 from part (a) and ∂g(s)∂s21 > 1, stationarity constraints (C.44) imply that
α < 1. Putting this and ∂g(s)∂s22 < 1 back to (C.44), we obtain β22 > 0. Therefore it
follows from (C.45) that s22 = S22 and β22 = 0.
(c) We prove this by contradiction using (C.44) and (C.45). Suppose on the contrary
(S11 − s11)s12 > 0 for some s11 < S11 and s12 > 0, then (C.45) require β11 = β12 = 0









+ β12 = 1.
This cannot happen due to ∂g(s)∂s11 <
∂g(s)
∂s12
and (C.46). Therefore we must have (S11 −
s11)s12 = 0.
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(d) We prove the two equations in similar ways by showing that any violation will lead to
suboptimality. For (C.37), suppose on the contrary s12(S12 − s12)(S21 − s21) > 0 for
some 0 < s12 < S12 and s21 < S21, then (C.45) and β21 = 0 from part (a) require








thus α > 0 and 1 < ∂g(s)∂s11 <
∂g(s)
∂s12
= ∂g(s)∂s21 . By the second derivatives in (C.43), increasing











Therefore we can keep increasing s12 (∆s12 > 0) and decreasing s21 (∆s21 < 0) simul-





















i.e., keep g(s) constant, while improving the objective function (service capacity) by






which follows from (C.49) and (C.50), until s12(S12 − s12)(S21 − s21) = 0 is satisfied.
Similarly, for (C.38), suppose on the contrary s11(S11 − s11)(S21 − s21) > 0 for some
0 < s11 < S11 and s21 < S21, then (C.45) and β21 = 0 from part (a) require β11 =
β
11








thus α > 0 and 1 < ∂g(s)∂s21 =
∂g(s)
∂s11
< ∂g(s)∂s12 . By the second derivatives in (C.43), increasing












Therefore we can keep increasing s21 (∆s21 > 0) and decreasing s11 (∆s11 < 0) simul-





















i.e., keep g(s) constant, while improving the objective function (service capacity) by






which follows from (C.51) and (C.52), until s11(S11 − s11)(S21 − s21) = 0 is satisfied.
It is then easy to verify that the necessary conditions (a)–(d) directly imply the three
patterns stated in Parts (1)–(3) of Lemma C.1. Note that for each pattern i, the service
capacity si(n) increases with n from n = si
−1(nA1 ), where s = nA1 is equal to the constant
service capacity in zone (2), and up to n = nA3 , the right end of zone (3). This also implies
that nA2 = mini{si−1(nA1 )}.
Next we prove the monotonicity of the per-driver profit rate with respect to n in zone
(3).
Lemma C.2. Per-driver profit rate under control regime A, piA(n), is decreasing in n for
n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ].
Proof. Lemma C.1 shows that for participating capacity n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ], the optimal ca-
pacity allocation may alternate among three patterns characterized by si(n), with ser-
vice capacity si(n) for i = 1, 2, 3. To prove this lemma, we show that the per-driver
profit rate given by (3.27) is decreasing for n varying within each of the 3 patterns or
at feasible transitions between patterns. First, note by (C.33) in the proof of Lemma C.1
that n = g(s) in zone (3) and hence ∂n/∂sij = ∂g(s)/∂sij . Then:
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(i) Within pattern (1): only s21 is increasing,
pi′(n) =
[














)−11 + S11(γ¯p− c) + S12γ¯p
(s21 + S22)γ¯p−
(







(ii) Within pattern (2): for small n, s21 is increasing while s12 = 0,
pi′(n) =
[














)−11 + S11(γ¯p− c)
(s21 + S22)γ¯p−
(














n− [(γ¯p− c)s− cr12]
n2
= 0. (C.55)
Note that pi(n) is continuous at the turning (non-differentiable) point where s =
(S11, 0, S21, S22).
(iii) Within pattern (3): for small n, s21 is increasing while s11 = s12 = 0,
pi′(n) =
[
























n− [(γ¯p− c)s− cr12]
n2
= 0. (C.57)
For large n, s21 = S21, s11 = S11 and s12 is increasing, we have the same (C.55).
Note that pi(n) is continuous at the two turning (non-differentiable) points where
s = (0, 0, S21, S22) and s = (S11, 0, S21, S22).
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As n increases, a feasible transition from pattern i to j at n must satisfy
si(n) = sj(n) and si
′(n−) < sj ′(n+). (C.58)
Namely, pattern i and j have the same service capacity at transition n, and the service
capacity increases faster after the transition. We then discuss all three possible transitions.
(i) Between pattern (1) and (2). If for pattern (2) s12 is increasing (or just reaches 0) at
the transition, there must be s1
′(n−) < s2′(n+) since otherwise
s1(n
A








′(n)dn = s2(nA3 ),
hence it must be a transition from pattern (1) to (2): (S11, S12, s21, S22)→
(S11, s12, S21, S22). Obviously r12 jumps up and pi(n) jumps down at the transition. If
for pattern (2) s21 is increasing at the transition, we have s1 = (S11, S12, s
(1)
21 , S22), s2 =
(S11, 0, s
(2)






















i.e., a transition from pattern (1) to (2): (S11, S12, s
(1)
21 , S22)→ (S11, 0, s(2)21 , S22). Sim-
ilarly we have pi(n) jumps down at the transition.
(ii) Between pattern (1) and (3). Due to similarities between pattern (2) and (3), the
cases where s12 or s21 is increasing under pattern (3) have been similarly shown above.
For the case where s11 is increasing (or just reaches 0) at the transition under pattern
(3), there must be s1
′(n−) < s3′(n+) since otherwise
s1(n
A












′(n)dn is an integration over n from n to s−13 ((S11, 0, S21, S22)) and from
s−13 ((S11, 0, S21, S22)) to n
A
3 . Therefore this must be a transition from pattern (1) to
(3): (S11, S12, s21, S22) → (s11, 0, S21, S22), obviously r12 jumps up and pi(n) jumps
down at the transition.
(iii) Between pattern (2) and (3). Similar to the analysis of the transitions between pat-
tern (1) and (2) where s11 ≡ S11 and we focus on s12 and s21, here s12 ≡ 0 at any
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transition between pattern (2) and (3) so that we can adopt the same approach by
focusing on s11 and s21. The details are omitted. Note that the transitions, if any,
are always from pattern (2) to (3).
Proof of Proposition 3.5. From Lemma C.1, it is optimal to reject rider requests at
the low-demand location for some n in zone (3) if and only if pattern (2) and/or (3)
provide the largest service capacity at some n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ), i.e., ∃n ∈ (nA2 , nA3 ) such that
s1(n) 6= maxi∈{1,2,3} si(n). We need to compare the three patterns in terms of their service
capacity si(n), i = 1, 2, 3. We have the following three observations.
(i) At the right end of zone (3), s1(n
A
3 ) = s2(n
A
3 ) = s3(n
A
3 ) = S.
(ii) For n close to nA3 (n→ nA−3 ), it follows from Lemma C.1 that pattern (1) has s1(n) =
(S11, S12, s21, S22) with s21 varying, while pattern (2) and (3) both have s2(n) =














































































i.e., s2(n) and s3(n) both increase linearly in n near n
A
3 .
(iii) The proof of Lemma C.2 establishes that any feasible pattern of transitions as n
increases in zone (3) must be from pattern (1) to (2), from pattern (1) to (3), or from
pattern (2) to (3)—not vice versa.
Using the above observations, the sufficient and necessary condition that patterns (2)




















3 ) > s1(n
A−
3 ), hence patterns (2) and (3) provide the largest service capacity near n
A
3 .





3 ) < s1(n
A−
3 ), i.e., pattern (1) is optimal near n
A
3 . It then follows from observation
(iii) that there is no transition from pattern (2) or (3) to pattern (1) as n increases in
zone (3), hence pattern (1) is optimal throughout zone (3). Therefore (C.59) is necessary
for patterns (2) and (3) to be optimal somewhere in zone (3). Putting in the derivative
expressions from the proof of Lemma C.1 and some algebraic manipulation will transform
(C.59) to inequality (3.46) in the Proposition.
C.2.2 Driver Supply and Actual Gains in Platform Revenue and
Per-Driver Profit
In this section we illustrate the impact of the driver supply characteristics, specifically,
the outside opportunity cost distribution F , on the actual platform revenue and per-driver
profit gains, compared to the upper bounds in Proposition 3.9 and 3.10, and on the tension
between the drivers’ and the platform’s gains. For simplicity we focus on the gains from
admission control, i.e., regime A over M . (Similar effects determine the actual gains from
repositioning.)
Figure C.1 illustrates these gains for two opportunity cost distributions. Panel (a)
presents a case where admission control yields large benefits for the platform as a result of
a large increase in driver participation, and consequently only small benefits for individual
drivers. Specifically, the top chart in panel (a) shows for the three control regimes the per-
driver profits that are non-increasing functions of the capacity, and the increasing marginal
opportunity cost function F−1 (n/N). Achieving the upper bound on platform revenue
gains from admission control requires two conditions, namely, n∗M = n
M
2 or equivalently,
F−1(nM2 /N) = piM (nM2 ), and n∗A = n
A
3 . The first condition holds in the example, the
second condition requires infinitely elastic supply around the profit level piM (n
M
2 ), i.e., that
F grows sufficiently fast around this point such that nA3 − nM2 additional drivers join if the





























































Figure C.1: Impact of admission control on the equilibrium capacity, per-driver profit, and
platform revenue (S = (3, 1, 4, 6), S = 14, N = 21, t = 1, γ = 0.25, p = 3, c = 0.45)
in Figure C.1 (a) shows how the upper bound can be approached if the supply increases
substantially for a moderate change in per-driver profit rate.
Panel (b), in contrast, presents a case where admission control (under regime A or
C) yields the maximum achievable per-driver profit gains as a result of a small increase in
driver participation, and consequently only modest platform revenue gains. As shown in the
top chart of panel (b), in this case the marginal opportunity cost function yields the same
equilibrium capacity under minimal control as in panel (a), i.e., F−1(nM2 /N) = piM (nM2 );
however, the driver supply is so inelastic that the number of drivers willing to participate at
the maximum profit rate (γp− c) is smaller than the minimum number required to serve all
riders without repositioning, that is, n∗A ≤ nA1 where F−1(n∗A/N) = γp− c. The platform’s
commission is too high to entice more drivers to participate.
199
Appendix D
Appendix for Chapter 4
D.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. By the definition of δu(t) in (4.4), (4.1) can be rewritten as
xt = min{ut, θ}+
∫ δu(t)
0
1(ut−s ≥ θ + s)ds. (D.1)
(i) If ut < θ, by Assumption 4.1 we have ut−s ≤ ut + s < θ + s, s ∈ [0, t], hence xt = ut
and δu(t) = 0.
(ii) If ut ≥ θ and t < u0−θ, by Assumption 4.1 we have ut−s ≥ u0−(t−s) > θ+s, s ∈ [0, t],
hence δu(t) = t and xt = θ +
∫ t
0 ds = θ + t.
(iii) If ut ≥ θ and t ≥ u0 − θ, then since ut−δu(t) ≥ θ + δu(t) by the definition of δu(t)
in (4.4), Assumption 4.1 implies ut−s ≥ ut−δu(t) − (δu(t) − s) ≥ θ + s, s ∈ [0, δu(t)].
Therefore xt = θ +
∫ δu(t)
0 ds = θ + δu(t).
These prove (4.2). Equation (4.3) follows from (4.2) noticing the value of δu(t) discussed
above.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. The first two cases in (4.5) is straightforward. Consider the
third case. Since ut ≥ θ and u0 ≤ θ + t, by the continuity of u there exists s ∈ [0, t] such
that ut−s = θ + s, hence δu(t) = max{0 ≤ s ≤ t : ut−s = θ + s} and ut−δu(t) = θ + δu(t). It
follows that
xt = θ + δu(t) = ut−δu(t), (D.2)














[t+ dt− δu(t+ dt)]− [t− δu(t)]





dt+ δu(t)− δu(t+ dt)
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where the last equality uses (D.2) and (D.3). Noticing the same limit term in the second






, if u˙t−δu(t) > −1.
If u˙t−δu(t) = −1, x˙t → −∞ does not exist. There is a downward jump of x at t.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Given tx ≥ (u0 − θ)+, (4.2) and (4.4) imply
xtx =

utx if 0 ≤ utx < θ
θ + δtx if ut ≥ θ
. (D.4)
Note that δtx = 0 and hence t
u = tx when utx < θ. Then xtx = utu follows directly from
the definition of δt in (4.4). Obviously dt
x = dtu when 0 ≤ ut < θ.










= 1 + u˙tu ≡ 1
1− x˙tx , (D.5)
where the second and last equalities use the third case in (4.5). If u˙tu = −1, xt is discon-
tinuous and jumps downward at tx, x˙tx does not exist, and dt
x = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. First, conditioning on whether ut < θ or if not, whether u˙t > −1 or
u˙t = −1, partition the interval [a, b] into consecutive intervals [c1, c2], [c2, c3], . . . , [cn−1, cn],
where c1 = a and cn = b. Let I
A = {i : 0 ≤ ut < θ for t ∈ [ci, ci+1]} IB = {i : ut ≥






























Next, calculate the integrals in the three rhs terms in (D.7). Note that it follows from the
definition of tu in (4.6) and the definition of δt in (4.4) that given any t
u ≥ 0, xtx = utu for
tx = tu + (utu − θ)+.
(1) For the integrals in the first rhs term in (D.7), 0 ≤ ut < θ implies dtxdtu = 1 by Lemma













f(x)dx, i ∈ IA,
where the second equality follows from uci < θ, ∀i ∈ IA.
(2) For the integrals in the second rhs term in (D.7), ut ≥ θ and u˙t > −1 imply (4.7) by



































where the last equality uses uci ≥ θ, ∀i ∈ IB.
(3) For the integrals in the third rhs term in (D.7), ut ≥ θ and u˙t = −1 imply discontin-
uous xt at t

















where the last equality uses ci+ (uci − θ)+ = ci+1 + (uci+1 − θ)+ and uci ≥ θ, ∀i ∈ IC .
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Last, since all integrals calculated above take the same form, the decomposed integration
(D.7) yields the desired (4.8).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Condition on the choice of u0, ut and xt can be written out
immediately and hence simplify the problem. If u0 ≥ θ, then ut = min{u0, θ + T − t} and
xt = min{θ + t, u0} for t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that ut and xt take symmetric values for t ∈ [0, T ],





G(u0)u0[T − (u0 − θ)] +
∫ u0
θ
((p(u)− w(u0))− (p0 − w0))udu
}
. (D.8)




Therefore the optimal u∗0 maximizes (D.8) and (D.9), which is given by (4.22).








































where the second equality follows from uT ≤ θ and the fourth equality can be obtained
by conditioning on u0 < θ or u0 ≥ θ and noticing that xt = θ + t for t ∈ [0, u0 − θ] if





{[p(xt)xt − w(ut)ut]− (p0 − w0)ut} dt = φ
∫ T
0













s.t. 0 ≤ xt ≤ θ + t, t ∈ [0, T ].
Since the problem is equivalent to φ
∫ T
0 max0≤xt≤θ+tG(xt)xtdt, the optimal solution is given
by
x∗t = arg max
0≤x≤θ+t
G(x)x, t ∈ [0, T ]. (D.11)
We can hence derive u∗t from (4.3) as in (4.27).
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4.3, we have
∫ T
0 utdt =∫ T












− (p0 − w0)xt
}
dt
s.t. 0 ≤ xt ≤ θ + t, t ∈ [0, T ].







the optimal solution is given by
x∗t = arg max
0≤x≤θ+t
Gp(x)x, t ∈ [0, T ]. (D.13)
We can hence derive u∗t from (4.3) as in (4.31).












































































Note that for x′ → x∗+,





























where the second equality follows from the definition of x∗. Therefore for finite expected
shock duration T¯ <∞, Π′(x∗) = 0 and Π′′(x∗) > 0 imply the existence of x′ > x∗ such that
Π(x′) > 0. When T¯ = ∞, both first and second derivatives are 0 but Lemma 4.4 shows
Π(x′) < 0 for x′ > x∗.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Under the same control ut, t ≥ 0, the change in platform’s





















































where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.5. Notice that the bracket part in the first
term in (D.19) is negative at t = 0 and positive at t = u0−θ, and the second term in (D.19)
is positive. It hence follows that ∆(u0) > 0 when T¯ →∞ and ∆(u0) ≤ 0 when T¯ → 0. We
thus have the conclusion.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. (Sketch) Let W (τ0) = φET∼exp(1/T¯ ) Eq.(4.47) denote the plat-
form’s expected wage payment to repositioning drivers. We can show W ′(0) < 0, W ′(∞) >
0 and W ′′(τ0) > 0 (DETAILS), hence there exits a unique minimizer τ∗0 at which W ′(τ∗0 ) =
0.
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